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Abstract 
 
The religion versus modernity dichotomy has become a platitude which is taken for 
granted by many researchers in the field of sociology of modernity. The dichotomy 
is the theoretical foundation of many violent ideologies, both religious and atheist. 
This thesis challenges the dichotomy and its variants – such as reason versus faith 
or ‘the sacred’ versus ‘the secular’ – as the results of the misreading of the history of 
the constitution of modernity. Modernity is historically shaped by and structurally 
intertwined with theology and sociologists’ need to reveal those theological forgotten 
roots and hidden structures. This is the first goal of the thesis which begins with the 
search for the theological roots of modern atheisms. Showing the theological 
unconscious of the modern atheist discourses will let us to see two sides of modern 
Prometheanism: The first side, which is well-known, is about the rebellion against 
the transcendental and considering the transcendental as the projection of the 
human mind into the sky. The point is that there can never be an overwhelming 
consensus about either this Promethean description of the origins of religion or 
another description of man being the projection of God on earth. We, nevertheless, 
are living in a society which contains both of those options and a lot more alternative 
possibilities in between. So, while we cannot reach an overlapping consensus about 
the principles, we can pragmatically engage in the process of self-formation through 
co-practice. The argument is that the desire of self-formation, self-creation and self-
actualisation is the second side of Prometheanism which will prepare us with a 
framework for co-practice.  
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Introduction 
 
The background line of reasoning of this thesis is a pragmatist one 
that adheres to the suggestion that there is no a priori principle which can 
guide our actions all the way from the beginning to end. Principles instead 
appear through the process of practice. Yet, those newly emerged 
principles are hardly created ex nihilo. They are the revised versions and 
re-written forms of the already existed formulas. 
One might choose several strategies to show the centrality of 
practice. For instance, one can, following Rorty, argue for the lack of such 
a priori and universally true principles or alternatively, dispute the 
existence of a truth-tracking faculty inside all human beings (Rorty, 1982). 
Another strategy, following Bernstein, could be to show the creativeness 
of praxis (Bernstein, 1972; 2010). Yet, another intellectual strategy would 
be to argue for the historicity of the current options of belief and unbelief. 
Taylor and Joas adopted the last way and I would like to define my thesis 
in this line as well (Taylor, 2007; Joas, 2014). I accordingly would limit my 
research to deal with only one of the current options which is atheism. I 
want to put forward a hypothesis that a discourse shift is happening in 
modern atheism which contains positive implications that goes beyond 
modern unbelief. That is, the emergence of a new form of atheism which 
(unlike Charles Taylor’s suggestion) does not define itself as a form of 
17 
 
overcoming religion and challenging the idea of God. It rather would 
challenge the very dichotomy of believer versus unbeliever and replace it 
with an analytically different dichotomy, of trained versus untrained. In 
extending the argument for the second dichotomy, Peter Sloterdijk’s 
suggestion was to utilise anthropotechnics, which were nourished in a 
religious context for several centuries, and not to merely reject them 
under the category of a critique of religion.  
In other words, this thesis adopts a twofold mission of showing the 
historicity of modern atheism and also the new possibilities which have 
emerged as a result of the stated shift in discourse. So, I will put all forms 
of modern atheism under the category of modern Prometheanism. That 
is, a theologically motivated process of the attribution of the powers of a 
Christian God to human beings. That was a process of gradually denying 
the existence of a creator and at the same time emphasising the creative 
powers of human beings. Prometheanism, arguably, contains two 
aspects. The first aspect is the well-known rebellion against God. That is 
rejecting God’s existence and accordingly the truth-fullness of religious 
claims. The second less acknowledged aspect, though, is the idea of self-
creation through mimicking God. Thus, Prometheanism is not all about 
the negative task of unmasking religion but also the positive task of self-
formation, self-creation, and training.  
The point is that the most recent aspect of Prometheanism, the 
importance of which increasingly appears in the works of particularly 
continental philosophers (such as Vattimo, Žižek, Sloterdijk etc.), can 
serve as a platform of co-practice of both believers and non-believers. 
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The public sphere cannot be totally occupied with varieties of truth-claims 
from either side without any serious dialogue and overlapping consensus. 
The pragmatist suggestion would be that consensus is not the result of a 
mere quarrel between different arguments and truth-claims. Rather, it 
needs to be created as a result of co-practice in a common battlefield. So, 
one cannot expect any lasting solution to be found as a result of a 
dialogue which is limited to the very intellectual side of different belief 
systems. The fact is that the acts of social agents are not solely (or even 
primarily) constituted as a result of a belief in a set of doctrines. So even 
if we are able to find an interesting intellectual solution to the 
disagreements, it is unlikely that they are going to be effective in real life 
unless they are accompanied with practice. One instead can expect that 
entering the public sphere merely with a truth-claim will only cause the 
deepening of the existing divisions. Alternatively, however, solutions 
might be created as a result of co-practice in a common struggle and in a 
shared battlefield (Žižek, 2012). One cannot anticipate the final form and 
shape of the solution because they cannot be foreseen through a 
universally valid principle. So the other option would be to focus on co-
practice not merely on unmasking the claims of the others.  
So, the suggestion is that the task of unmasking which is not 
followed by a subsequent proposal for a co-practice would be unfinished. 
In a way, and according to Sloterdijk who is central to this thesis, this was 
an original mistake of the founders of the Enlightenment. So, an over-
emphasis on the unmasking religious claims and revealing the errors of 
the religious people who hijacked the creative process of dialogue 
19 
 
created an antagonised environment. The parallel strategy of the 
Enlighteners was to envisage an ideal sphere of neutrality which would let 
all the sides express their viewpoints with freedom.  The secular (as a 
modern epistemic category) was going to represent that neutrality 
(Calhoun, 2012; Milbank, 2013). Thus, one could imagine that religions 
and ideologies are filled with dogmas and irrational beliefs, so it would be 
impossible to find any overlapping consensus through a mere dialogue of 
religions. The secular would supposedly present us a neutral sphere of 
dialogue which is based on reason and rationality. This, in fact, was a 
clever suggestion, and against which is difficult to argue. In the last part 
of the thesis, I will define post-secularism as the embodiment of the 
hesitation about the possibility of that alleged neutrality. Thus, post-
secularism, for philosophers such as Taylor, can be considered as a 
critique of ‘subtraction stories’. Those are the secular stories which 
assume that ‘religious illusions’ are there to distort reality. Thus when we 
get rid of them, we will be able to see ‘reality’ as such. The main way to 
challenge these subtraction stories is by showing the historical 
construction of the idea of the secular as the neutral. The ideas of 
neutrality and secularity have been historically constituted as responses 
to particular political necessities after the Confessional Wars. Nowadays, 
secularity can also emerge in a plurality of social versions in different 
countries. For example, the secular as the neutral in France means the 
ban of religious appearance in the public while in India it is translated as 
the equal subsidising of all religions by the government. Thus, ironically, 
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the secular as the neutral is also subject to interpretations (Calhoun, 
2012: p. 337).  
On the believers’ side, there was a subsequent strategic tool which 
connected the loss of faith to the decline of morality. That is, a ‘reverse 
subtraction story’ which claims that a society without religious teachings 
will necessarily be a less moral society. As Joas argued, this is also a 
myth-in-trouble. In fact, sociological studies do not show any meaningful 
difference between religious and irreligious societies in terms of their 
commitment to morality (Zuckerman, 2008; Joas, 2014). Yet, this 
strategic tool at the hands of the believers is another barrier for co-
practice in a society which increasingly hosts varieties of belief and 
unbelief options. 
In the first part of the thesis, I will try to ‘unmask’ the theological 
unconscious of modern forms of atheism. However, this is not done 
simply as a favour to the religious side, but as an attempt to make two 
points: firstly, to illustrate the historicity of atheism and challenging the 
subtraction stories which pretend that atheism is not a mere belief system 
along with others, but that it is the ‘logical’ result of overcoming long-
standing illusions. The critique of neutrality-claims and other self-
congratulatory subtraction stories is for the benefit of ‘unbelief’ as well. It 
will let the non-believers enter into a meaningful dialogue without the 
assistance of the authority of an imagined neutrality (Taylor, 2010: p. 
406). Secondly, it will help us to appreciate the more interesting and 
productive side of modern Prometheanism which is an invitation to self-
formation. My core argument is this: the Promethean demand of self-
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formation presupposes a conception of human flourishing which is 
detached from transcendental beings (what Charles Taylor called ‘a 
closed reading of the immanent frame’). But since it contains co-practice, 
co-working and co-training, it can easily be stretched to include believers. 
So the co-practice of believers and non-believers which will lead to new 
possibilities and unforeseeable horizons is emerging inside modern 
Prometheanism. In a way, I am welcoming the emergence of what I will 
call ‘tourist atheism’ and I assume that its underlying idea of self-creation 
can work as a common ground for co-practice.  
Positing modernity and religion as incompatible has become a 
platitude amongst the sociology textbook writers. For a long time the 
standard definition of modernity has been progress from the religious past 
towards a secular future without religion as a determining factor. 
Historically, this dichotomy has been devised as a conceptual tool for 
establishing modernity’s self-definition and its alleged autonomy. Even 
many religious people accepted that opposition as the true reading of the 
history of modernity. However, recently, following sociological hesitations 
about the old versions of the secularisation theories, it has been shown 
that the foregoing distinction is a false duality. Religion has survived to 
modern times and as one of the most important forces has always made 
contributions to societies. Even more notably, recently the social sciences 
have experienced a gestalt-switch, or as Peter Berger called it an ‘aha! 
experience,’ which tells us that: “the world today, with some exceptions 
[…] is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so 
than ever” (Berger, 1999: p. 2). This constitutes one of the earliest steps 
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toward challenging the above-mentioned platitude. The second step, it 
can be argued, has been taken outside the social sciences, and mostly in 
the departments of theology and history of science. This latter step 
concerns types of theories which not only considers the survival of 
religion in the modern age, but also recognises the constitutive role of 
religion. That is to say, modernity itself has emerged in the first place as 
the by-product of some theological shifts within Christianity of the Middle 
Ages’. The fundamental argument of these series of theories about the 
structural dependence of modernity on religion has caused a shift in the 
modernity studies of our time. When John Milbank, Michael Allen 
Gillespie and Brad Gregory talk about the theological ‘roots’ of modernity, 
they do not only mean the ‘historical origins’, but also a kind of ‘structural 
affinity’. After this second aha! experience every year an increasing 
number of researchers scrutinise the aspects of this dependence (see: 
Funkenstein, 1989; Milbank, 2006; Brague, 2007; Gillespie, 2008; Fuller, 
2011; Gregory, 2012). This thesis is a contribution to those theories, with 
the goal of extending that wave to the social sciences. One of the 
motivations behind this project is to show that religion and modernity are 
inextricably intertwined; thus the dichotomy of ‘reason based modernity’ 
versus ‘faith based religion’ is not valid any more. Arguably, this will 
cause a vast reformulation of our current understanding of the modern.  
I need to define the concept of atheism from the outset. The 
meaning of this concept is not as clear and transparent as is often 
assumed. In fact, historically speaking, calling oneself an ‘atheist’ with a 
positive connotation is a very recent phenomenon. In premodern times, 
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atheism was normally a kind of accusation used to discredit someone. 
For instance, in ancient Greece Socrates was accused of corrupting the 
minds of youth with his atheism – an accusation rejected by Socrates. 
Strangely enough, some of the first Christian apologists were also 
accused of being atheists by pagans. Justine Martyr (100-165 AD) was 
one such example, and in response he approved of the accusation by 
saying that “we are [atheists] in relation to what you consider gods, but 
are most certainly not in relation to the Most True God” (qtd. in McGrath, 
2004: p. 8). In addition, at the end of Middle Ages, Viret – a close 
colleague of Calvin – used to refer to deists of his age as atheists (Betts, 
1984, p. 6). There is a common link between all these cases: Socrates, 
the first fathers of Christianity, and deists used not to worship the publicly 
accepted deities. That is to say, they were reforming or denying the 
official religion of society but only replacing it with a new sort of deity. So, 
the term ‘atheism’ had a negative connotation. It meant that one does not 
conform to socially accepted religious rules, whether there is a place for 
God in his or her new heretical belief system or not. Atheism with its new, 
positive connotation was first used during the eighteenth century by 
figures such as David Hume (1711-1776). But it attained public attention 
after the debates between theologians and scientists following the 
publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859). The theory of 
evolution was not coherent with the literal reading of some parts of the 
bible, specifically in the case of the age of the earth. That conflict 
deepened as a result of the efforts of some textbook writers who tried to 
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project the conflict between science and religion on to the whole of pre-
Darwinian history (Armstrong, 2009: p. 259).  
In recent decades, scientifically motivated atheism has been 
revived in the works of so-called New Atheists that includes four writers: 
Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens. 
These hard-line defenders of atheism, and writers of some of the best-
selling books in recent decades, have tried to publicise the idea of 
atheism as a modern, scientifically supported ideology which is not only 
true but has an inherent mission to show the falsity of religious points of 
view. They have mostly based their arguments on Darwinism: Dennett, 
famously, called evolutionary theory a ‘universal acid’ which ultimately 
erodes all superstitious and religious beliefs (Dennett, 1995). The 
popularity of New Atheism heightened after 9/11, becoming a type of 
zeitgeist resulting from the renewed interest in religion and its effects on 
modern society. This zeitgeist has largely subsided in the past few years 
and subsequently the popularity of New Atheists has declined. The first 
claim of this study is that a new type of atheism has recently emerged 
which is totally different from New Atheism. Accordingly, in the second 
chapter, following Bauman’s division, I will define two types of modern 
atheisms: pilgrim atheism and tourist atheism. With the pilgrim metaphor, 
I mean that the New Atheists’ type of atheism is about the clear-cut 
boundaries between science and religion, reason and revelation and truth 
and falsehood; this is similar to a pilgrimage which is about a journey 
from the land of darkness toward the realm of light. That is to say, 
pilgrimage is always about a certain true goal and definite methods of 
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reaching it through some specific rituals. The tourism metaphor, 
conversely, is about searching for internal pleasure. So, unlike the 
pilgrim’s obsession with one certain destination, a tourist can have fun in 
several places and none of them is considered to be an ‘authentic’ 
destination. Thus, it is a way of playing with different narratives of ‘truth’, 
not a journey to find the truth. Accordingly, tourist atheism has two major 
figures which otherwise have nothing in common: the German 
philosopher, Peter Sloterdijk and the Slovenian leftist philosopher, Slavoj 
Žižek.1 One might dare to include the popular writer of this new type of 
atheism, Alain de Botton, specifically referring to his best seller Religion 
for Atheists (2012). The common point between these thinkers and 
writers is a sort of deconstruction of religion, and approaching it not as 
superstition but as part of our cultural heritage. Thus, even an atheist can 
be religious in terms of taking advantage of religion. Correspondingly, 
Žižek published a manifesto of his attempts to establish an ‘atheist 
theology’ (Žižek, 2009) and Sloterdijk, controversially, asserted that 
religions have never existed. What do exist are only “misinterpreted 
anthropotechnic practice systems” (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 84). de Botton, 
for his part, talked about a project called ‘atheism 2.0’ which tries to 
borrow a secular version of some rituals and sentiments from religions for 
the sake of an atheistic well-being. Ipso facto, we might wonder whether 
a transition is taking place from the paradigm of pilgrim atheism to the 
paradigm of tourist atheism. What is certain now is that the tourist atheist 
movement has been emerging since the beginning of the second decade 
                                                          
1
 I write about Sloterdijk in chapter six along with Hans Blumenberg (who can also be 
cautiously added to this group). The discussion concerning Žižek’s point of view is in 
chapter eight.  
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of the twenty-first century. I will explain the details of tourist atheists’ 
projects in the third part of this research. All in all, to clarify my usage of 
this term, and to limit the scope of the study, in this research when we are 
talking about modern atheisms we mean these two contemporary types 
of pilgrim and tourist atheisms in the West.  
After this conceptual clarification, let us return to the 
aforementioned ‘unsettling question’ about the theological roots of 
modern atheisms. The second claim of this study is that modern atheisms 
are rooted in some Christian theological doctrines that used to consider 
man as a being that was created in the image and likeness of God. There 
is a verse in the Book of Genesis which says: “So God created man in 
His own image, in the image of God created him” (1:27). In terms of the 
historical consequences of its interpretations, this is probably the most 
significant verse in the whole of the scriptures of the Abrahamic religions. 
The story of the evolution of interpretations of this verse starts with Saint 
Augustine (354-430) who found the divine element of human beings 
crucial to man’s integrity while approaching different inner temptations 
and external forces. This doctrine, which has been known as the imago 
dei doctrine, became one of the most significant Christian doctrines in 
terms of defining the relationship between God and man. In the scholastic 
tradition, too, this doctrine was at the centre of the discussion between 
the Middle Age philosophers. Arguably, the most revolutionary 
interpretation of this doctrine belongs to Duns Scotus, one of the leading 
figures of the nominalist movement in the fourteenth century. Scotus and 
his followers interpreted this doctrine univocally. That means they 
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considered it not analogically but literally – i.e. they believed that 
humankind had been created in the image of God and thus God’s 
attributes also applied to people. In this understanding, for example, if 
God is powerful, it means that we, God-like creatures, are also powerful 
in the same sense. The only difference is that His power is unlimited 
whereas our power is restricted to the borders of our body, place, time 
and so on. The founding fathers of ‘the scientific revolution’ also believed 
in this doctrine – specifically, Newton. They have interpreted this doctrine 
in a new way. That is to say, if we are created in the image of God, this 
means that there is an existential overlap between the divine mind and 
the human mind. This was a kind of theological precedence for Kant’s 
concept of a priori knowledge as a potentiality of grasping the basic 
features of reality (Fuller and Lipinska, 2014: p. 47). In any case, 
historians and philosophers of science have shown how this kind of 
conception of the existential overlap between God and man has 
constituted the modern scientific ethos, and through that the modern 
world (Funkenstein, 1989; Gillespie, 2008; Fuller, 2007, 2010 and 2011). I 
employ the fundamental thesis of these intellectual projects by searching 
for such a foundation for the modern pilgrim and tourist atheisms. I will 
argue that the two aforementioned types of modern atheisms are 
extensions of two Scotist doctrines: respectively, the doctrine of the 
primacy of the will and the doctrine of haecceitas (haecceity or 
individuation). On the one hand, according to the first doctrine we are 
created in the image and likeness of God in terms of gaining God-like 
objective knowledge. On the other hand, haecceitas is about being 
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created in the image of God by being an autonomous individual like Him. 
So when we apply our individual rights and follow our egoistic wishes we 
reproduce God’s main feature of singularity (or subjectivity). Thus, there 
are two ways of playing God: the pilgrim way of reproducing God’s 
objective knowledge and the tourist way of mimicking God’s singularity.  
We can put both these versions of atheism under the category of 
‘Prometheanism’ – the modern atheistic conception of God as the by-
product of man’s psyche or society. That is to say, it is not God that 
created man, but conversely, man has created God. Viewed in that light, 
Prometheanism is the common premise of modern atheisms from 
Feuerbach and Marx to Dawkins and de Botton. It is necessary to justify 
Prometheus as a suitable metaphor for modern atheisms, but before 
doing so, we need to recall that metaphors, by nature, involve the 
descriptions of one thing in terms of something else. Particularly, today 
scientists use metaphors to simplify scientific ideas for non-scientists. For 
example, describing DNA as a ‘map’ gives a visible and positive face to 
an otherwise nucleic acid which is just a part of all living organisms. Using 
metaphor, scientists can direct the public’s attention towards a ‘map’ that 
tell us a lot about life. But the downside of using metaphors is that, as 
mere contracts or artefacts, they necessarily conceal parts of reality 
(Evenden, 2014: p. 37). The same is true for the ‘Prometheus metaphor’ 
which brings a number of positive and negative meanings to mind. Thus, 
we need to make clear the limited meaning of this metaphor as it will be 
used in this study. For us, Prometheus the fire thief is the symbol of both 
rage against God for the sake of providing human beings with material 
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(however purposeless) progress and the demand of self-creation through 
mimicking God. Probably the best description of this type of reading of 
the myth is in Goethe’s short poem Prometheus (1785) in which was 
mixed the pagan and Christian definitions of God. Thus, one can replace 
Zeus with God and Prometheus with a damned angel (not only another 
Titan). In the poem Prometheus as a rebellious angel subjected Zeus to a 
monologue on his hatred of the divine. The poem ends: “Here I sit, 
forming humans, in my image; a people to be like me, to suffer, to weep, 
to enjoy and to delight themselves, and to not attend to you -- as I”. This 
clearly exemplifies what we mean by the goal of modern atheisms: the 
intentional hostility towards, and detachment from, the divine for the sake 
of making earthly progress. This is probably different from the way Mary 
Shelley (1797-1851) used the Prometheus metaphor and is closer to the 
traditionalists’ usage of the term. Hossein Nasr, the famous traditionalist, 
placed the pontifical man against the Promethean man. Considering man 
as the pontiff or the bridge between heaven and earth is the traditional 
religious view of man as khalifatallah or ‘the representative of God on 
earth’ to use the Islamic term. Therefore, the “Pontifical man is aware of 
his role as intermediary between Heaven and earth” (Nasr, 1989: p. 145), 
while the Promethean man rejects that role and seeks independence 
from the divine. This paradox of the rejection of, and simultaneously, 
dependence on the divine is the element that I have abstracted from the 
myth of Prometheus.   
Before going through the details of the abovementioned 
discussions, we need to respond clearly to one of the common 
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accusations concerning the type of theories in question – known as the 
genetic fallacy accusation. The simple form of this accusation is as 
follows: even if religion historically constituted modernity, this does not 
mean that it is still theoretically relevant. In responding to this we need to 
remember that the genetic fallacy states that “the origins do not 
necessarily determine the current state”. One common mistake is to read 
“not necessarily” as “necessarily not”. In other words, our claim is that the 
theological roots of modernity are still theoretically relevant. But the 
fallacy is a formal, logical point which indicatively neither rejects (nor 
approves) that claim. Thus, to reject a claim which has been based on the 
historico-sociological facts, we need the counter historico-sociological 
facts, not a formal, logical point. Moreover, the claim of this study is not 
that the modern world is religious but that religion and modernity – either 
analytically or historically – are not necessarily contradictory.  
Finally, I need to review briefly the structure of the thesis. This 
thesis contains three parts and ten chapters. I will start with the 
theoretical framework of the research in part one. In chapter one, a 
historical narrative of the emergence of modern Prometheanism will be 
reviewed, and in chapter two, I will explain the division between pilgrim 
and tourist atheisms. Following that, a pincer movement strategy is 
required to go through the details about these two types of atheisms. 
Thus, the basic question which is going to be addressed in the second 
part: how atheists interpreted religion. Lastly, the final part of the thesis is 
dedicated to the idea of going beyond Prometheanism through co-
practice. There I will put forward a synthesis of two theses; one by 
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Sloterdijk in his ground-breaking You Must Change Your Life (2013) and 
the other by Rorty in his classic essay; The Priority of Democracy to 
Philosophy (2008). I will call the synthesis the primacy of training over 
truth which summarises the core argument of this thesis: one does not 
need to go to the public sphere, merely with his or her truth-claims. We 
can pragmatically give priority to creative co-practice in a common 
struggle to be able to cope with crises of the modern age. 
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Part One 
Prometheanism 
 
Prometheanism is a neologism for the modern atheistic conception of the 
relationship between man and God. According to this conception, God is 
created by man. This is the inversion of the theistic conception of the 
relationship between man and God. In the first chapter of part one, 
through a historical survey I will show that modern atheisms are products 
of a significant paradigm-shift at the end of the Middle Ages’ 
scholasticism: the shift from Thomism to Scotism. Reviewing the 
evolution of the Promethean man, I will focus on three historical turning 
points from the fourteenth century to today. Three figures represent those 
turning points which are respectively Duns Scotus, René Descartes and 
Ludwig Feuerbach. In the second chapter, I will put forward a typology of 
modern atheisms – pilgrim atheism versus tourist atheism – which I think 
is more comprehensive than the other typologies. Finally in chapter three, 
I will argue that the modern Promethean unbelief, contains two sides; 
rebellion against the transcendental and self-creation through mimicking 
the transcendental. However one might tend to reject the rebellion side of 
Prometheanism but he or she could be agreeing with the analytically 
different self-creation side. Moreover, this recognition and acceptance 
could open up a space for co-practice of believers and nonbelievers.  
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Chapter One 
Scotist Mentality and Promethean Modernity 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter describes a theologically rooted image of the world 
which was constituted during the late Middle Ages. That revolutionary 
image, which inverted scholasticism, altered the traditional conception of 
the relationship between man and God and gave birth to the modern 
Promethean man. This type of man evolved along with the advancement 
of modernity. The last chain in the evolution of the Prometheanism, in our 
time, is modern atheism. So, first, in this chapter, we need to clarify what 
is intended by the term ‘Promethean man’, and then we can delve into the 
notion of modern atheism in the next chapter. My focus will be on the 
changing images of the relationship between man and God in the history 
of Christianity from the age of Jesus to our time. Since the intention of 
this research is not a wide historical survey, I chose three main turning 
points in that process; Duns Scotus, René Descartes and Ludwig 
Feuerbach are the main figures of these three phases respectively.  
The fundamental argument of this chapter is that some 
characteristics of the Christian God during the late Middle Ages were 
attributed to man. This transmission of God’s properties to man found its 
substantial inception in the nominalist narrative with figures like Duns 
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Scotus (1265-1308) and William of Ockham (1287-1347). That narrative 
in fact has sowed the very seeds of the modern Promethean man. 
Modern atheism was the extreme point of that spectrum in which (as 
Feuerbach stated) man became the creator of God. That is, the creation 
became the creator. The basic question of this chapter, thus, will be: how 
did God become the debtor of man? Or, to put it in our terms: how has 
this Promethean image of man been constituted?  
2. Three stages of the evolution of modern Promethean man 
The modern Western Promethean man has been shaped in three 
main stages. Those three levels indicate changing modes of relationship 
between God and man. In the first stage, the relationship between God 
and man, which was considered an equivocal bond in the Thomisitc 
narration, transformed into the univocal one. In the same vein man 
became a godlike creation who is totally different from the transcendental 
God but in degree not in kind. In the second stage, God became 
detached from the world; he was still the creator but he was not a 
constant intervener in the destiny of man. This level was started by René 
Descartes’ famous cogito. By this statement, Descartes founded faith in 
God not on His grace but on man’s autonomous subject. The 
Enlightenment idea of ‘God the clockmaker’ also appeared in this level. 
But the peak of this stage was the establishment of ‘deism’ during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The idea of inner-worldly progress 
emerged in this level as a secular version of the Christian doctrine of 
providence. Finally, the last stage was started by Ludwig Feuerbach’s 
assertion about God. He believed that God is the product of the projection 
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of man’s mind into the sky. This was an end to the relationship between 
man and God through the elimination of one side, and was also the 
beginning of modern atheism with the specific characteristic of conceiving 
of God as the creation of man. In the next chapter I will deal with two 
types of recent modern atheisms and how they are constituted. But for 
now, the emergence of the modern Promethean man in its theological 
context will be the subject of the present chapter. 
3. Modern man: tormented God or godlike creature? 
Jesus Christ was a hybrid entity. He was considered to be ‘the Son 
of God’ and ‘the Son of Man’ at the same time. That was an 
unprecedented place that he shared with no other prophet. A hybrid entity 
like Christ could be tortured and crucified. But still his soul was a Godly 
one. Christ’s physical pains (like the pains of the Jews in their miserable 
situation after the Roman destruction of Jerusalem in 66 AD) were real. 
But, nonetheless, one could keep hoping by trusting in the God side of 
the soul. This side caused relief for Jesus through resurrection and 
eternal salvation. In him, thus, God and man were united in one body at 
least once. Then ‘Jesus’ became ‘Christ’. In Christ, the transcendental 
God simultaneously became immanent. Or, God became the ‘absolute 
fragile’ (Žižek, 2000). That is the absolute and infinite God incarnated in a 
body which is fragile in terms of its finite nature. This inconsistent 
combination did not remain limited to the figure of Christ. The Christian 
belief that man, as the high-grade creature, is created in the image and 
likeness of God was the basis of the imago dei doctrine which was first 
used by Augustine (MacIntyre, 2009: p. 26). But it found a central locus in 
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the fourteenth century nominalist tradition (Fuller, 2011: p. 79; 
Funkenstein, 1986). With the mediation of some late Middle Ages 
scholastic narrations, thus, a hybrid definition of Christ expanded to 
humanity as a whole. Man was assumed to be an animal with the 
potentiality to possess godlike powers. Those theological narrations 
(about which I will write in the next sections) constituted the metaphysical 
framework for the emergence of modern humanity and modern 
Prometheus.  
3-1. The nominalist poetic revolution and the metaphysical 
framework of modern humanity 
The nominalist foundation of the modern conception of humanity 
has been, recently, the centre of many discussions. In his Humanity 2.0 
(2011), Fuller puts forward a theory that he has named the theory of 
mendicant modernities – which is of help to our discussion about the 
metaphysical framework of the emergence of modern man. The central 
insight of the theory is that humanity in the West has been the site of a 
‘bipolar disorder’. That is, humanity has been a changing concept which 
was, from time to time, moving on the continuum of being. Two extreme 
poles of that continuum are God and animal. This remark attests to the 
point at issue: “Western theology poses the question of humanity in terms 
of whether we are more like gods or apes” (Fuller, 2011: p. 78).  The 
starting point of this continuum is, as I wrote above, the very hybrid 
nature of Christ. But this dichotomy found its own counterpart institutions 
during Middle Ages by the emergence of two Christian mendicant orders, 
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Dominicans and Franciscans, who are respectively behind the 
establishment of the two universities of Paris and Oxford.  
Indeed, the differences between the university’s founding 
Christian orders, the Franciscans and the Dominicans, have 
redounded through the centuries, resulting in what I call 
alternative ‘mendicant modernities’: on the one hand our 
reabsorption into nature and on the other our transcendence 
of nature. (Fuller, 2011: p. 69) 
The Dominican version of Catholicism, on the one hand, continued 
through Vico, the Scottish Enlightenment and “various ontological 
pluralists of the modern era” such as neo-Kantians.2 On the other hand, 
the nominalist view was a fourteenth and fifteenth century intellectual 
movement which was mostly the continuation of the Franciscan line. It 
also passed through the fathers of the Reformation, Descartes, the 
rationalist3 and the positivists (Fuller, 2011: p. 95). The founding fathers 
of the Scientific Revolution were also inspired by the Scotist version of 
the imago dei doctrine. This version of the doctrine was paving the way 
for man to acquire perfection and move toward divinity. Thus, the 
departure of man is from the ape side of the continuum of being, headed 
toward that divine side. This idea “suggested that our rational faculties 
were divinely inspired and capable of indefinite expansion” (Fuller, 2011: 
                                                          
2
 John Milbank argued that one cannot put Kant on the Dominican side. Milbank’s 
argument emphasises the Kantian rejection of any kind of kinship between the visible 
and the invisible. So the Kantian noumenon/phenomenon distinction stands against 
Thomistic doctrines of analogy and participation and puts Kant on the Scotist line (cf. 
Milbank, 2000: pp. 38-40).  
3
 Rationalists were those who believed in the ability of human reason to discover the 
natural laws. They also tried to deduce positive laws by a mathematical methodology 
from a few concepts (Waddicor, 1970: p. 45).  
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p. 81). In this way the ‘achievable perfection’ became the theological 
foundation of the modern idea of progress (Lӧwith, 1949: chapter 4; 
Funkenstein, 1986: chapter 4). Modernity in general also originated from 
this kind of conception of human perfection. Modernity is an 
unprecedented phenomenon in history because it is not only a form of 
being but also a form of becoming – or rather, it means “not merely to be 
in a history or tradition but to make history” (Gillespie, 2008: p. 2—ital. 
original). To be modern means to be ‘self-originating’ and to be ‘creative’ 
– like God. The modern men are about to become the masters of the 
world and control nature and society, and in this way apply their god-like 
powers to move further toward the divinity side of the continuum 
(Gillespie, 2008: p. 2). The argument, here, is that Duns Scotus’ version 
of the imago dei doctrine, which was the starting point for the modern 
man’s journey to seek divinity, was itself a reaction to a ‘crisis’ inside the 
Christianity of the Middle Ages. That was a crisis about the nature of God 
and his relationship with man (Gillespie, 2008). Let me explain this crisis 
through referring to the aforementioned division between the universities 
of Paris and Oxford, and through the background of the tension in the 
tradition of scholasticism. Then I will return to the Scotist revolution as 
one of the intellectual answers to this crisis. 
3-2. Middle Age schools as embodiments of crisis  
Italy is the modern name for a land in the eleventh century which 
was the place of a turning point in the history of Europe. Christians of the 
time became neighbours of Muslims of North Africa. Apparently, multiple 
cultural exchanges between those two civilisations took place. The crisis 
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of Christian theology, indicatively, began with approaching the Islamic 
image of the relationship between the creator and the created or the new 
Arabic/Persian onto-theological system of thought. Furthermore, it was 
through Muslim thinkers that Europeans were able to rediscover ancient 
Greek philosophers. The crisis of the man-God relationship (with the 
spread of Muslim and sometimes Jewish comments on Aristotle in 
Europe) was turned into a debate between reason and revelation 
(MacCulloch, 2010: p. 399). Specifically Ibn-Rushd – or in its Latinised 
form Averroes (1126-1198) – is a crucial figure here. Ibn-Rushd was a 
major commentator on Aristotle in the Western part of the Islamic world 
and Southern Europe of the time. He was also a devout Muslim. Not 
surprisingly, the tensions between reason (Aristotle and philosophy) and 
revelation (Muhammad and Islam) became the main theme of his works. 
His answer to this big question was that the truths of reason and 
revelation are not two separate truths because the truth must be one 
united and unique thing. So everything in, say, the Quran is justifiable 
through philosophy. Correspondingly, every philosophically ‘proven’ truth 
is identifiable in the Quran. He tried to show that whenever God in the 
Quran talked about aql (the intellect) in fact He wanted us to 
philosophise4 (Dinani, 2005: chapter 4). However, this solution for the 
tension between reason and revelation never became predominant in the 
Islamic world. One sign of this is that Ibn-Rushd was not considered to be 
                                                          
4
 Ibn-Rushd emphasised these verses of the Quran: “Call to the way of your Lord with 
wisdom and goodly exhortation, and have disputations with them in the best manner; 
surely your Lord best knows those who go astray from His path, and He knows best 
those who follow the right way” (16:125). Here he interpreted wisdom as philosophy. In 
addition, another verse says: “Do they not reflect that their companion has not 
unsoundness in mind; he is only a plain warner” (7:184). And here Ibn-Rushd suggested 
that “reflection” means “philosophising” (Dinani, 2005).  
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an important theorist for the mainstream philosophers of the Islamic East5 
(Nasr and Aminrazavi, 2012: pp. 175-176). His importance thus should be 
understood in terms of the Western point of view, because of his bridge-
like role between two civilisations, and because of being one of the 
sources of the previously mentioned crisis of the West.  
On the European side, one of the first ways of dealing with the 
crisis was the establishment of the Christian schools, for the first time, as 
the main caretakers of the above-mentioned intellectual crisis. Those 
institutions were using the Islamic schools of North Africa as their 
template – specifically the University of Al-Azhar in Cairo (MacCulloch, 
2010: pp. 397-400). Even in the beginning, those schools were influenced 
by Islamic schools in terms of their curriculum. For example, in the case 
of the University of Bologna, “following Islamic precedent, law rather than 
theology was the emphasis of the study” (MacCulloch, 2010: pp. 398). 
After a few decades, during the twelfth century, a university in Paris 
became the leading Christian school of theology. That place was later 
named the Sorbonne after its most well-known college. During the 
thirteenth century, Dominicans dominated the University of Paris, the 
leading figure of which was Thomas Aquinas. The curriculum that 
Aquinas used to prescribe to those schools also shows his obsession 
with handling the aforementioned intellectual crisis. It was a fully-fledged 
programme which used to begin with focusing on the acquisition of skills 
                                                          
5
 Another incident is that many textbook writers of philosophy at that time in the Islamic 
world never mentioned Ibn-Rushd in their works, and even some of those who did 
mentioned his name in the wrong way (like Ibn-Rashid or Ibn-Rashed). Emphasising 
Ibn-Rushd’s central role in the Islamic world is not only an evident misreading of history 
but the consequence of a Euro-centric point of view in historiography (see chapter ten). 
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in grammar and logic. This led the students to mathematics as an 
exercise of imagination, followed by lessons on natural sciences and 
finally on metaphysics and theology (MacIntyre, 2009: p. 94). The very 
structure of these programmes exhibits concern about the unity of 
philosophy and theology (cf. MacIntyre, 2009: chapter 11). Aquinas 
believed that philosophy begins with finite beings and from this it makes 
its way to the knowledge of the final cause, the unmoved mover or God. 
Theology on the other side begins with God. Subsequently, Aquinas not 
only wanted to adapt the two sides of reason and revelation but (more or 
less similar to the argument of Ibn-Rushd) believed that our failure to do 
so would cause the ‘defective knowledge of God’. Alasdair MacIntyre 
explained the goal of Aquinas in this way: 
We understand God as creator in part through a study of the 
natural order of things and of the human place within that 
order. Errors about that order and about the human place 
within it give rise to errors about God himself and our 
relationship to him. So that philosophy and the natural 
sciences are required as a complement to theology, as 
more than a rational prologue to it. (2009: p. 75) 
This kind of seeking the ‘equilibrium between opposed tendencies’ 
(as Etienne Gilson once mentioned as characteristic of Thomas’ ideas) is 
also discernible in Aquinas’s talk of reason versus will of God (as one of 
the derivations of the dichotomy of reason and revelation). Aquinas was 
notably influenced by Aristotle. Aristotle believed that the blind will which 
is not accompanied by knowledge can be called the animal appetite. But 
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when knowledge precedes the will, we can talk about freedom which is 
itself the defining characteristic of man. Aquinas, drawing on Aristotle’s 
argument, believed that on the one hand “choice is essentially an act of 
the will” and on the other hand without human judgement the “will would 
not be will” (Gilson, 1940: p. 313). Thus in his equilibrium we may talk 
about free will for man with which Aristotle was not familiar.  
Let us return to the Franciscan/Nominalist/Scotist axis which 
became dominant at Oxford University after the fourteenth century. On 
the issue of the will, Scotus inverted this Aristotelian/Thomistic image of 
the human will in a way that I will try to explain in the next section. 
Nominalism was a theoretical resistance against the growth of 
Aristotelianism in the scholastic tradition. The nominalists sought a 
‘superior synthesis’ between Thomism and Augustinianism 6  (Gillespie, 
2008: chapter 1; Bettoni, 1979: p. 19). But the main danger was not the 
pagan ideas of Aristotle. The prevalent Islamic interpretations of Aristotle 
was more threatening. This interpretation of the motivation behind the 
nominalist resistance seems even more persuasive when we put it in the 
political context of the time after the Crusades when the Muslims’ army 
was still on the other side of the borders of Europe (Gillespie, 2008: pp. 
20-23). Duns Scotus and William of Ockham in this situation wanted to 
defend the omnipotent God whom they used to deem the ‘truly Christian 
                                                          
6
 We might wonder what the Augustinian approach to the relationship between theology 
and philosophy was. Augustine believed that the philosophical enquiry (the act of 
thinking) is only a tool at the hands of believers to get rid of the barriers that 
philosophers and sceptics put in the way of faith (the act of loving). In book 11 of The 
City of God, he argued that “we both are and know that we are, and delight in our being, 
and our knowledge of it” because we are made in the image and likeness of God. So he 
started with a certainty about not only being but also the quality of being (i.e. being in the 
image and likeness of God). Yet even more than that, this is God’s illumination that lets 
us gain knowledge of being (MacIntyre, 2009: p. 26). 
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God’. Amos Funkenstein also believed that “In constructing his theory of 
divine attributes Scotus wanted first and foremost to secure God’s 
absolute and infinite will – libertatem salvare” (1986: p. 59). The 
outcomes of the nominalists’ intellectual efforts were what are known as 
the doctrines of the primacy of the will and the univocity of being.   
3-3. Doctrines of the primacy of the will and the univocity of 
being 
Escaping from the Aristotelian God of via antiqua, Scotus returned 
to the God whose omnipotence is his major characteristic (the result of 
his efforts later was branded as via moderna). That was a sort of 
Franciscan tendency to search for the authentic. The authentic God of 
Christianity for Scotus was an entity whose will is prior to everything, 
even his own past decisions (otherwise known as natural laws). This was 
the way that nominalists used to justify the problem of miracles. That is to 
say, miracles happen when God decides to break his own previously 
posed laws. That way, they do not involve any contradiction because 
those laws are also the products of His divine will (Oberman, 2003: p. 
32). This is the ‘doctrine of the primacy of the will’. For Aquinas it could be 
blasphemous to claim that God’s will is prior even to His justice, for 
example, because this implies that the divine will does not work according 
to the divine wisdom (Oberman, 1983: p. 90). But for Duns Scotus all 
laws, either divine or human, are positive laws – a kind of contract 
(Brague, 2007: p. 237). Law is in fact the ‘eternal will of God’. The crucial 
shifting point in the image of God is here, from the Thomistic image with 
the centrality of God’s wisdom to the Scotist power-centred image of God. 
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But how can we prove the free will of God? The answer to this question is 
the crux of the issue about Scotus’ conception of humanity and his 
relationship with God.   
Scotus’ revolutionary methodology of knowing God is the basis of 
his doctrine of the univocity of being. He suggests that “to understand 
how we can ascribe will to God we must first analyse what our own 
freedom involves” (Wolter, 1986: p. 9). Scotus defined three stages for 
this: “[1] If we take what is a matter of perfection in our will with respect to 
its acts, [2] eliminate what is a matter of imperfection there, [and then] [3] 
transfer that which is a matter of perfection in it to the divine, the case at 
hand immediately becomes clear” (Scotus, 2008: p. 475). So we can 
have a conception of God’s perfection simply by intensifying what we 
have at hand as finite beings. What is common here between man and 
God is the status of being – i.e. the univocity of being.  
Let us take a look at another similar argument by Scotus. He 
believed that to know God we need first to look around ourselves. Any 
being is necessarily a member of one of these categories: (1) absolute 
being (i.e. God); (2) being that exists per se (i.e. substance); and (3) 
being that exists only in another (i.e. accident). Now we can imagine that 
they all exist. But none of them is equal to being as such. So, the 
question which arises is: can we derive from things a concept that is 
much more perfect than things themselves? Echoing Scotus, Bettoni 
answered: “This is impossible, since no being can of itself give rise to 
knowledge that is more perfect than itself” (Bettoni, 1979: p. 36). Then 
how can we justify the existence of that certainty about being inside 
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ourselves? The answer is that being is a light through which everything 
else can be seen (Bettoni, 1979: p. 33). Scotus took this kind of 
conception of being from Ibn-Sina or in its Latinised form Avicenna (980-
1037), the Persian philosopher of the Islamic Middle Ages (Cunningham, 
2002: p. 16). Ibn-Sina in his al-isharat wa-t-tanbihat (Hints and Pointers) 
carried out a thought experiment known as The Flying Man experiment. 
That experiment is about imagining a man created ex nihilo, floating in 
space in a way that he cannot see or hear or feel anything (including his 
own limbs). In this situation he still would have one certainty: the flying 
man would be certain that he exists.7 That is, he might hesitate about the 
existence of God, the universe or even his own hand, but he cannot 
hesitate that he is. Ipso facto the primary and adequate object of the 
human intellect is neither God nor man but being as such (Bettoni, 1979: 
p. 32). 
Thus we can conclude that Scotus’ revolutionary idea changes the 
relationship between man and God in two ways. First, we need to look at 
the creature (i.e. human being) to know the creator but not in the way that 
Aquinas believed. That is, for Scotus the knowledge of God is not the 
ultimate product of the pincer movement of philosophy and theology; 
rather, we can know God through examining our own existential status. 
Second, and more importantly, this methodological point about knowing 
                                                          
7
 Here I am concerned with Scotus’ reading of Ibn-Sina, not what Ibn-Sina really 
believed. Some recent research shows the European misreading of the original idea of 
Ibn-Sina. As Hasse showed in his work about the Western reception to Ibn-Sina, the 
book of Hints and Pointers was never translated into Latin. So those who used his hints 
could not see that a kind of ‘indicative method’ (already mentioned in the very title of the 
book) involved in the issue (Hasse, 2000: pp. 89-90). On the other hand, Goodman 
argued that even the hint was not about the existence per se but about the existence of 
the soul (Goodman, 1992: pp. 156-157). 
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God presupposes that God is different from man not in kind but in degree. 
When we are talking about being, we are talking about one thing shared 
between man and God. It is true even in terms of certain characteristics – 
for example, God is powerful as I am powerful. But my power is imperfect 
– it has limits, and when I get older I will lose it – while God’s power is 
perfect and infinite (cf. Fuller, 2011: pp. 79-81; Funkenstein, 1986; 
Wolter, 1986; Milbank, 2006: chapter 1; Bettoni, 1979: pp. 32-39). The 
result is that for nominalists, human beings share being with God. This is 
called the doctrine of the univocity of being.8 And the idea which I defend 
is that this doctrine paved the way for the possibility for man to get closer 
to the God-pole on the continuum of being (Fuller, 2011: p. 81; Milbank, 
2006: chapter 1).  
4. The Scotist mentality 
What we, following Fuller (2012), will call the Scotist mentality, 
emerged in the fourteenth century9 but evolved over time to become the 
cornerstone of modern Prometheanism. Briefly, the main elements of 
Scotist mentality are as follows. First, we need to start from finite beings 
                                                          
8
 This doctrine is against the doctrine of equivocation (or the analogical mode of 
understanding God) which Thomists were supporting. 
9
 How did the nominalist theory become prevalent in Europe after the fourteenth 
century? Probably the most important reason was the horrible experience in Europe of 
the Black Death and existential insecurity as its main outcome. The Black Death (which 
was the unintended result of neighbouring Mongols between 1347 and 1351) was a 
terrifying experience for Europeans. Considering the level of medical awareness of the 
time, the plague seemed an unknown, sudden and devastating force which kills the 
victim in a few days. The “Black” in the name of the disease originally referred not to a 
symptom but to the dreadfulness of the experience of the plague (Herlihy, 1997: p. 19). 
Herlihy’s main question is about how the people of Europe at the time reacted, when 
their environment became so dreadful. One of his answers is that in the intellectual 
realm nominalism became fashionable (Herlihy, 1997: p. 18, also see: Gillespie, 2008: 
p. 46). The Thomistic via antiqua system of thought could not survive the situation 
because of its inadequate conceptual framework. That is, the nominalist theoretical 
resistance against Aristotelianism inside schools coincided with an epidemic disaster 
which seized and traumatised the outside real life.  
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to know God. In other words, God is the greatest member of the meta-
category of being, while man is the other member of it. To know God, 
thus, we need to start from our own mode of being, which is a common 
element between us and Him (i.e. the univocity of being). The knowledge 
of being, then, is somehow prior even to the knowledge of God. 
Therefore, this implies that philosophy is prior to theology. Second, God, 
known by this method, is an omnipotent being who can create any 
possible world. Not only that, but He is God because of this absolute 
power. Consequently, this God is highly creative and there are also 
countless possibilities that God might want to realise (i.e. the primacy of 
the will). Finally, we are created in the image and likeness of God (i.e. 
imago dei doctrine). Thus, not only do we have god-like powers, but also 
we are obliged to apply those powers – it is a kind of theological mission 
for us.  
5. Cartesian autonomous man and the Deistic Supreme Being 
Cartesian cogito (which is the hallmark of the second destination in 
our historical narration) is completely inside the Scotist mentality. 
Descartes (1595-1650) based all human knowledge on one certainty: 
cogito ergo sum. Thereupon, philosophy, mathematics, science and even 
theology are based on an autonomous subject which is the only source of 
certainty. Gillespie realised that: “The Cartesian notion of science […] 
rests upon a new notion of man as a willing being, modelled on the 
omnipotent God of nominalism and able, like him, to master nature 
through the exercise of his infinite will” (2008: pp. 40-41). Accordingly, 
Cartesian unaided reason was the ‘ultimate authority’. In the same vein, 
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Hans Blumenberg described the birth moment of this reason as ‘the 
absolute beginning’ (1983: pp. 145-7). Indicatively, this concept marks the 
birth moment of an autonomous man and is the absolute beginning of 
Prometheanism. However, the Promethean man, ingeniously, rejected 
the history of its constitution. Thus, one cannot put this reason in the 
historical context because it is not considered to be a historical 
construction but a ‘discovery’. By Descartes’ cogito, man’s reason 
considered to be appeared after its eclipse in the Middle Ages. Not 
surprisingly, Descartes and Bacon declared the end of history. They 
defined history respectively as the ‘totality of prejudices’ and the ‘system 
of idols’ which via and after reason now came to an end (Blumenberg, 
1983: p. 146).  
This Cartesian man with the authority of reason was the key figure 
of the Enlightenment project of the eighteenth century. The 
Enlightenment will-centred conception of man challenged any sort of 
exception and encouraged a sense of the value of democracy, because 
what makes all of us equal is this common ground of being. Carl Schmitt 
in his famous Political Theology (1985) emphasised that “The rationalism 
of the Enlightenment rejected the exception in every form” (Schmitt, 1985: 
p. 37). Consequently, an anti-exception and pro-democracy interpretation 
of the idea of providence was initiated by the fathers of the 
Enlightenment. Providence for them meant ‘the good will of God for all 
men to be happy’. This conception of providence has a negative side; 
according to them, God does not want the good only to one certain group 
of people. For example, they have refuted the Jewish notion of ‘the 
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chosen people’ (Betts, 1984: pp. 121-122). On the other hand, the 
positive side of the new secular concept of providence is a revolution in 
their conception of history. For them history became the field of 
unrealised possibilities. Drawing on past discussions, the argument goes 
as follows. First, God’s will is prior to anything, even his own past 
decisions. Then, he can will new possibilities. Second, man is created in 
the image and likeness of God and so, finally man can also open new 
horizons by creating other possible worlds. Moreover, the human being 
becomes fully human to the point that he realises the new possibilities, 
i.e. creation as a kind of divine mission for human beings. The idea of 
making paradise on Earth is the result of this type of seeing the future as 
a ‘dynamic horizon’ (Lӧwith, 1949: p. 111). Thus, the future of the 
Enlightenment figures was an open realm for man to apply his own god-
like power.  
Accordingly, in this second stage of the constitution of the modern 
Promethean man, the relationship between man and God is not broken. 
God is instead excluded from the world and history while the modern 
autonomous man represents His will on Earth (Schmitt, 1985: p. 59). The 
radical form of this conception of God, which emerged in France at this 
time, is known as deism, a theology in which many Enlightenment figures 
believed. The Supreme Being of Deists was a being who was not the 
inhabitant of the world and did not apply his power to determine every 
single detail of our life. Instead, he used to will the good for human being 
in general. Deists of the time (like Voltaire) not only rejected the revealed 
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religions (specifically Catholicism) but were also hostile to atheism (cf. 
McGrath, 2004: p. 25).  
It is noteworthy that one of the first texts of the deistic literature 
was a book called L’Espion Turc (‘The Turkish Spy’, 1684) by Jean Paul 
Marana (1642-1693). His method of writing, which was a precedent to 
Montesquieu’s Lettres Persanes (‘The Persian Letters’, 1721), was based 
on – one might say – a thought experiment. Both of them imagined a 
foreigner travelling to France and describing the political situation and 
religious beliefs of that society. In this genre the writer was assuming the 
fictional persona of someone from a radically different culture looking at 
the present situation. What would he see? What would we look like? For 
Montesquieu this was a satirical way to criticise French politics and 
Catholic dogmas. But for Marana, this genre was useful for showing 
another possible system of belief. The new possibility for Marana was 
deism, which was considered to be a common ground between the three 
Abrahamic religions (Betts, 1984: p. 99). He detached a Turkish Muslim 
from his own form of life with all of its linguistic games, meanings, 
certainties and dogmas, then threw him into a new world with a new form 
of life. The Turkish Spy (whose name is Mahmut) gradually found the 
common ground between those religions (God or the Supreme Being) 
and became a deist. “[H]is tone” of talk about religions “may be detached 
or even sceptical, but never destructive” (Betts, 1984: p. 101). Marana’s 
experiment was similar to Ibn-Sina and Scotus’ aforementioned flying 
man experiment. Marana also came to a similar conclusion: the big 
moment for Mahmut was when he understood that morality is prior to 
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belief. As such, you might believe in any religion but you should remain 
moral. As a result, prioritising morality over the revealed religion indicates 
the priority of the natural over the super-natural. In other words, the moral 
and the happy life is something that man can attain unaided. Defending 
the ability of the human, unaided mind still does not mean that the 
transcendental God does not exist (Betts, 1984: p. 17). The highly 
transcendental God exists but as a clockmaker – a supra munadane 
intelligence who made the world. But after creation, natural laws govern 
the world without his interference, like a clock which works without the 
assistance of the clockmaker.10  
6. The advent of the modern Promethean man 
In the last phase of our historical survey, God became an illusory 
entity and the product of human consciousness or the projection of man’s 
mind into the sky. Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872), the figure of this 
phase, mainly predicated his theory of religion on Hegel’s philosophy. But 
unlike Hegel, Feuerbach did not believe that religion is something 
between us and God. Instead, the absolute being is inside us. The 
religious figures are in fact the projections of the essential predicates of 
the nature of man. So, accordingly, religion turned out to be a kind of 
alienation of man from himself. The famous formulation of Feuerbach’s 
notion of the relationship between man and God has been mentioned in 
the very first lines of the second chapter of his The Essence of 
Christianity (1841): “Religion is the disuniting of man from himself. He 
                                                          
10
 This conception was attributed to Newton by the Enlightenment figures; however, 
Newton never thought of it.  
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sets God before him as the antithesis of himself. God is not what man is. 
Man is not what God is. […] But in religion man contemplates his own 
latent nature” (Feuerbach, 1957: p. 33). Thus, Feuerbach’s mission is to 
show that God is the ‘differencing’ of man with his nature. What follows 
from these preliminary notes is that theology must be replaced by 
anthropology. Another conclusion is that the concealed reality of 
Christianity underneath its appearance is atheism (Harvey, 1995: p. 25). 
In this way he not only rejects the religious truth but he also shows how 
atheism is the inherent logic of religion (and here Christianity).  
What was the starting point for Feuerbach’s deduction of atheism 
from Christianity? I would suggest that he was under the indirect 
influence of a tradition of thought which was started by Scotus. Through 
the doctrine of the univocity of being, as has been mentioned above, the 
nominalists of the Middle Ages and then their Protestant pupils implied 
that the human rational faculties are divinely inspired and men are gifted 
with the ability to expand toward the opposite pole of the continuum of 
being – i.e. God’s pole. This is the point that Feuerbach pushed to the 
extreme. He believed that the scholars of the Middle Ages united God 
and man but not completely. Feuerbach asked: “Did not the old mystics, 
schoolmen, and fathers, long ago compare the incomprehensibility of the 
divine nature with that of the human intelligence, and thus, in truth, 
identify the nature of God with the nature of man?” And he answered that 
the Middle Ages’ scholars put man and God on the two sides of one 
continuum because God as God is “nothing else than the reason in its 
utmost intensification become objective to itself” (1957: p. 36). Therefore, 
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the deity side of the continuum has been identified as an illusion and 
discredited. Feuerbach’s thesis is the end of a long path which started 
with Duns Scotus. In each step of this journey man and God grew closer 
and increasingly similar. Therefore, the monopolised powers and 
exclusive characteristics of God were increasingly attributed to man. 
What Feuerbach did was to destroy the last bridge between the finite and 
the infinite by disclosing the emptiness of the infinite. That is, Feuerbach 
only declared the success of a project at the end of a long historical 
process. That was a process of castrating the concept of a 
transcendental God and also making up the modern concept of humanity 
as a Promethean creature.  
Karl Marx, in his early works, was impressed by Feuerbach’s 
thesis. However, in his later works, he began to criticise Feuerbach for 
not being radical enough. In chapter three, I will argue that Marx’s 
radicalised point of view led him to articulate the other aspect of 
Prometheanism. That is to say, Prometheanism for Marx had two sides of 
rebellion against the transcendental but also, importantly, a side which 
emphasised self-creative aspects of man. So, man is a self-making entity 
and ‘alienation’ is the description of man’s detachment from himself. For 
Feuerbach, alienation meant to empty the real world for the sake of 
enriching God or putting man’s essence outside man (Lobkowicz, 1967: 
p. 253). In his sixth thesis on Feuerbach, Marx confirmed the 
Feuerbachian conception of alienation but he pushed it further by saying:  
Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence 
of man. But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in 
54 
 
each single individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of the 
social relations (Marx, 1938).  
The ‘ensemble of the social relations’ foreshadows Marx’s notion 
of class which also has a pragmatic connotation. That is to say, to 
become truly radical means that one should consider that history is the 
result of man’s own practices. So, to change the existing circumstances 
one needs to engage with practice which will turn into circumstance of 
tomorrow (Lobkowicz, 1967: p. 417). Both the usage of the Promethean 
metaphor and the notions of reification and alienation can be traced back 
to Marx’s very early poems and also his doctoral dissertation. S. S. 
Sprawer in his review of the young Marx, found that he constantly 
referred to feeling Godlike and superior to the man-made world, 
specifically the ‘oppressiveness of the modern city’. One of the dominant 
themes of his poetry was the purpose of showing that buildings are 
nothing but bricks. They have not made themselves. They instead are the 
products of ‘human ingenuity’. He constantly refers to ‘an overpowering 
drive to action’ (Sprawer, 1976: p. 12). In writing this very poem and, “In 
speaking of his love, […] the poetic persona or ‘lyric I’, feels at once to 
Prometheus and to Jove” (Sprawer, 1976: p. 11). And again, in the 
preface to his doctoral dissertation he wrote: “Prometheus is the foremost 
saint and martyr in the philosopher’s calendar” and also, that “It is better 
to be slave to the rock than to serve Father Zeus as his faithful 
messenger” (Sprawer, 1976: p. 23).  
More significant, is the content of his doctoral thesis. He drew an implicit 
parallel between Prometheus and the state of modern philosophy. 
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Answering the central question raised by Hegelian philosophy, he argued 
for the same transition that he argued took place in Greek philosophy. 
Marx believed that the speculative metaphysics of antiquity had turned to 
practical ethics. So, Hegel’s abstract philosophy also needs a practical 
translation. The “inward illumination”, so to speak, needs to be translated 
into the “outside flames” (Sprawer, 1976: p. 27). In a way, Marx was 
interested in Aristotle’s heirs because as a Young Hegelian, he was 
concerned about his own intellectual position as an heir of Hegel 
(Lobkowicz, 1967: p. 240). One can interpret this radicalisation of 
Feuerbach’s materialism by Marx in the light of the parallels drawn with 
Aristotle and Prometheus which have been discussed here.  
7. Prometheus versus Jesus 
Social theory as the embodiment of the modern will to control 
man’s life was based on Promethean conception of humanity (Milbank, 
2006). The founding father of modern social theory is August Comte 
(about whom I will write more in the next chapters). We know that at the 
end of his life, Comte called himself the First Great Priest of the Religion 
of Humanity (Pickering, 2009: p. 525) and tried to establish a secular 
version of Catholicism. His idea was to praise man’s historical 
achievements through some religious-like organised rituals. This was to 
escape from the spiritual crisis of the modern age which was caused by 
the Enlightenment hostility toward any spiritual power in society. 
Humanity was not only the name of his new secular religion but also at 
the centre of his ideas. He praised this humanity without excluding 
religions from its history. Following Feuerbach’s insights, Comte used to 
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think of religion as nothing more than the projection of man’s mind into 
the sky. But also he defined religions as the necessary childhood of 
humanity. Passing through religious ideas was a necessary step toward 
becoming mature. Therefore, he also praised prophets for facilitating the 
maturity of man. In this way, he also mimicked the Catholic religious 
calendar of saints and made up his own version of the calendar. The 
secular calendar of Comte contained the names of scientists (like 
Newton), poets (like Percy Shelley) and even prophets (like Zarathustra). 
But the curious fact is that he never mentioned Jesus in his calendar – 
why? Given that he was evidently mimicking Catholicism, ignoring the 
main figure of Christianity would not be easily justifiable. Moreover, 
Comte once rejected the very historical existence of Jesus (Voegelin, 
1999: p. 201).  
We need to find the answer in the problematic moment of the unity 
of man and God in Jesus and his hybrid entity. What Comte did, following 
the Scotist mentality, was the divinisation of the human being in its intra-
mundane form and also the rejection of the transcendental beings. Comte 
rejected even the very existence of Jesus not by offering the historical 
evidence for his claim but because of Christ’s half-God nature. The half-
God nature of Jesus is transcendental, so Jesus is beyond history. Thus, 
it has no history and what has no history for Comte does not exist 
(Voegelin, 1999: p. 201). Comte, also, used to consider the other half, the 
human half, of Jesus as his rival. Comte more than anything else wanted 
to divinise man. That is what Jesus Christ did by his own very life, i.e. 
becoming god-like man who came to save human being. Christ himself 
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was the embodiment of the ‘perfect man’ that Comte intended to be and 
to make. Jesus was a successful God who established Christianity and 
the church. Comte was mimicking Christ in order to be the Christ of 
modern times. He could not live in peace with the name of Jesus in his 
calendar. I agree with Voegelin’s answer: “The rejection of Jesus” by 
Comte was owing to “a personal affair” (1999: p. 196).  
On the continuum of being (in which man is on one side and God 
is on the other), Fuller mentioned that Jesus is “a being who somehow 
provides a precedent for all of humanity by traveling along this ontological 
continuum” (Fuller, 2011: p. 84). So, in this way we might be able to 
justify the love-hate relationship between modern Promethean man and 
Jesus. The hybrid nature of Jesus was a precedent for modern man who 
would undertake a Promethean mission of divinising the world of 
immanent entities (Voegelin, 1999: p. 193). 
8. Conclusion: The image changed 
In this chapter I have discussed a significant change in the image 
of the relationship between man and God. It was a change from an image 
of God who is different from creatures in kind to an image of God who is a 
member of the bigger category of being, so that he is not different from 
creatures in kind but in degree. The former conception of God used to 
describe Him as wise, while the second conception of God depicted Him 
as a being with the will prior to his wisdom. This theological turning point 
in Christianity in the Middle Ages caused a big paradigm shift which 
became a metaphysical framework for the emergence of modern 
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humanity. That is, it put man and God on two sides of the continuum of 
being; furthermore, the hybrid figure of Christ (as the Son of God and the 
Son of Man) became a precedent for the unity of both sides of the 
continuum in one body. What I have called the modern Promethean man 
is the final product of the radicalisation of this unity by attribution of God’s 
powers to man. Finally, Feuerbach’s atheism inverted theism rather than 
negated it. He considered atheism not as something contra religion but as 
its lining. This was the end of the continuum of being by the dissolution of 
the God side of it.  
Modern atheism is the outcome of this process, and its specific 
character is not the mere rejection of the existence of God but also 
considers man as the creator of God. While in this chapter I was dealing 
with the historical process in which a theological change of image 
paradoxically gave birth to atheism, in the next chapter I will describe two 
types of recent atheisms. 
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Chapter Two 
The Emergence of Tourist Atheism 
 
1. Introduction 
In the past chapter, the process of the emergence of the modern 
Promethean man and the relevance of the nominalist shift in theology has 
been discussed. Considering modern atheism as the last point of the 
historical generation of the modern Prometheus, the central question of 
the present chapter is about the typology of the modern Prometheanism 
in our time. Previously, I showed the difference between the Dominican 
and the Franciscan roots of modernity. Next I defined modern 
Prometheanism as the result of the inversion of the relationship between 
God and man (i.e. man became the creator of God) which is (primarily but 
not exclusively) the historical outcome of the Franciscan/Scotist axis. This 
was the beginning of modern atheism. Here, I will explain the relationship 
between that beginning and this end by suggesting a new typology of 
recent atheisms. Following Zygmunt Bauman’s typology of modern 
identities (Bauman, 1996), I will separate ‘pilgrim atheism’ from ‘tourist 
atheism’ which are the extensions of two Scotist doctrines – respectively, 
the doctrine of the primacy of the will and the doctrine of haecceitas 
(haecceity or individuation). I will also suggest that the will-centred 
discourse of tourist atheism is on the rise. This new type of 
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Prometheanism in our time tends to follow the path of subjective pleasure 
(like a tourist) rather than searching for the pre-existing laws in the temple 
of the universe (like a pilgrim). 
2. Pilgrim atheism versus tourist atheism 
Charles Taylor suggested three forms of unbelief in the modern 
age. In his A Secular Age, Taylor argued that in the modern world, 
receiving spiritual richness and moral fullness from somewhere which is 
detached from a transcendental being has turned into one option for 
people, among many others (Taylor, 2007). I will write about his scheme 
in the next chapter. For now, we need to recall that for Taylor, detached 
ways of receiving fullness can take three forms. One can put Kant, 
Feuerbach and Camus in the first category. These figures put forward 
completely different versions of experiencing detached fullness. What is 
common amongst all their work, though, is the idea that we all experience 
some sort of autonomous inside reason. For example, Kant believed in a 
form of inside rational agency which is able to make laws. Feuerbach, 
however, famously considered God as something inside the human 
psyche which we project into the sky. And Camus saw human beings as 
vulnerable to both suffering, weakness but also capable of bravery and 
audacity. For Camus, the main challenge in our lifetime was to reach the 
stage of ‘devising our own rules of life’ (Taylor, 2007: pp. 8-9). So, all in 
all, the figures of the first category of modern detached unbelief see 
something inside human beings which can be the source of the 
experience of fullness. The second category, Taylor argued, are those 
who receive fullness somewhere else and not through autonomous 
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reason. We can put deep ecologists in this category. So, they, in contrast 
with the first group, receive fullness from somewhere else—not through 
autonomous reason. That is to say, they might believe that fullness can 
be found in nature or in an ‘inner depth’ or in a harmony of the both 
(Taylor, 2007: p. 9). This connects mostly with a romantic critique of 
reason and the Enlightenment. Finally, Taylor talks about the post-
modernist which in brief is the negative view about something which is 
always not there. The figures of the last category criticise both the idea of 
an internal reason and an outside nature along with any conception of 
harmony and recovered unity. Taylor’s description of a so-called ‘post-
modern’ unbelief is those intellectual positions which express themselves 
in a negative way, through rejecting others.  
These are views […] which deny, attack or scoff at the 
claims of self-sufficient reason, but offer no outside source 
for the reception of power. They are as determined to 
undermine and deny Romantic notions of solace in feeling, 
or in recovered unity, as they are to attack the 
Enlightenment dream of pure thinking; and they seem often 
even more eager to underscore their atheist convictions. 
(Taylor, 2007: p. 10) 
Taylor dismisses this last type of unbelief because he believes that 
there is a twist in their arguments. The point is that the post-modernists 
can only survive with negation. So they claim that the age of Grand 
Narrative has come to an end. But they need and utilise a narrative to 
justify their positions: “[once] we were into grand stories, but [now] we 
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have realized their emptiness and we proceed to the next stage” (Taylor, 
2007: p. 717)11.  
In contrast, one of the main points of this research is to show the 
importance of a so-called post-modern unbelief (and specifically the trend 
that I will call tourist atheism). In arguing Against Taylor’s thesis, I do not 
think that the post-modern unbelief is based on the mere negation of the 
narratives that it implicitly uses. The point about post-modernism is not 
the mere rejection of Grand Narratives, but the belief in the plurality of 
narratives. It is more about the rejection of the portrayal of a Grand 
Narrative as a truth-tracking story that its “epistemic validity transcends 
the perspectival contingency of its own spatiotemporal determinacy” 
(Susen, 2015: p. 40). In other words, I would argue that rejection of the 
grand narrative is not a necessary part of a ‘post-modern’ intellectual 
standpoint. Post-modernism, as explored by Simon Susen in his recent 
erudite book is about the rejection of the possibility of those narratives 
and, say, social theories that are ‘projects of unmasking’.  
As unmasking endeavours, macro-theoretical approaches 
aim to uncover an underlying storyline, which is believed to 
be inherent in the structural composition of society and the 
processual unfolding of human actions. (Susen, 2015: p. 41-
- Ital. Original) 
In other words, the problem was not the narratives per se. Instead 
their cognitive ambitious claim was problematic. The idea of a mega-
                                                          
11
 This is also Taylor’s main criticism of Rorty’s philosophy (Taylor, 1996: p. 257). 
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narrative and a mega-theory which is going to expose the hidden reality 
was the target of their criticism not the narrative. Thus, attributing some 
narratives to the post-modernist stories about its own constitution is not a 
twist in argument. It, is rather, a mere story to give a consistency to one’s 
current position which, by the way, does not contain any specific 
epistemic privilege.  
That way of defining post-modern unbelief resonates with Taylor’s thesis 
that modern unbelief can only define itself as a sort of achievement or as 
a kind of ‘overcoming of our illusions about God’ (Taylor, 2007: p. 27 and 
268). In this chapter, I will argue for the existence of a post-modern type 
of atheism which is not defined by its intention of overcoming religion; 
instead it has been defined by its treatment of religion as a repository of 
cultural heritage. What I will call ‘tourist atheism’ can be considered as a 
‘post-modern atheism’ which means that it treats religion as a story which 
is not uncovering any deep truth. Rather, it is a useful story which does 
not need to be discarded completely. A tourist atheist would argue that 
even if we discard ‘religious illusions’, there is not any hidden reality that 
will appear. 
Finally, one can safely consider what I will call ‘pilgrim atheism’ as 
one of the branches of Taylor’s first category of unbelief (i.e. an 
autonomous reason inside); while one can consider some branches of 
the environmentalist movements to Taylor’s second category. For 
example, Edward Abbey (1927-1989) as an essayist and, crucially in 
terms of the argument I present here, a deep ecologist author. Famously 
he did not want to be called an atheist and preferred the term ‘an earth-
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ist’ (Taylor, 2001: p. 182). However, Abbey’s and other’s obsession with 
nature overshadows their rejection of traditional religions and even the 
existence of supernatural beings. Thus, that aspect of their point of views 
has never been fully expanded either against or for religion. So, here I 
would prefer to focus more on tourist/post-modernist atheism which I 
would suggest is a promising movement which is changing modern 
Prometheanism from inside.  
Stephen LeDrew, for his part, put forward a division between 
humanist atheism, of say Feuerbach, and scientific atheism, of Dawkins 
for instance (LeDrew, 2012: pp. 70-86). This division, for LeDrew, is 
grounded in an old, late nineteenth-century split between natural sciences 
and humanities. Scientific atheism, on the one hand, is mainly based on 
Darwinism and the theory of evolution as the alternative to the religious 
explanations of the creation. Humanistic atheism, on the other hand, 
tends to consider religion “a social phenomenon and a symptom of 
alienation and oppression” 12  (LeDrew, 2012: p. 71). There are two 
problems with this dichotomy. First of all, LeDrew mentioned Feuerbach 
as the first humanist atheist (LeDrew, 2012: p. 78). By doing this, he 
anachronistically applied the late nineteenth-century split between 
humanism and naturalism to Feuerbach, who died a few decades before 
that. Feuerbach was a ‘humanist’ but his humanism was based on his 
conception of anthropology which was a science built upon Kant and 
Herder’s conceptions of the science of man. Thus, it was thoroughly 
                                                          
12
 Probably the best example of the humanistic atheism is Ludwig Feuerbach’s 
aforementioned thesis on the replacement of anthropology with theology (see the last 
chapter).  
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naturalistic. This makes the division between scientism and humanism 
meaningless. Second, this division, even if true for the nineteenth 
century, does not seem valid any more. We are, currently, witness to new 
versions of atheism in Western Europe and North America which are 
difficult to place in only one of those two categories since they adopt 
some elements from both sides. In the next chapters I will write about a 
new version of atheism which is known as atheism 2.0 and based on the 
idea of considering religion as part of human cultural heritage. In fact, it 
tries to take advantage of the religious elements (like ceremonies, rituals, 
and clever ideas, for example) for an atheistic but happy life (see part 
three). Considering the aforementioned division between scientific and 
humanistic atheisms, we need to ask how to consider this newly-emerged 
type of atheism: as a scientific atheism or a humanistic one?  
Starting from this insufficiency of that typology of modern 
atheisms, and regarding the past discussion on Prometheanism, I want to 
put forward a new division between ‘pilgrim atheism’ and ‘tourist atheism’. 
This new typology, which is limited to the continuation of the Scotist axis 
in our time, borrows two metaphors from an article on identity by Zygmunt 
Bauman (1996) in which he made a comparison between two types of 
characters: pilgrim versus tourist. Before applying that division to modern 
atheisms, let us compare those two types here. Consider an imaginary 
temple in Varanasi in India. Visiting that temple, an Indian pilgrim and a 
European tourist would have vastly different experiences. The temple for 
the pilgrim is a place for a profound spiritual experience. One might not 
consider himself a true pilgrim, but he is certain that the truth is always 
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there. The truth for the pilgrim is always in the distance. The life of the 
pilgrim is also considered to be a journey to find that truth. The pilgrim 
also sees the temple as a unity. Moreover, the pilgrimage experience is 
about continuity. All these elements combine in a narrative the effect of 
which makes “each event the effect of the event before and the cause of 
the event after” (Bauman, 1996: p. 23). As a consequence, there is a 
sense of progress inherent in the pilgrimage. The idea of progress is 
interwoven with the presumption of an absolute and unique destination or 
an expected moment of truth in the future. 
In contrast, a tourist’s experience of the temple is a fragmentary 
experience; that is, the touristic conception of the temple is a loosely 
patched image of a historical site. A tourist cannot see the unity of the 
temple. He would be an observer and what he observes is a combination 
of some old buildings, shiny windowpanes and wooden doorways. For the 
tourist the temple is not a unique place. The Varanasi temple is as 
interesting a site as Big Ben in London – both are regarded as 
remarkable places. This fragmented view of the world does not emanate 
from the purposelessness of the touristic experience. As Bauman 
correctly emphasised there is a goal for the touristic experience. But it is 
a subjective one: pleasure, amusement or adventure (Bauman, 1996: p. 
29). The world for a tourist is not a meaningful unity; rather, it is a 
combination of fascinating spots where one can maximise one’s pleasure. 
Therefore, if pilgrimage is about the objective truth, tourism is about the 
subjective pleasure.  
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Accordingly, I want to use these metaphors for two rival categories 
of modern atheisms. First of all ‘pilgrim atheism’, a category which 
includes both scientific and humanistic atheisms. Both of these 
tendencies have a clear criterion of the division between the true and the 
false. It is a well-known fact that scientific atheism sees religion as the by-
product of something else. That ‘something’ is a deep-seated cause or 
innate law behind religious attitudes which needed to be discovered by 
natural sciences – especially biology – or be revealed by social sciences 
– especially anthropology (Dawkins, 2006aa: chapter 5; Hinde, 1999: 
chapters 17 and 18; Boyer, 2002: chapter 1; Harvey, 1995: chapter 1). So 
‘pilgrim atheism’ first presumes that religion is just an appearance. The 
reality of this appearance should be shown through certain tasks. The 
mission of the scientist or anthropologist is this revealing effort. Second, 
because of the presumption of that destination pilgrim atheism contains 
the ideal of progress. In most cases the ideal of progress goes beyond 
implication and becomes the basis of the theories of pilgrim atheists – as 
was the case for Spencer. The famous representative figure of this type 
of atheism is Richard Dawkins (2006).  
The second category would be ‘tourist atheism’. Tourist atheism, 
just like tourism itself, is a recent phenomenon. It emerged after the so-
called ‘postmodern turn’. Echoing Bauman, I have mentioned that we can 
define the touristic approach by its subjective goal: seeking pleasure, 
amusement and adventure for oneself rather than pursuing the objective 
truth. Tourist atheism, in the same vein, starts with this Sartrean 
assumption: “there is no other universe except the human universe, the 
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universe of human subjectivity” (qtd. in Geroulanos, 2010: p. 9). Tourist 
atheism focuses on human existence, human suffering, or more generally 
human subjectivity. Tourist atheism is not necessarily known by its 
support of the scientific truth as the ultimate truth but it is not necessary to 
assume any contradiction between science and this version of atheism. 
The main point is that for tourist atheists the strict, universally valid 
division between the true and the false is fading away. And more 
importantly tourist atheists do not consider science in radical contrast with 
religion. They see the difference between the two but for them one does 
not necessarily dominate the other. Tourist atheism, in its recent version, 
is an ongoing project which is planning not merely for the rejection of but 
for the occupation and expropriation13 of theism (Watkin, 2011: p. 14). 
The main public figure of this second category of atheism would be Alain 
de Botton (2012).  
But we cannot comprehend these two types of atheism without 
considering their theological backgrounds. In the next sections, I will 
argue that each of these two categories of atheism (as two types of 
Prometheanism) is also the result of the extension of a Scotist doctrine. 
‘Pilgrim atheism’ is the extension of the doctrine of ‘the primacy of the will’ 
while ‘tourist atheism’ is the extension of ‘the doctrine of individuation’ (or 
haecceitas). In the last chapter I indicated that I tend to see the modern 
Prometheanism (and its final product modern atheism) as the upshot of 
the Scotist narration inside the nominalist theological movement of the 
late Middle Ages. The imago dei doctrine was the central idea for that 
                                                          
13
 Below, I will write about the relationship between tourism and expropriation in brief 
and I will return to it in part three. 
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movement; we have been created in the image and likeness of God. But 
it is crucial for our discussion to elucidate what is there in God that we as 
creatures are ordained to imitate.  
3. Pilgrim Atheism  
In our time the most prominent representatives of what I called 
pilgrim atheism are the (so-called) four horsemen of New Atheism.14 The 
renowned characteristic of New Atheists is the way they devote 
themselves to media. They are the writers of the best sellers and self-
help books. They also take any opportunity to appear on TV or make their 
own documentaries. And furthermore, they are great fans of social media 
like Twitter and Facebook. That is, pilgrim atheists try not to remain 
isolated in their own laboratories and libraries. They contact people and 
invite them to their own beliefs. On a public scale they challenge the 
other’s religious beliefs. Peter Boghossian’s A Manual for Creating 
Atheists (2013) is the most recent example of a theorisation of this public 
engagement.  In it, Boghossian tries to introduce strategies for talking 
people out of religious faith (Boghossian, 2013). But the New Atheists’ 
proselytising activities are not limited to the theoretical level. They were 
even highly active in lobbying to make organisational changes, for 
example in education policy.15  
We need to step back and ask why it is such an important mission 
for New Atheists to convince others of their atheistic beliefs. We might 
                                                          
14
 Richard Dawkins for the first time called his own project a ‘pilgrimage’ in the title of a 
book called The Ancestor's Tale: the pilgrimage to the dawn of evolution (2005). 
15
 For example, The British Humanist Association tried to make ‘humanism’ a subject in 
religious education classes in Britain. In addition, Richard Dawkins in a letter to David 
Heywood declared that theology should not be taught in universities (Dawkins, 2007).  
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wonder why pilgrim atheists are such proselytisers. Why is the truth of 
scientific achievement and the necessity of acknowledging that truth by 
others so important for them? Let us ask this question in another way: 
why pilgrim atheists targeted the ‘ignorance’ of people i.e. they want to 
prepare people with the ‘scientific truth’? Why do they not target, say, the 
suffering of human beings? Why do they not give priority to assuaging the 
pains of the human being, regardless of man’s ignorance?  
4-1.  Science and discovering the laws of the temple of the 
universe 
The answer is detectable in the Christian backdrop of modern 
atheism. It is likely that if modern atheism had accidentally emerged in a 
Buddhist context, say in India, it could have been more about assuaging 
the sufferings, rather than the quest for the truth. But in the Christian 
context pilgrim atheism chose science (not literature, for instance) as a 
battleground. But what was there in modern science that pilgrim atheists 
found appealing? The basic thesis here is that the same roots which gave 
birth to modern science also led us to pilgrim atheism. Thus, I will start 
with the pilgrim scientists and then proceed to pilgrim atheism at the end.  
The goal of modern science at its sixteenth and seventeenth 
century origin was to give man godlike power. Modern science was a tool 
to give divine power to a man who has been created in the image and 
likeness of God. And it was achieved through a radical change in the 
image of God for believers during the fourteenth-century nominalist 
revolution. As I mentioned in the last chapter, for the nominalists the will 
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of God was prior to his wisdom. Then, the God of nominalism was a wilful 
being. This primacy of the will was also attributed to man which 
connected the extremes of God and man by considering them as two 
poles of the continuum of being. So man also became a wilful being (see 
chapter one). This wilful being was about to control nature and society 
through science. The scientist’s mission was to search for the natural 
laws qua the logic of the creation by the wilful God. Thus to find out what 
the ultimate goal of science was, we need to ask: (1) In what terms was 
such a wilful God conceived? (2) How could a wilful man imitate that 
God? We need to answer this question first to be able to come back to 
the doctrine of the primacy of the will and its role in the constitution of 
modern science as well as pilgrim atheism.  
To get an accurate image of the nominalist wilful God we need to 
start from the fact that the main product of the Scotist tradition was that it 
inverted the traditional definition of being. For the Christian philosophers 
of via antiqua, being was considered to be beyond time (Gillespie, 2008: 
p. 36). Thus, it was being par excellence. This conception of being as 
such was a Jewish insight. When Moses asked God about His quiddity, 
God did not call himself the pure act of thinking as Aristotle used to 
believe; rather, he replied with ‘ego sum qui sum’ (‘I am who I am’). 
According to via antiqua that means God referred to his very existence 
because God is existence: pure being (Gilson, 1940: pp. 49-51). 
Traditionally, change used to be considered the sign of the imperfection if 
not the corruption of being. It was specifically true about the nature of 
God. Then, God was the Real, the unchanged or the unmoved-mover. In 
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contrast, following the nominalist poetic revolution, not only did change 
stop being considered the sign of the imperfection of being, but God 
himself then became changeable. More precisely, through allowing the 
central role for will in God’s being, He turned into change par excellence. 
For example, this God also creates, but for nominalists and their 
Protestant pupils, creation depends on His will. Thus creation is an 
ongoing project because it depends on the will of God. God wills and 
creates at every single moment (Wolter, 1986: Introduction). In this way, 
nominalism inverted that traditional ontology by considering God not as 
“the ultimate whatness or quiddity of all beings but their howness or 
becoming” (Gillespie, 2008: p. 36). In the following centuries the mission 
of modern science has been defined, accordingly, “to discover the 
divinely ordered character of the world”, which thus means “to investigate 
becoming” (Gillespie, 2008: p. 36). And for this goal one needs to 
discover the natural laws which are governing the motion of all beings 
(Gillespie, 2008: p. 36). Concisely, with the new image of God as a wilful 
creator, and the new image of the world as the collection of creations in 
motion, the new image of man was also constituted. Man (who has been 
created in the image and likeness of God) for his salvation, needs to 
become god-like. And for this purpose man needs to discover the laws of 
nature and control nature and society as God does. Modern science also 
kept alive the hope for discovering the natural laws and looking at the 
world from God’s perspective, also known as an objective point of view. 
In this way the nature of what we have called the wilful man is interwoven 
with that image of the nominalist God. 
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4-2.  Jesus, scientist and pilgrim  
In the Christian context God was incarnated in Jesus. I wrote 
about the centrality of the modern interpretation of Jesus Christ in the 
emergence of modern Prometheus in the last chapter. We should now 
recall that Jesus turned into Christ when he “acquired the capacity to see 
everything from God’s point-of-view, the so-called ‘view from nowhere’” 
(Fuller, 2011: p. 99). This kind of epistemic reading of the character of 
Jesus was a theological precedent for the ideal of scientific ‘objectivism’. 
For example, the ideal of Victorian physics was to explain the world 
through mathematical laws. This was a way to unite different branches of 
physics (heat, light, mechanics, etc.) in one scheme (Fara, 2009: pp. 199-
200). And this was because mathematics used to be considered as highly 
objective knowledge and thus similar to God’s point of view. The one who 
possesses this objective knowledge is the scientist. Therefore, that 
Christian motif preceded the depiction of the modern scientist as the 
saviour. It was only in the later stages (i.e. the late nineteenth century, 
post-Darwinian era) that the contradiction between religion and science 
appeared. Thus the character of Christ dissolved in the figure of the 
modern scientist and the existence or non-existence of the distant God of 
nominalism became irrelevant. But what remained is the Christ-like 
scientist who needs to attain God-like power by discovering the laws of 
nature and society through scientific efforts. This was considered to be 
the only way to progress.  
Two historical examples about the Christ-like character of the 
scientist would help to clarify the argument. Henry Brougham (1778-
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1868) was a British statesman who founded the Society for the Diffusion 
of Useful Knowledge in 1825. This society for the first time in modern 
times started to publish cheap scientific books. But, as Patricia Fara 
(2009) believes, this was not for the sake of democracy, or for that 
matter, for an equal opportunity for all people to have access to scientific 
ideas. Rather, the organisers of this society 
acted like scientific missionaries with a hidden agenda. Even 
the name they chose reveals their feelings of superiority, 
implying that a core elite sent down to the working classes 
pre-digested information that was not necessarily 
intellectually demanding, but would help them carry out their 
work more efficiently. (Fara, 2009: p. 201) 
The noteworthy point is that there was an ideology behind this kind 
of popularising science. This ‘democratisation’ of knowledge was an 
ideological tool at the hand of statesmen and scientists to persuade the 
crowds that the way to progress is through nothing but science. In order 
to persuade, one needs to emphasise the ultimate goal of science which 
is ‘truth’ and also the representation of the scientist as the saviour or the 
Christ.  
Many studies show that this sacred halo was still around the heads 
of scientists in the twentieth century, and even continues to exist in 
contemporary times. Jeffrey Alexander (2003) studied the reports of 
popular magazines about the first generation of computers in the period 
between 1944 and 1975. He shows that the tone and diction of many 
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reports were religious and mythical while they were “filled with wishful 
rhetoric of salvation and damnation” (Alexander, 2003: p. 187). He also 
quotes from a report in Time magazine:  
Arranged row upon row in air conditioned rooms, waited upon 
by crisp young white-shirted men who move softly among them 
like priests serving in a shrine, the computers go about their 
work quietly and, for the most part, unseen from the public. 
(qtd. in Alexander, 2003: p. 188) 
The scene that the journalist in Time is describing for the public 
audience is not about a cluster of scientists working in their own 
laboratories. But they are pilgrims of science and technology. 
Technology, in this case the computer, is a tool which can work without 
the intervention of human values. So the computer will objectively help us 
to solve all the problems “on earth as well as those posed by the celestial 
universe” (qtd. in Alexander, 2003: p. 187). This belief was so serious that 
Time’s journalist concluded his report with this assertion: “when we want 
to consult the deity, we go to the computer because it’s the closest thing 
to God to come along” (qtd. in Alexander, 2003: p. 188).  
Briefly, regarding the nominalist belief that we have been created 
in the image and likeness of God, one needs to remember that for the 
scientists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, mimicking God 
was more about attaining His epistemological objective point of view. God 
was the divine sovereign because of His objective knowledge and the 
scientist can become close to God by possession of that kind of 
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knowledge. Furthermore, the ontological sovereignty over nature and 
society will be the outcome of that epistemological advantage which is 
owing to technology (Fuller, 2011: p. 101). The depiction of the scientist 
as someone like Christ, priest or pilgrim, is the outcome of that wilful 
picture of man. As modern science was the result of the extension of the 
doctrine of the primacy of the will, the model of the ‘pilgrim scientist’ was 
also the result of the extension of the role of the wilful sovereign God (and 
his Son) to the realm of humanity. When, through the emergence of the 
modern Prometheanism, God was made secondary, the theological 
discourse did not disappear. It remained intertwined with science and 
later on also formed pilgrim atheism. The proselytising role of the atheist-
scientists (like most of the New Atheists) is understandable under this 
rubric. 
4-3.  Pilgrim scientists and pilgrim atheists  
Still one last question remains untouched. All scientists are not 
atheists and all atheists are not scientists. Therefore we need to clarify 
where those two categories overlap. What is the relationship between 
pilgrim atheism and pilgrim scientific approaches? The answer is 
detectible in the history of modern science and its achievements in the 
nineteenth century –that is, the century in which for the first time science 
and religion considered being hostile (Fuller, 2007: p.24).  
During the nineteenth century, the discoveries of a new branch of 
science, geology, challenged the biblical estimations of the age of the 
world. The discovery of fossils showed that the world is far older than has 
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been alleged in the Bible. Initially, the English scholars who were 
contributing to this kind of scientific research did not find any contradiction 
between their Anglican beliefs and the results of the discoveries because 
“for them, creation stories in Genesis merely spoke figuratively of the 
time-spans involved in God’s plan” (MacCulloch, 2010: p. 856). But when 
these geological discoveries were coupled with Darwin’s theory, 
everything changed. Darwin believed that the different species did not 
come directly from the Garden of Eden but that they are the result of a 
long fight for survival that is the process of ‘natural selection’. Although he 
never called himself an ‘atheist’, Darwin’s theory became the basis of a 
robust atheistic tradition afterwards. Darwin published his controversial 
book, On the Origin of Species, in 1859. In subsequent decades a new 
set of books was published in Britain and the United States in which, for 
the very first time in the history of the modern world, the idea of 
antagonism between science and religion was theorised (Fuller, 2007: pp. 
24-5). Consequently, science, atheism and the pilgrim experience at this 
point joined together for the first time. This type of atheism was scientific 
because it challenged some religious beliefs by supporting the results of 
Darwinism as a scientific theory. And it was a ‘pilgrimage’ because of its 
belief in another system of interconnected truths.  
3-4. Pilgrim atheists: either scientists or admirers of science 
Pilgrim atheism has been always about science, but pilgrim 
atheists are not necessarily scientists themselves. I will put those atheists 
who are not natural scientists into two categories: the admirers of science 
in philosophy, and humanists. Those admirers themselves are divisible 
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into two groups. First, those whom I, following Peter Winch, tend to call 
the under-labourers of science (Winch, 2008: pp. 4-5), like Bertrand 
Russell (1872-1970); and second, those who want to give purpose and 
direction to science, like Auguste Comte (1798-1857) and Karl Marx 
(1818-1883). The under-labourers tend to see science as pure 
knowledge, and philosophy as having only the negative role of “removing 
the impediments” to its advancement (Winch, 2008: p. 4) because 
science has built on the ‘certain’ statements. This, on the contrary, is not 
the case for philosophy. For instance, Bertrand Russell, the author of 
Why I Am Not a Christian? (1927), believed that “we shall be wise to build 
our philosophy upon science, because the risk of error in philosophy is 
pretty sure to be greater than in science” (Russell, 2010: p. 145). Thus, 
other fields should not be ashamed of being the under-labourer of “the 
incomparable Mr. Newton”, as John Locke said (Winch, 2008: p. 4). Yet 
philosophers like Comte tended to see science as an arm for the body of 
their philosophy which could shape the future of humanity (Gane, 2006). 
So they preferred to set a goal for science from a standpoint outside it. 
The majority of the second group of pilgrim atheists, the 
humanists, are those who try to apply those scientific theories (e.g. the 
theory of evolution) to society or history. The best case here would be 
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). He tried to consider the theory of evolution 
for society. Then he came up with the idea of ‘social Darwinism’, though 
he used to write about evolution even before Darwin (Rogers, 1972: p. 
266).  While there were growing tendencies for such naturalistic 
interpretations of religion during the nineteenth century (Thrower, 2000: p. 
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126), there were another set of, one might say, humanistic-pilgrim-
atheistic studies about the ‘historical Jesus’. These studies used to put 
Jesus in his historical context in order to know him. The classic work in 
this field was Albert Schweitzer’s The Quest for the Historical Jesus 
(1906). Most of these historical works considered Jesus a Jewish 
insurgent (MacCulloch, 2010: pp. 859-860). They also used to consider 
history as a kind of science. This was also true for Sigmund Freud (1856-
1939) and his psychoanalysis. He considered psychoanalysis as a 
science which is concerned with searching for an overwhelming law that 
unites and justifies everything about human behaviour. In his research he 
was obsessed with the myths of Judaism, his ancestral religion, and also 
Christianity. He concluded that the human sexual drive is that force 
behind varieties of appearances of human behaviour. For him love, in 
human behaviour, shows itself in two ways: either sexual love, or love 
which is a sexual desire in the human unconscious (the sublimated love). 
Thus, love of God is also nothing but sublimated libido (Nicholi, 2003: 
chapter 3).  
3-5.  Pilgrim atheists are proselytisers 
To conclude, pilgrim atheism and science are interwoven with 
each other in their origin and in their goal. The first branch of modern 
atheism, which I called pilgrim atheism, historically depended on the 
nominalist image of the world as a homogenous thing which needs to be 
captured by a univocal language. According to that image of the world, 
some natural laws are there in the temple of nature to be discovered. So 
there are some laws in nature which explain almost everything. Pilgrim 
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atheism contains those ideals of scientific efforts which are targeted at 
the theory of everything. Pilgrimage is thus ascribed to the first category 
of atheism because it takes for granted a kind of pre-existing truth. For 
pilgrim atheists there is a clear line between right and wrong, true and 
false or delusion and reality. Given the clear division between true and 
false, pilgrim atheists, who are mostly scientists, blurred the borders 
between the advancement of science and the scientific reorganisation of 
society, as their eighteenth-century scientist forerunners did (Fuller, 2007: 
p. 18). In a way they have not been satisfied with their scientific 
achievement. They wanted science as an ideology or the new system of 
beliefs for modern society. Thus science became ‘the true knowledge’ 
and atheist-scientists turned into proselytisers. 
4. Tourist Atheism 
Earlier, I defined Prometheanism by its inversion of the relationship 
between God and man where man became the creator of God. That is, 
Prometheanism is essentially about the divinisation of man. However, 
while pilgrim atheism was the first form of modern atheism, it is not the 
only form. The other form of modern atheism which still can be 
categorised under Prometheanism is tourist atheism. Tourist atheism tries 
to divinise humanity by extending another aspect of the Scotist tradition. 
The prime trait of tourist atheism is that it relinquishes the proselytising 
mission by reproducing another feature of God: His singularity. The noble 
characteristic of the tourist type is its individualism. That is, the goal and 
purpose of a journey is ultimately inside each person. Everyone becomes 
his own God. In the consumerist world in which citizens have turned into 
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mere consumers, and their individual wish is prior to everything else 
(Milbank, 2012: p. 235), the subjective goal of atheists became egoistic 
pleasure. The objective world is nothing but a large, fragmented space 
without any hierarchical order. Any hierarchy is thus related to individual 
priorities. At this point, I want to suggest that this type of touristic 
individualism itself is rooted in the Scotist tradition. When one fully applies 
his individual rights and fulfils his individual priorities, one reproduces 
God’s primary feature of singularity. 
4-1. The ontologically isolated individual 
In general, all the ‘Religions of the Book’ value the person. John 
Milbank (2012) separated the traditional ‘person’ from the modern 
‘individual’ by referring to a person’s position in a chain of inter-relations 
with others – a chain which even connects man to God. But nominalism 
was the beginning of the individual – a “self-sufficient sovereign entity, 
abstractable from his social insertion” – and following that “he is not 
essential to the composition of any social aggregation” (Milbank, 2012: p. 
218). Milbank calls this “the ontological isolation of the individual” 
(Milbank, 2012). The modern isolated or atomised individual was 
presumed in nominalism through the doctrine of haecceitas (or 
individuation, or this-ness). Challenging the idea of the universal in its 
Thomistic version, Scotus tried to indicate that the cause of universality is 
in one’s mind but the cause of singularity is in the thing itself (Bettoni, 
1979: p. 59). To articulate the doctrine of this-ness, Scotus rejected the 
doctrine of double negations of thinkers like Henry of Ghent. Let us 
articulate his answer with this question. Given two persons like Plato and 
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Socrates, Henry of Ghent would say that they are two individuals 
because Plato is not Socrates and Socrates is not Plato (i.e. double 
negation). The individuation, for Henry of Ghent, does not need any 
positive assertion “because the essential characteristics of the individual 
are negative” (Bettoni, 1979: p. 59). For him, it would be enough to say 
that the individual is the indivisible. So, the individual is (1) not anything 
else and (2) is not internally divided (Bates, 2010: p. 88). In contrast, 
Scotus tried to defend the ‘dignity’ of the individual by saying that 
negation cannot be the foundation of a ‘this’ because negation is “of the 
same kind in this and that” (Bates, 2010: p. 91—ital. mine). Namely, in 
separating Plato from Socrates we are doing the same thing: this is not 
that (first negation) and that is not this (second negation). In this double 
negation, we have not stated anything positive about each individual. 
Scotus believed that this is absurd. What we need, according to him, is a 
positive principle which Scotus called the principle of this-ness. Thus 
Scotus concludes that the this-ness of Plato, for example, is radically 
different from the this-ness of, say, Socrates. Neither has anything in 
common. Therefore, this-ness is the ultimate reality or the authentic. 
What really exists in the world is the plurality of these thisnesses or 
individuals.    
One needs to put this Scotist emphasis on the individual in the 
Christian context. Max Weber pointed out that ‘Religions of the Book’ 
have always gone against the ‘natural sib’, family and tribe16 (Weber, 
                                                          
16
 Weber mentioned this line of the Bible as the evidence for his claim: “I came not to 
send peace, but a sword” – Matthew, x, 34 (Weber, 1977: p. 329). But this is also true 
for the Prophet of Islam who for the first time, in the Arabic peninsula of his time, raged 
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1977: p. 329). And it is true that the way to salvation is paved only for 
individuals. The individual possesses “greater richness” in comparison 
with the species (Bettoni, 1979: p. 63). But this originally nominalist 
tradition of obsession with the individual constituted many schools of 
thought in the history of modernity. Currently, Slavoj Žižek (2009) follows 
that line. He shows that what I called the touristic experience is a mode of 
seeing man created in the image and likeness of God. He wrote “what 
makes a human being ‘like God’ is not a superior or even divine quality of 
the human mind” – that is, Žižek rejects the basic thesis of those whom I 
called modern pilgrims. Žižek wants us to leave behind the motifs of a 
man as deficient copy of divinity. Namely, he criticises the Enlightenment 
reading of the imago dei doctrine which was demanded for God’s 
‘objective’ point of view. But what Žižek wants us to be is related to 
another reading of the imago dei doctrine. His reading is based on the 
doctrine of haecceitas. The basic idea here is that we are created in the 
image of God in terms of being a person or being a singular entity: “It is 
only at the level of person, qua person, qua this abyss beyond all 
properties, that man is ‘in the image of God’” (Žižek, 2009: p. 30). We 
might wonder what the central peculiarity of the individual is for the 
followers of the tourist line. That is about finding the purpose and 
meaning exclusively inside the autonomous self which led us to a kind of 
ontological-narcissism. I will explain this answer, further, below. 
                                                                                                                                                             
against his own tribe (Quraysh) in Mecca and migrated to another city, Yasreb, to build a 
new community of believers who are mainly detached from their families. Subsequently, 
the city was named after him Medinah-tun-nabi (the City of the Prophet or in its short 
form Medina). In fact Medina was the first city in the history of Islam which was built 
upon the community of atomised individual believers and was also named after the 
leader of those individuals not by pointing out his name (i.e. Muhammad the son of 
Abdul-llah) but in terms of his legal personality. 
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4-2. No goal but a subjective one 
I have mentioned in the last chapter that the separation of will from 
reason and giving priority to the will is the main characteristic of the 
nominalist movement of the late Middle Ages, which has no precedent 
whatsoever in other Abrahamic faiths. Giving priority to one’s will over 
reason also encourages a sense of freedom for the individual – “a ‘raw’ 
freedom independent of ends, of which one can never be legitimately 
robbed” (Milbank, 2012: p. 225). This is because the individual is defined 
because of this freedom. That freedom is the authentic thing about the 
individual. The individual is free because he is the sovereign and he is the 
sovereign because he possesses will.  
While pilgrim is the man of ultimate truth, tourist is the man of 
indefinite possible worlds and endless options for well-being and 
maximising pleasure. Bauman stated that the world for a tourist is a “do-
it-yourself world” which is kneaded by the tourist’s desires and wishes 
(Bauman, 1996: p. 30). If the world for the tourist is an infinite 
combination of a plurality of individuals, the chaos of radically individual 
beings (Gillespie, 2008: pp. 15-151) or the ‘unfathomable void’ (Žižek, 
2009: p. 30), any goal and meaning will merely be subjective. It is likely 
that Francesco Petrarch (1304-1374) was the first Renaissance figure to 
see the nascent form of the modern tourist personality type as the legacy 
of the nominalists: “human beings for Petrarch live in a chaotic world and 
are constantly pulled by their passions or loves in multiple directions” 
(Gillespie, 2008: p. 55). Not surprisingly, he believed that the only way out 
is to overcome this world by relying on human will. In one of his imaginary 
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conversations with Aquinas, Petrarch discovered that “there must be will, 
and that will must be strong and earnest that it can deserve the name 
purpose” (qtd.in Gillespie, 2008: p. 58—ital. mine). 
Briefly, following the nominalist doctrine of haecceitas, the 
individual in its modern sense came in to existence. Then, the world 
became the chaos of endless individuals, each radically different from the 
other. The human being is also not a stable creature in such a world; 
rather, man is the subject of different sets of inner passions and outer 
forces. So, the only Archimedean point is the deity side of man – human 
will. In other words, the destination of man is considered to be inside 
himself. Needless to say, meaning and purpose are interwoven with each 
other, since if there is no purpose, there will be no meaning (Lӧwith, 
1949: p. 6). The tourist is therefore the one who keeps the goal subjective 
and searches for meaning not in the temple of the universe but inside the 
self. Or, in other terms, the tourist is the one who constructs and 
distributes meaning in the world. 
4-3. Tourists leisurely stroll in the temples  
The final question of this chapter regards when tourism and 
atheism joined together. As I mentioned above, one can find the seeds of 
a touristic outlook in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and even 
among Renaissance figures such as Petrarch. But the first step toward 
tourist atheism was taken by a generation of thinkers after 1920, mostly in 
continental Europe. The story of that generation starts with Nietzsche’s 
assertion that ‘God is dead’. But after two World Wars, Stalinism, 
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Fascism and other disasters of the first half of the twentieth century, it 
turned out that man is also dead. The Enlightenment’s humanistic hopes 
for a just and happy life through the new conception of humanity had 
apparently failed. As Adorno and Horkheimer memorably described: “the 
wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity” (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 2002: p. 1). So for this generation of atheists,17 the goal of 
atheism was not ‘to overcome’ religion through the divinisation of 
humanity, but ‘to get lost’ in the world without God (Geroulanos, 2010: p. 
8). If humanity could neither be grounded in a relationship with God, nor 
with itself as a paradigmatic self, then the only option would be 
acknowledging the restrictions of the universe of human subjectivity and 
trying to inhabit in the limited realm of the individual self – an inhabitation 
which is equal to getting lost in the bigger world, a world which now 
seems far too big to be controlled by man. This was only the first step: 
fully-fledged tourism only came to existence after the so-called 
postmodern turn. Tourist atheism is radically changing the face of modern 
atheism by returning to religion not as the subject of faith but as a cultural 
legacy. That legacy can be activated once more in a secular guise.  
‘Atheism 2.0’ is a term that Alain de Botton used for his version of 
tourist atheism, which he presents in the format of a self-help book (de 
Botton, 2012). He invites people to choose any aspect of the religious 
rituals and doctrines that suits them for their atheistic life. To wit, he 
invites us to deconstruct religions, and this deconstruction is based on 
Feuerbach’s assertion that God is the projection of man’s mind into the 
                                                          
17
 Amongst whom were thinkers like Kojève, Malraux, Sartre, Beaufret and others 
(Geroulanos, 2010). 
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sky. But atheism 2.0 takes another step by asserting that religious rituals 
and ideas, if not true, were definitely not useless. That is, they had some 
functions in terms of assuaging the pains and sufferings of people – for 
example, it could make them feel supported by a community and then 
feel happier. The title ‘wisdom without doctrine’ which de Botton used for 
the first chapter of his book might not be very precise philosophically 
speaking, but it effectively encapsulates tourist atheism’s doctrine (see: 
de Botton, 2012: p. 7). Tourist atheists are not afraid of strolling in the 
temple of religion and treating it as a buffet full of interesting items with 
which to maximise their own pleasures. While the goal is subjective, 
anywhere in the world would be a mere spot. And philosophy, mythology, 
science and religion are different forms of approaching these spots. One 
might say this is the last step toward secularising religion: considering it 
as nothing more than a touristic spot. 
4-4. Tourists delicately expropriate the temples 
This novel strategy of the modern atheist movement – the 
expropriation of religion – is crucial to the future of modern atheism. 
However, although tourist atheists are different to militant atheists and do 
not appear that hostile to religion, one should not underestimate their 
‘violence’. They are as violent as Gandhi was, as Zizek ironically argues. 
The point is that Gandhi was violent because he targeted the whole 
system of colonisation in India via non-reactionary acts such as 
boycotting the British cloths. But Hitler was always reactionary. That is to 
say, not targeting the functioning of the capitalist government, he 
radicalised the functions of capitalism (Žižek, 2013: p. 122). I suggest that 
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the tourist atheist’s strategy is more similar to the former.18 They are 
violent in terms of trying delicately to expropriate religious rituals and 
sentiments. Keeping the furniture of the temple, they get rid of the priests 
and worshippers. Concisely, while tourist atheists are expropriators, 
pilgrim atheists are occupiers. After all, as has been mentioned above, 
pilgrim atheists occupied the religious concept of God by turning it into 
objectivism. The difference between pilgrim atheists and tourist atheists is 
that while pilgrims occupy theological concepts and abandon religious 
rituals and sentiments, tourists do it other way around – abandoning 
theological concepts and expropriating the religious rituals and 
sentiments. In other words, pilgrim atheists destroy the temple and pick 
up the theological ideas, while tourist atheists abide in the temple and 
evict the traditional inhabitants.   
Needless to say, the history of human civilisation and religion is full 
of similar occupations and re-occupations of past doctrines and rituals. 
The first community of Christians at the dawn of the Middle Ages started 
to absorb and redefine some elements from the pagan doctrines. Not only 
that, but they also dwelled in some pagan rituals. After the Crusade the 
European Christians also used some aspects of the Islamic doctrines, 
while Muslims themselves did the same thing with ancient Greek ideas 
(cf. Blumenberg, 1983: Part I; Bala, 2006). But the significance of tourist 
atheism is in the conscious employing of this method. Pilgrim atheists will 
not accept their theoretical and structural dependence on the theological 
                                                          
18
 I need to emphasise that, for the goal of this argument, one needs to ignore the 
positive reputation of Gandhi, on the one hand, and the negative reputation of Hitler, on 
the other. That is, I am not about to imply any value judgement about the role of tourist 
atheism in society. 
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past. They see themselves in the time of light and the realm of truth far 
from any ‘dark ages’. Tourist atheists, conversely, start from they depend 
on earlier rituals. The popularity of this method might change the face of 
atheism, mostly through opening the doors of religion toward atheists. 
The significant point about tourist atheism is not the way these atheists 
want to take advantage of religion but the way they define themselves as 
expropriators of religion.  
5. Conclusion: a new typology of modern atheisms 
In this chapter, I have tried to show the insufficiency of the old 
division between scientific and humanistic atheisms through illustrating an 
atheistic movement which cannot be categorised under any of these 
types. Thus, we need a new typology of modern atheisms. Following 
Bauman’s dichotomy of pilgrim and tourist experiences, I suggested the 
same metaphors for the new typology of modern atheisms. Both pilgrim 
atheism and tourist atheism are types of what I called modern 
Prometheanism. That is, they consider man as the creator of God not 
vice versa. And both of them (like Prometheanism itself) are the outcome 
of Scotists’ poetic revolution in the late Middle Ages. The difference is 
that while pilgrim atheism is the extension of the doctrine of the primacy 
of the will, tourist atheism is the extension of the doctrine of haecceitas. 
The goal for pilgrim atheists is in objective scientific truth, while tourist 
atheists are searching for a subjective destination. This means that whilst 
pilgrim atheists reject religion by relying on scientific facts, newly 
emerged tourist atheists are not afraid of taking advantage of religious 
elements for the sake of individualistic goals. I also distinguished two 
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types of pilgrim atheists: scientists versus admirers of science. The 
members of both of these categories are proselytisers – trying to promote 
their ideas and ‘save’ other people from ‘ignorance’. Yet, tourist atheists 
relinquish that proselytiser purpose and try to expropriate religious rituals 
and sentiments. These ideas will be followed up in the chapter four and 
five, in which I will try to scrutinise these two categories to show modern 
atheistic techniques of approaching religion on the one side and the 
public on the other. But before that I need to answer some theoretical 
questions about the very act of unmasking the theology behind modern 
forms of unbelief. 
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Chapter Three 
The Intellectual Deviation Story and 
Promethean Self-Creation 
 
1. Introduction 
Every academic attempt to unmask the historicity of a present 
phenomenon (e.g. the history of the constitution of the modern individual 
or modern state) should clearly state its analytic goal from the outset 
which justifies the necessity and importance of unmasking. Otherwise, 
the unmasking effort can easily be mistaken with the rejection of the 
subject or a questioning its legitimacy. In the current chapter, I want to 
argue for the necessity of the recognition of the historical constitution of 
modern atheism or unbelief in its theological context, not in order to reject 
it, but to distinguish its two sides. Modern Promethean unbelief, I would 
argue, contains two sides; rebellion against the transcendental and self-
creation through mimicking the transcendental. However, Brad Gregory 
as a Christian historian, John Milbank as an Anglican theologian or Jean 
Elshtain as a Christian ethicist might all tend to reject the rebellion side of 
Prometheanism but, they could be agreeing with the analytically different 
self-creation side. Moreover, this recognition and acceptance could open 
up a space for the co-practice of believers and nonbelievers.  
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Let me begin by rewinding the story of two branches of an 
academic tradition. From the mid-1980s, an increasing number of 
historians of modernity and philosophers of religion theoretically tied the 
modern age more closely to their medieval precursors. Let us call this the 
continuity conception of the emergence of secularisation, in contrast with 
the radical break conception associated with figures such as the founding 
fathers of the Enlightenment. The most important contributions in the 
continuity story were Amos Funkenstein’s Theology and the Scientific 
Imagination (1986), the classic Passage to Modernity (1993) by Louis 
Dupré and John Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory (2006) and the 
recent Beyond Secular Order (2013). Nevertheless, it was Charles 
Taylor’s eminent A Secular Age (2007) which gained the most popularity 
and established a reputation in the academic debate 
The former figures focused more on what Taylor called the 
Intellectual Deviation story, but Taylor preferred to explain a Reform 
Master Narrative which is defined as an analytical, phenomenological and 
genealogical account of secularisation (Taylor, 2007: p773; Casanova, 
2010: p. 265).  The Intellectual Deviation story emphasises more the 
emergence of a Scotist/voluntarist theology and the parallel univocal 
understanding of being. That is, a theoretical approach in the Christian 
schools of late middle ages (Milbank, 2006 and 2013; Cunningham, 2002; 
Fuller, 2007 and 2011; Brague, 2007). While the Taylor’s Reform19 shows 
how secularity emerged “as a mass phenomenon” in the larger society 
                                                          
19
 The term ‘Reform’ might be confusing here. For Taylor, ‘the Reformation’ was merely 
a tiny part of a massive process of ‘Reform’. The latter was a titanic movement which 
was begun by Axial religions and through a zig-zag and long process gradually this 
ended up in modernity. 
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(Taylor, 2007: pp. 774-5). He shows how the act of Reform, the so called 
‘mother of revolutions’, trickled down secularity (Taylor, 2007: pp. 61 and 
775). So while the Intellectual Deviation story understands secularisation 
as something which emerged historically firstly among the elites of the 
society, Taylor tends more toward its socio-historical manifestations.  
In the epilogue of A Secular Age, Taylor explains that he has great 
sympathy with Milbank’s Intellectual Deviation account but yet believes 
that it hardly can be the main story behind secularity. The main story 
concerns not only mere disenchantment but also the discipline of and 
reordering of society. Additionally, Taylor sees two stories of Intellectual 
Deviation and Reform Master Narrative as complementary and explaining 
the same phenomenon from different directions (Taylor, 2007: p. 775). 
Milbank, for his part, and in total agreement with Taylor, says that 
Intellectual Deviation is by no means the most fundamental account of 
secularisation. Furthermore, he acknowledges that Taylor’s account deals 
with the more essential issue of the “fusion of ideas and practice” 
(Milbank, 2009: p. 100) which indeed is the ‘mother of revolutions’. 
Without such a fusion any theoretical and intellectual upheaval in isolation 
of either academia or religious circles will not be effective. Milbank 
brilliantly summarises the difference between those two accounts of the 
emergence of secularisation: “We [i.e. those who work on the Intellectual 
Deviation story] are saying that over-piety paradoxically undermines 
theology; he [Taylor] is saying that hyper-reform of the laity paradoxically 
undermines belief” (Milbank, 2009: p. 100). The former concerns elites, 
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the latter concerns mostly the socio-historical processes20. Milbank hopes 
for an upcoming and “still more adequate account of secularisation” which 
is going to bridge together Taylor’s social approach and the Radical 
Orthodoxy’s elitist standpoint “in terms of exactly how scholastic theology 
related to disciplinary, pastoral and legal practice” (Milbank, 2009: p. 
101). This shows that the continuity conception is still considered to be an 
unfinished project which is waiting for its masterpiece to appear in the 
future.  
Nevertheless, so far, the common ground between the two 
approaches is that both see the story of Christianity undoing itself behind 
secularisation. To reveal this backstage, both also adopt a genealogical 
narrative which recognises the importance of the nominalist theology as 
the point of departure. Taylor and Milbank’s mutual confirmations show 
that from this perspective there is something revolutionary about 
nominalism that needs more emphasis especially regarding the 
constitution of what Taylor called the modern forms of unbelief. What is 
that revolutionary idea? To answer this question I will review the 
segments of Taylor’s A Secular Age which address the shared elements 
with the Intellectual Deviation story. 
There are a series of questions that we need to answer in this 
regard. Are the modern forms of atheism, and more generally unbelief, 
rooted in the theological doctrines or shaped by them? Are they 
                                                          
20
 There is a yet more sociological and leftist criticism of both of these approaches that 
emphasises the importance of “historical forces conditioning and contouring secularism 
that do not take shape primarily as ideas or explicit human aims” (Brown, 2010: p. 89—
ital. Original). This would be the thrust of Marx’s classic critique of religion (Brown, 2010: 
83ff). But again, it does not seem that either Milbank, Taylor or any of the above-
mentioned scholars would oppose the existence of those historical forces entirely. 
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extensions of the past or even stronger pre-determined by it? Let us ask 
this question in another way, what are the implications of unmasking the 
theological unconscious of atheism?21 So far I have made it clear that by 
the theological past I mean the Scotist/nominalist school of the late 
middle ages. So the underlying question would be, why single out that 
moment in the history of Christianity and not for instance Italian 
Renaissance humanism, the age of the Reformation or Spinozistic 
pantheism?  
This chapter contains two interconnected arguments: As 
Funkenstein suggested: “The “new” often consists not in the invention of 
new categories or new figures of thought, but rather in a surprising 
employment of existing ones” (1986: p. 14). In other words, the core 
argument of the continuity conception would be that the new is the new 
order of the old ideas, doctrines, concepts, practices and so on. So far, 
most of the main figures of the continuity conception have focused on the 
elitist side of the story. I will try to show why the elitist/nominalist side of 
the story is still relevant and important—but nevertheless incomplete.  
Secondly, living in what Taylor called an ‘immanent frame’, we 
should recognise the existence of the Promethean unbelief as an option 
in modern society which rejects the existence of the transcendental. One 
however might not choose this option and might instead be able to see 
the other side of modern Prometheanism. Beside the rejection of the 
transcendental, modern Prometheanism has another aspect which is the 
                                                          
21
 Gillespie on the one hand would argue that the present is rooted in the past (see: 
Gillespie, 2008). Gregory on the other hand used the term extension. The present is the 
extension and continuation of the past (see: Gregory, 2012: p. 383). Yet, Taylor wrote 
that the past sediments in the present (Taylor, 2007: p. 268). 
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emphasis on self-formation, self-actualisation and self-creation. I would 
argue that the second aspect of Prometheanism is a common place for 
the possible interaction and co-practice of both believers and unbelievers 
in the immanent frame. So Prometheanism contains two sides of rebellion 
against the transcendent and self-formation by mimicking the 
transcendent. The latter option of re-making the self (and subsequently 
society) allows the believers and unbelievers not to focus on the mere 
rejection of other options but on co-practice and, through this, going 
beyond the imposed dichotomies. I would suggest that to formulate this 
second aspect of Prometheanism inevitably we need still to refer to the 
elitist, theological and Scotist side of the story. 
2. Why single out Scotist theology 
Why do we need to single out Scotism as a point of departure in a 
genealogical study of modernity? Let me begin with an unexpected 
example. It has been said that Wahhabism is undermining the Islamic 
heritage by its crude violence. One can draw a parallel between the 
recent and controversial Wahhabism in the Islamic world and some 
branches of Franciscanism (and later on Puritanism) of Christianity of the 
late middle ages. Wahhabism has turned Islam into a monotheistic 
religion which does not allow any sacramental mediation. It has made a 
radical break between the natural and supernatural, because it is against 
most of the rituals, pilgrimage (except Haj), religious arts, and 
theologically inspired architecture etc. Hence the destruction of historical 
and even holy sites by the radicals which is already part of the upsetting 
everyday news coming from the Arab world and parts of North Africa. 
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What remains after the gradual dismantling of these mediations, Milbank 
believes, is an “impermeable, drained, meaningless immanence” that can 
very easily be detached from any transcendental (2009: p. 94). So in a 
way, Wahhabism is not only a danger to modern Islamic societies but 
also to those very Islamic teachings and traditional rituals. This 
theological tendency to detach the natural from the transcendental can 
also be the very point of singling out Scotist theology among all the 
former and latter events. It was, arguably, the beginning of the process of 
detaching God from the universe by assuming His will prior to even His 
own former decisions. An unpredictable wilful God who creates on a 
moment to moment basis and does not care even about being just to His 
creatures is someone who lives beyond the cosmos and is not attached 
to it in any recognisable way. This mode of theology was begun by Duns 
Scotus (Oberman, 1983).  
2.1. Getting subtraction stories out of the way 
Consider Taylor’s take on this point. He also begins his 
genealogical narrative with a reference to the Scotist theology. 
Nevertheless, before getting into that debate, he dedicates a noticeable 
part of his A Secular Age to challenging what he calls ‘subtraction 
stories’. His main question is: “why was it virtually impossible not to 
believe in God in, say, 1500 in our Western society, while in 2000 many 
of us find this not only easy, but even inescapable?” (Taylor, 2007: p. 25). 
How did we get to the point of thinking about the plurality of alternative 
options of belief and unbelief? Today Westerners cannot naively believe 
in one option and think of it as the only possibility anymore. The ‘fullness’, 
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as Taylor calls it, takes several forms and this is an unavoidable 
awareness of anyone who lives in the modern world. The first step to 
positively explain this condition of plurality of options is to reject different 
versions of ‘subtraction stories’ which are: 
…stories of modernity in general, and secularity in 
particular, which explain them by human beings having lost, 
or sloughed off, or liberated themselves from certain earlier, 
confining horizons, or illusions, or limitations of knowledge.  
What emerges from this process—modernity or secularity—
is to be understood in terms of underlying features of human 
nature which were there all along, but had been impeded by 
what is now set aside. (Taylor, 2007: p. 22) 
These stories, including most of the main stream secularisation 
theories, presuppose that the secular was hidden and suppressed under 
the religious illusions (Calhoun, Juergensmeyer and VanAntwerpen, 
2011: p. 11). So by erosion of those illusions the secular as the authentic 
and normal state of being emerged once more. Take the case of the 
modern individual. According to those subtraction stories, all of us are 
primarily, by essence and nature, individuals who are, secondarily, 
associated in society for our mutual benefit. Thus according to these 
subtraction stories we just need to liberate ourselves from the ‘old 
horizons’ and imposed conceptions of sociality. Then “the mutual service 
conception of order” would be “the obvious alternative” and “the evident 
residual idea” which remains after the erosion of the long-standing 
metaphysics (Taylor, 2007: p. 169). That was theorised in the social 
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contract theory of Grotius and Locke. The new picture of the society 
depicted individuals who ‘come together’ and make a political entity 
against the pre-existed ones and so on (Taylor, 2007: p. 159). 
Nevertheless, this self-congratulatory story of liberation ignores the fact 
that modernity also contains “the rise of new principles of sociality” 
(Taylor, 2007: p. 169).  
If we look at modern individuality or individual-in-itself from the 
point of view of the subtraction stories, it might seem that the individual-
in-itself has always existed until the Christian illusion suppressed it. 
Another relevant branch of the subtraction theory narrates the same story 
about nature. As if the ancients knew something called ‘pure nature’ in 
the modern sense of the term; that is a nature which is governed by 
forces of physics and so on. So, the subtraction story goes on, the idea of 
the supernatural was something imposed on it by Christians. That is a 
supernatural idea which stands on the top of that pure nature. While we 
know that this was not the case (Hadot, 2002; Milbank, 2013: p. 6). What 
we can find among the thinkers of antiquity rather was a concept of the 
‘extensive self’ in unity with nature. That is an individual which belongs to 
a universal order. “The Kosmos included humans as an integral though 
unique part of itself” which “prevented [the individual] from being the 
philosophical and moral ultimate” in itself (Dupré, 1993: p. 94). The 
Aristotelian soul, for instance, was a biological concept and so part of 
physics. However, the human mind, which enters the soul, after death 
“returns to its own universality” (Dupré, 1993: p. 94). So, there were an 
organic unity between human beings and nature in a general sense of the 
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term—hence the cosmos. Therefore, from the point of view antiquity 
either nature or the individual in an ontological isolation were almost 
inconceivable. So again, how did the modern double detachment of the 
transcendental being from the cosmic-human side, on the one hand, and 
the individual from the cosmos, on the other, take place? 
Taylor’s method of getting the subtraction stories out of the way 
was partly by what he might call telling a story about the emergence of 
modernity. By giving a historical/genealogical account of the history of 
modernity we can explain how the secular was positively invented 
(Casanova, 2010: p. 265). His phenomenological account of the 
conditions of belief and unbelief also explains the role of Christianity in 
the Western process of secularisation. He tries to show that we became 
secular “not against religion but because of religion” (Mendieta, 2012b: p. 
307). This is a narrative that cannot be grasped through subtraction 
stories. The critique of the secular from this perspective has an increasing 
effect on social theory and was the motivation behind some pioneering 
theoretical efforts in this regard (cf. Joas, 2014; Warner, VanAntwerpen 
and Calhoun, 2010). Calhoun for example continues this line of argument 
by saying that: 
Secularism is often treated as a sort of absence. It’s what’s 
left if religion fades. It’s the exclusion of religion from the 
public sphere. But then it is seen as somehow in itself 
neutral. This is misleading. We need to see secularism as a 
presence. It is something, and therefore not entirely neutral, 
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and in need of elaboration and understanding. (2012: p. 
335) 
If we are not interested in the story of the rise of the secular age in terms 
of subtraction stories of vanishing religious illusions, then we need a 
positive story about the double detachment (of the transcendental being 
and the cosmos on the one hand, and also the human being and cosmos, 
on the other hand). Taylor’s alternative story (Reform Master Narrative) is 
closely related to the emergence of ‘exclusive and self-sufficient 
humanism’. And here Taylor sees ‘important Christian motives’ at work 
(Taylor, 2007: p. 26). We should, Taylor suggests, put that sort of 
humanism in the context of the originally nominalist description of the 
world. 
2.2. Nominalist description of the world 
The Intellectual Deviation story of Milbank and Fuller are very 
similar to Taylor’s take. The difference is rather between different points 
of emphasis.  From one perspective, there are three main themes of 
interpretation of the nominalist theology. Firstly Milbank, as discussed in 
the other chapters, tends more toward the emphasis on the very 
foundational metaphysical premises of nominalism. The most important of 
which is the univocity of being. The premise of univocity, as Milbank 
defines, is “a decision against a middle in being, between identity and 
difference” (2013: p. 51, ital. Original). That is to say, it was a radical 
rejection of the Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy as something between 
‘identity’ and ‘difference’. For instance, Aquinas could argue that man 
represents God in the world which means that on the one hand, man is 
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not God and on the other hand, they are not totally incomparable. We 
can, instead, make an analogy between the two. Scotus and Ockham, 
however, rejected this middle ground. For them, two beings are either the 
same in existence, or totally different. Fuller’s version of the Intellectual 
Deviation story, though, puts more emphasis on the anthropological 
consequence of the univocal conception of the human being and his 
power of creativity, gaining objective knowledge, control of nature, etc. 
Fuller’s emphasis is on the nominalist interpretation of the biblical idea of 
imago dei. So, the univocity of being was a prerequisite of putting God 
and man on one spectrum of existence (Fuller, 2011 and 2014). I have 
discussed these two themes in depth in the previous chapters of the 
thesis. 
Finally, Taylor and Dupré place an emphasis on the nominalist 
radical detachment of the natural from the supernatural. We can explain 
radical detachment in terms of the idea of exclusive humanism. It is 
reasonable to say that some sort of understanding of human flourishing 
did exist in all pre-Abrahamic religions. That is to say, people were 
appealing to divinities and were asking for health, safety, and prosperity 
etc. Yet it was in unity and harmony with the cosmos. Christianity’s 
contribution was to define a form of self-flourishing which can go beyond 
the cosmos. This is closely related to the doctrines of salvation. In other 
words, a sort of ‘flourishing in a wider scale’ was presumed which also 
rejected the idea that tribal, social or personal flourishing is the highest 
goal of humanity (Taylor, 2007: p. 153). The idea of individual salvation 
fundamentally detached the person from society, tribe and community. 
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Everyone is equal in the eyes of a transcendental God of Abraham. As 
Dupré puts it, this detachment was ‘the essence of personhood’ (Dupré, 
1993: p. 95). Now, what is unprecedented about modern humanism is 
‘the flourishing of individual’ without any connection to higher beings 
(Taylor, 2007: p. 151). Where does this phenomenon come from? 
Among the post-Axial religions, according to Taylor, it was 
Christianity’s attempt to ‘willed re-making of society’ that ended up in the 
idea of the self-flourishing individual. This also was a multi-tracked and 
multi-layered process (Taylor, 2007: p. 155-6). In any case, it was 
pressure from within Christianity which broke the ‘great chain of being’ 
and detached a sovereign God from the rest of the world.  
At the beginning of a chapter on the rise of the ‘disciplinary 
society’, when Taylor writes about shifting descriptions of the world, he 
writes: “This begins with the nominalist revolution against the reigning, 
Thomistic idea of autonomy of nature” (2007: p. 97). For Aquinas, God 
was a guarantee for the intelligibility of the world. Nevertheless, with the 
emergence of a nominalist God which is detached from the cosmos 
because of His unbounded free will, medieval thought experienced a 
crisis of intelligibility of the world. With nominalism what was missing, 
Elshtain shows, ‘the dialogic dimension of God’s sovereign power’ 
(Elshtain, 2008: p. 35). 
Yet in his discussion about the immanent frame Taylor reconfirms 
the importance of the nominalist detachment of natural and supernatural 
as a point of departure.  
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[T]he irony is, that this clear distinction of natural from 
supernatural, which was an achievement of Latin 
Christendom in the late Middle Ages and early modern 
period, was originally made in order to mark clearly the 
autonomy of the supernatural. The rebellion of the 
“nominalists” against Aquinas’ “realism” was meant to 
establish the sovereign power of God, whose judgments 
made right and wrong, and could not be chained by the bent 
of “nature”. Likewise the Reformers did everything they 
could to disentangle the order of grace from that of nature. 
(Taylor, 2007: p. 542) 
For Taylor, ‘the immanent frame’ which originated from the 
constant attempts to detach the sovereign God from the world does not 
negate God. It pushes God into the realm of the supernatural. 
Consequently, He, the divine, cannot remain the only subject of belief in 
an immanent frame. In this case, we can compare Taylor’s A Secular Age 
with Brad Gregory’s The Unintended Reformation (2012). Gregory draws 
a similar picture; there is a world “desacramentalised and denuded of 
God’s presence” which has appeared via metaphysical univocity doctrine 
and Ockam’s razor. Therefore, the nature:  
…would cease to be either the Catholic theatre of God’s 
grace or the playground of Satan as Luther’s princeps 
mundi. Instead, it would become so much raw material 
awaiting the imprint of human desires. (Gregory, 2012: p. 
57) 
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Dupré adds that during this process, that not only was nature 
reduced to raw material but also the others were considered as objects 
(Dupré, 1993: p. 119). The new metaphysics, in the last analysis, 
detaches man from the world and both of them from the higher beings. 
Throughout Taylor, Gregory and Dupré’s complex and erudite books one 
can find this picture of the world. Immanent frame, the useful phrase that 
Taylor coins, for instance, concerns the latter detachment of the natural 
order from the above. The immanent frame constitutes a natural order in 
contrast to the supernatural one. This immanence encompasses all the 
ideas of ‘disciplined individual’, instrumental rationality and secular time 
(Taylor, 2007: p. 542). 
Taylor believes that the secular age is an age in which our 
practical self-understanding has gone through profound changes (2007: 
p. 542). Our self-understanding constitutes as a result of a series of 
responses to the questions such as ‘how we fit into the world or into 
society’. Either religious or irreligious, Taylor suggests, we share the 
practical self-understanding that we are in a self-sufficient immanent 
constellation of orders: cosmic, social and moral (2007: p. 543). That is to 
say, these orders are understood on their own without reference to the 
intervention of the outside.  
So, to answer the question about the analytic importance of 
singling out the late middle age nominalist theology as a point of 
departure, we can say that it depicts and describes a picture of the world 
which was the very first precedence of an imminent frame; a detached 
world from the transcendental. The point is that this detachment is an 
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irresistible analytically explanatory period in history of the West which has 
been emphasised in the Intellectual Deviation story, for instance thinkers 
of Radical Orthodoxy (Milbank, 2006; Cunningham, 2002). It is certainly 
not the whole of the story (or even its most important part) but it makes a 
useful point of departure for a genealogical research about the 
constitution of the immanent frame (Vanheeswijck, 2015: p. 131).  
From this perspective, we can divide between three general 
periods of the history of the West: firstly, the ancient seeking perfection 
through unity and harmony with the cosmos. Secondly, the introduction of 
the idea of perfection through individual contact with a higher being 
beyond nature. Finally, the nominalist radicalisation of the ontological 
distinction between the higher being and nature-- with all of its unintended 
consequences in what Taylor calls the ‘long march’ of history which 
cannot be summarised in a few pages. But Taylor emphasises that one 
needs a genealogical study to show the process of ‘the long march’, not a 
subtraction story about a hidden human essence or nature which was 
waiting there to be discovered.  
3. The new order of the old 
The second question was about the extent to which the modern 
unbelief is affected by the theological past. Taylor argued that all forms of 
modern unbelief are marked by that religious origin. That is to say, we 
can recognise the process of sedimentation of the past in the present 
(Taylor, 2007: p. 268). Furthermore, he connected his thesis to the idea 
of unbelief having been defined as an ‘achievement of rationality’ to 
overcome ‘the irrationality of belief’. This achievement is clearly related to 
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a historical awareness or a historical narrative which shows the process 
of victory over the irrationality. For the same reason, Taylor argued, 
unbelief cannot explain itself except through some sort of reference to the 
past (Taylor, 2007: pp. 298-9). So in the modern times, every attempt to 
redefine or recover belief will unavoidably refer to path-breaking exclusive 
humanism. So belief also needs unbelief as an opposite to define itself.  
As Taylor suggests, the past sediments in the present. But it does 
not determine or shape the present. That is to say, I would argue, we 
cannot explain the present only and merely by reference to the past. But, 
at the same time, to escape from self-congratulatory stories about our 
achievements we need these genealogical studies which unmask the 
precedence of the present consciousness. Below I will argue that in 
general, following Funkenstein, we can say that the new is the surprising 
and novel order of the old ideas, doctrines, and practices etc. 
Nevertheless, before going further the importance of this discussion 
needs to be addressed.  
3.1. Why should we talk about the origins? 
In brief, the idea of theological origins becomes important for the 
researcher’s particular analytic goal. The goal of this thesis is to show the 
historicity of modern forms of atheism and consider a new possibility of 
dialogue between believers and unbelievers. Taylor’s goal, however, is to 
challenge the mainstream secularisation theories for one important 
misreading of history which is also one of the obstacles in the process of 
dialogue between belief and unbelief (Vanheeswijck, 2015: p.141). This is 
what has been defined above as a ‘subtraction story’ and its main branch, 
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the theory of secularisation. So the differentiation between the secular, 
the theory of secularisation, secularism, unbelief and atheism is crucial in 
our discussion as well. 
The secular is a modern epistemic category which in its original 
form implied some sort of neutrality (Calhoun, 2012: p. 335). During its 
historical constitution in Western Europe, it was a cognitive reaction to the 
religious wars through assuming a cognitive place for non-division over 
the metaphysical questions. So, it gradually turned into a ‘residual 
category’ or what remains at the end when one gets over religious 
disputes (Casanova, 2011: p. 55). Secularism, however, refers vaguely to 
a series of ideologies and worldviews concerning religion. Casanova 
distinguishes two meanings of secularism as statecraft and secularism as 
an ideology. So the former, is about some principles of state impartiality 
vis-à-vis religions, while the latter refers to an ideology which determines 
and defines what religion is or is not (Casanova, 2011: p. 66). 
Secularisation, nevertheless, is “an analytical conceptualisation of 
modern world historical processes” (Casanova, 2011: p. 54). The theory 
of secularisation contains at least three aspects of the institutional 
separation of the Church and state, the theory of progressive decline of 
religion and finally the privatisation of religion as a prerequisite for 
democratic politics (Casanova, 2011: p. 60).  Taylor’s critique of 
subtraction stories could be directed at any of these concepts but it 
mainly concerns the theory of secularisation. It is because in his 
genealogical study he prefers to give an alternative history and 
conceptualisation of the modern world historic course. For this goal, he 
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also distinguishes between secularity 1 (divorce of religion and state), 
secularity 2 (the increasing lack of the popularity of religious belief) and 
secularity 3 which he defines as a move from a society in which the belief 
in God is unchallenged to a society in which it is not the easiest option on 
the table (Taylor, 2007: p. 20). This last division is possibly a 
controversial one but it serves Taylor’s arguments well (Butler, 2010: p. 
195ff). Finally, unbelief is even more of a problematic term. In a way this 
refers to the lack of belief in general which is not Taylor’s intention. By 
this term he means the lack of belief in religion. Otherwise, Taylor states 
and acknowledges that atheism and other forms of unbelief also 
necessarily contain some forms of faith. This term is perhaps the best to 
use in that context because it refers to all forms of non-religious faith; 
atheism, agnosticism, scepticism, etc.  
So let us take a look at Taylor’s main critical target, that is. theories 
of secularisation. It is interesting to note that all three aspects of the 
secularisation theory (political separation, religious decline and 
privatisation of religion) were originally founded on what Peter Sloterdijk 
called ideology critique. The genealogical unmasking of the historicity of 
our current options is necessary because of the existence of the 
polemical strategies which have been used in all branches of the theory 
of secularisation. Sloterdijk’s classic Critique of Cynical Reason (1987) 
addresses this issue. 
In that book, which gave him an astonishing popularity in post-war 
Germany, Sloterdijk criticised several enlightenment forms of ‘ideology 
critique’. He argued that Enlightenment figures’ primary failure to make a 
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dialogue with the opponents has been channelled into the critique of an 
‘archenemy’ inside the people’s minds; that is prejudice. In this way, the 
opponents (mostly the Church but also religious people) turned into 
‘cases’ while their consciousness was an object of critique (Sloterdijk, 
1987: p. 15). “Ideology critique means the polemical continuation of the 
miscarried dialogue through other means” (Sloterdijk, 1987: p. 15—ital. 
Original). It was not only a sincere attempt to find the truth but a 
combination of strategies of struggle. Sloterdijk intended to expose some 
of those strategies. The most important of them is the critique of religious 
illusion. Here enlightenment adopted two main strategies. It, firstly, 
reversed the ‘image relationship’ between God and man in Christianity. 
That is to say, God did not created man in his image and likeness, as the 
bible claims. Conversely, man has created God in his own image. The 
second strategy was the theory of priest deception. However, most of the 
subjects of the enlightenment critique were considered to be naïve 
because of their illusions and errors, this was not the case for the priests. 
They were equally intelligent and deceptive; hence the theory of priests’ 
deception (Sloterdijk, 1987: p. 28). The final result of this double-critique 
was a two sided explanation of the existence of religions: “for the 
enlightener, it is easy to say why religion exists: first, to cope with 
existential fears, and second, to legitimate oppressive social orders” 
(Sloterdijk, 1987: p. 29). This simple formulation, Sloterdijk believes, 
found its proper and complex forms in the works of Marx, Freud and 
Nietzsche (Sloterdijk, 1987: p. 29).  
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Taylor’s 800-page-long effort to show the historicity of our current 
options and Calhoun’s insistence on considering the secular as a 
presence (not a mere absence) are only two forms of challenging the 
underlying simplistic presuppositions of the theories of secularisation. 
Those are the presuppositions which have survived even in our time. 
Thus Taylor or Calhoun’s theses are not favours to the religious side, but 
an attempt to get a miscarried dialogue back on the rails. This attempt 
(which begins by questioning the neutrality of the secular) needs an 
alternative historical narrative (or as Taylor prefers; story) which backs 
the fundamental presupposition by showing the historical constitution of 
the secular. Thus the secular needs to be treated as an invention which 
has emerged at some point in human history. It also evolved in certain 
ways and thus found different forms. So unlike the alleged neutrality, it is 
open to change and evolution. Thus, we can separate two main reasons 
for the genealogical unmasking of the theological unconscious of 
modernity: first to show the historicity of the current options and secondly 
the opening up a space for dialogue (see chapter 10). 
3.2. The new is the new order 
Now we should address the question about the extent to which 
modern unbelief is affected by the theological past. In his discussion 
about freedom as ‘one of the leading concepts of Western thought’, 
Dupré gave an example which helps me to explain my argument. My 
argument was that the past lives in the present because the new can be 
considered as the new order (Funkenstein, 1986: p. 14) or the ‘profound 
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rearrangement’ (Elshtain, 2008: p. 39) of the formerly existing 
phenomena. 
I would explain my example by a quick recap of Ockham’s 
argument about God and His relationship with man. The ‘free creation’ for 
Ockham meant that God has created the world by choice and the world 
exists because God preserves it through His continuous support in every 
single moment. In other words, God’s absolute sovereign power is not 
intrinsically limited by anything. He always has an option of not creating 
the world in the next moment. However, he does not exercise this power, 
because he loves us. Yet, it is necessary to acknowledge that possibility 
and power. So God’s rationality coincides with his creativity i.e. logos. So 
there is not any rationality outside God’s creativity. Rationality, in other 
words, is what humans call what God has done. This creates certain 
cognitive expectations on our side, for example, the world tomorrow will 
be the same as the world today. This is where faith is embedded in the 
Ockhamist theological argument. God does what he wants and we do 
what we want. All being well, these two sorts of divine and earthly actions 
are going to coincide at some point. Otherwise, the creatures are 
evidently going to pay the price. So, God is truly free. This was the 
nominalist beginning of the formerly discussed detachment of nature and 
the supernatural. Nevertheless, Dupré was concerned with the effects of 
this conception on human freedom. One of the immediate consequences 
was in law. When the lawgiver is not abiding by the intrinsic rationality of 
the law, the consequent legal order will be voluntaristic. So the universe 
is not reflecting a predictable and yet-to-be-discovered order. Dupré 
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suggested that we cannot be reductionist about this. Nominalism does 
not explain all the early modern philosophies of individualism. 
Nevertheless, it definitely contributed in the constitution of the idea of 
freedom as self-choice (Dupré, 1993: p. 123). Jean Bethke Elshtain 
(2008) has followed this line of argument in more detail and I will write 
about this in the next section. For now, we need to focus on Dupré’s 
interesting example which he finds in the works of Shakespeare.  
The self-creative godlike quality of freedom which has transmitted 
to human beings through the formerly discussed imago dei doctrine is the 
key here. We can see this unprecedented concept in the works of 
Shakespeare’s remarkable tragedies (Hamlet, Julius Caesar and 
Macbeth) and in comparison with Greek tragedies. 
[Shakespear’s] protagonists no longer struggle with fate or 
supernatural powers but with the awesome responsibility of 
having to shape their own lives without being able to predict 
the consequences. (Dupré, 1993: p. 125) 
Furthermore, John Owen makes a connection between Hamlet 
and Prometheus by calling them ‘the dramas of free-thought’. Hamlet like 
Prometheus and Job was a victim [of the] inevitable clash between the 
finite and the infinite. Both are also similar in representing human right 
against the arbitrary tyranny (Qtd. in Williamson, 2013: pp. 204-5).  
Let me explain the new order in this way: the concept of the 
individual existed before Shakespeare. A concept of God, higher being 
and freedom also existed. The ideas of fate and the clash of infinity with 
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finiteness also appeared in many tragedies before Hamlet. But what 
makes this protagonist a unique character in world literature was the 
unique combination and discipline of these conceptions. That is to say, 
the human is endowed with the infinite freedom and autonomy 
previously attributed to God who, at least in Christianity, is a 
transcendental being beyond cosmos. Thus, an unlimited and godlike 
freedom of choice has been attributed to the individual. Accordingly, the 
tragedy appears in a new shape. Hamlet is oppressed by the ruling 
powers of the very universe that he intended to change.  
The new age gives primacy to the individual. Using Taylor’s terms; 
the social imaginary, “the way ordinary people imagine their social 
surroundings”, has been reordered around the individual (Taylor, 2007: 
pp. 171-2 and 210).  We can also think about this in terms of historical 
evolution of social hierarchies. The Europe of feudalism was a 
hierarchical society. This means that, the Lord was represented by the 
king and the monarchy was a representation of God’s absolute power on 
earth. The modern society, in contrast, gives that absolute power to the 
citizen which is a ‘direct’ notion. That is to say, a citizen is related to the 
rest of the society directly, not by the mediation of an external institution 
or person (Taylor, 2007: p. 210). So, again the notions of individual, 
sovereignty and society have been reordered in a new and innovative 
way.  
How does this constant process of reordering happen? I have 
made it clear that any answer to this should be historical and 
genealogical. I would like to adopt two interconnected pragmatist 
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intellectual positions in this regard; the first one here and the next in the 
following section.  
The first pragmatist argument to which I want to refer is Richard 
Rorty’s thesis about the creativity of imagination. Rorty’s version of neo-
pragmatism is defined in opposition with correspondence theory. 
According to that theory, truth is the result of the correspondence 
between representations in our minds and outside reality (Rorty, 1982; 
Malachowski, 1992). But Rorty fundamentally rejected the idea of a mind 
which is like a cinema with successive representations of the images of 
reality on its screen (Rorty, 2007b: p. 113). To break that image, he subtly 
connected his intellectual position with Romanticism. For Romantics, 
such as Shelley, imagination is “the source of freedom because it is the 
source of language” (Rorty, 2007b: p. 114). There is a common sense 
understanding of poetry which goes like this: we as children master a 
language first, and then in the second level, we will learn how to use the 
words and concepts in an imaginative and creative way to make poems. 
Rorty, following the Romantics, argued that “imaginativeness goes all the 
way back. The concepts of redness and roundness are as much 
imaginative creations as those of God, of the positron, and of 
constitutional democracy” (Rorty, 2007b: p. 114). So, in the widest sense 
of the term we are all poets because we use language in creative ways 
on a daily basis. We learn it through creating it. Thus in this way, 
language does not represent or correspond to reality but creates it. 
Consequently, poetry in the general sense of the term contains 
prose as well. From this perspective “[g]etting the word “red” into 
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circulation was a feat on a par with Newton’s persuading people to start 
using the term “gravity”” (Rorty, 2007b: p. 114). Heidegger, Newton and 
Blake were all poets because they were creative. This type of conception 
of society joins two static and dynamic parts (the existing order and its 
constant re-creation by people) through focusing on the creativeness of 
language. So finally, the new is the new, imaginative, surprising and 
novel usage of the old concepts and ideas in language. Then it would be 
easy to make the connection between this type of conception of language 
and Taylor’s social imaginaries as the people’s images of their own life. 
Those images do not exist there outside; they are created, re-created, 
amended and re-used on the daily basis.  
When we are talking about theological origins, we need to consider 
the fact that this does not refer to any authentic and original moment in 
history that shaped and determined modernity. Concerning our 
discussion, none of the modern forms of unbelief are ‘mere 
representations of what has happened in late Middle Ages’. We can only 
argue for analytically significant moments in the long history of the 
evolution of orders. Choosing such a point for any genealogy (or story) is 
unavoidable, but we need to be careful not to overextend it. For that 
reason, Milbank, Taylor and Dupré cautioned about the overextension of 
such historical arguments and the flawed presupposition of an overly 
substantial period in history (Dupré, 1993: p. 124; Taylor, 2007; Milbank, 
2009). To answer the formerly discussed question about the extent to 
which a modern phenomenon is affected by the past, I can conclude that 
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the new means the new (however still evolving) order of the old. This 
leads me to my final argument.  
4. Uses of Genealogy 
A Taylorian secular society in which spiritual fullness takes 
varieties of forms (and also cannot be arbitrarily and radically altered 
according to one single option) needs the reconsideration of co-practice. 
The thrust of the argument here is that the unavoidable multiplicity of 
options implies that achieving an overlapping consensus and 
synchronising our understandings of truth over the main issues is 
increasingly challenging (see chapter nine). The realm of co-practice and 
co-training would let us get over either religious or atheist triumphalism. I 
would suggest that modern Prometheanism contains two sides of 
rebellion and self-creation. To make this distinction and use the latter as a 
common ground for the co-practice of believer and unbeliever alike, the 
reconsideration of the Intellectual Deviation story is necessary. Following 
Unger, I would suggest that the pragmatist idea of experimentalism, 
which can be deduced from the Intellectual Deviation story, contains 
various conceptions that are necessary; if we want to cope with the crises 
of the modern age.  
So where do we need to begin? The past section illustrated an 
image of what can be dubbed ‘the plasticity of social life’ (Unger, 2007: p. 
190) or ‘liquidity of society’ (Bauman, 2000). To take these themes 
further, the final question would be what to do next? Concerning the 
genealogical description of the origins of modernity (and modern unbelief) 
there was an overwhelming consensus among both the figures of the 
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Intellectual Deviation story (Milbank, Pickstock and Cunningham) and 
those who are closely connected to their genealogical study (Taylor, 
Gregory, Elshtain and Dupré). For instance, they all believe that the 
nominalist theology is a suitable point of departure for the narrative. Both 
also believe that the essential and noteworthy nominalist idea was the 
radical detachment of the natural from the supernatural. Nevertheless, 
there is a profound disagreement among these intellectuals regarding the 
question of the next step which is the use of the genealogical study of 
modernity. This is the moment when diverging analytic goals become 
important.  
There are three main themes of using the Intellectual Deviation 
genealogy: The first theme is about the goal of revealing and unmasking 
the historical background of one of today’s options; for example, the ‘pro-
choice’ movement for Jean Bethke Elshtain (2008). For instance, the 
underlying question of Elshtain’s study was: how the sovereignty of God 
has shifted to the state and the self? The second response would be for 
those who are mostly disappointed and saddened by the failure of the 
former political experiences and ideological projects of the past century, 
that is, Nazism, Communism and Liberalism. Löwith and Gregory, for 
example, tended toward the pessimistic interpretations of the past and a 
distrustful approach to the future. Their question was: what went wrong 
that we got here? The last category of responses, though, is for those 
who are actively trying to answer to the questions of what to do and what 
can we make of the present options. Blumenberg and Fuller fall under the 
latter category. I also tend towards, and want to argue for, the last way of 
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using the Intellectual Deviation story. The main argument of the last 
group becomes explicit in comparison with two other types of argument. 
4.1. Elshtain’s unmasking 
As for the first theme, Elshtain tended to use the Intellectual 
Deviation story to show the background of the emergence of the so-called 
‘pro-choice’ movement (Elshtain, 2008). In her genealogy, she followed a 
trend in modern politics which was begun by Ockham’s voluntaristic 
conception of God’s sovereignty. “Ockham’s individualist ontology, 
combined with the divine-command argument, extends and magnifies a 
vision of God’s awesome power” (Elshtain, 2008: p. 39). She added:  
If God’s sovereignty is cast voluntaristically, so, too, is 
political authority: A command-obedience theory of secular 
rule takes hold. This involves a profound rearrangement of 
the furniture of moral and political argumentation. (Elshtain, 
2008: p. 39) 
For instance, breaking with the Medieval Christian ontology, Jean 
Bodin (1530–1596), the French political philosopher, believed that the 
basis of the state is force not justice. Without the king there would be 
chaos which is evil. So a king who protects the order is a necessary and 
unique ‘supreme force’ (Elshtain, 2008: p. 54). Thus, the ‘overarching 
secular authority’ inherited the temporal power of the church as well. This 
type of political voluntarism was an end to the Thomistic synthesis of 
reason and faith. One cannot be loyal to two authorities because the 
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divided loyalty causes self-destruction. Thus the chant of the nominalist 
politics would be ‘there must be one’ (Elshtain, 2008: pp. 74-5).  
Elshtain connects that nominalist background to the modern 
ideologies of the past century. “In the twentieth century, transcendence 
was promised by fascist, communist, and other ‘totalizing’ projects” 
(Elshtain, 2008: p. 205). She believed that when the sky was emptied 
from any sort of transcendental truth, the transcendence “infused into 
immanence, experienced on the horizontal level as we became godlike” 
(Elshtain, 2008: p. 205).  Thus, the idea of ‘radical self-transcendence’ 
has appeared regarding society as well as nature which contains the 
rhetoric of mastery, control, domination, triumph over and even torture (as 
Francis Bacon used the term regarding nature). From there she moved 
toward unmasking the nominalist idea of self-sovereignty and mastery of 
nature behind respectively abortion and eugenics. Eugenics, on the one 
hand, is an attempt to control nature through designing the sorts of 
people who are going to be part of our world (Elshtain, 2008: p. 205). 
Abortion, on the other, is no longer considered to be a tragedy. It instead 
is a way of controlling the ‘flawed nature’. Therefore, “[o]verall, it becomes 
a story of ‘us’, the forces of control and perfection, against ‘them’, the 
forces of randomness and imperfection” (Elshtain, 2008: p. 209). She, as 
a Christian philosopher, obviously did not favour this rearrangement of 
concepts around the individual decision and sovereignty over one’s 
body/foetus, nature and society, which is understandable; the eugenics 
projects have always been criticised by the Church, however the rest of 
the Abrahamic religions (i.e. Judaism and Islam) have shown more 
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flexibility regarding the issue (cf. Sandel, 2005: pp. 196-210). This, 
though, is not the case for abortion. All of the traditional religions are 
clearly against it. So, it is evident that Elshtain could not be agreeing with 
either of them. 
The first underlying dichotomy that Elshtain put forward was the 
dichotomy of perfection against randomness. Broadly conceived, she was 
on the side of natural randomness. The deeper dichotomy, nevertheless, 
is between ‘seeking perfection’ against ‘gaining maturity’. The recent 
dichotomy suggests the necessity of taming the sovereign self. So just 
like any other taming, her plan contained putting some limits on 
sovereignty. We can do that, she suggested, by defining sovereignty with 
responsibility. So the idea of maturity here did not contain only the 
positive element of trusting one’s own either reason or godlike power, 
rather it has been defined by responsibility. Any sense of responsibility 
comes with restrictions and limitations for the sake of mutuality. One is 
responsible in relation with others with diverging demands and benefits 
etc. Thus one becomes mature ‘in a relationship’ and ‘with others’ and 
through putting some limits on his or her demands. Mutuality, Elshtain 
argued, would define the final achievement of a mature sovereign self 
(Elshtain, 2008: p. 227-30). 
Finally, Elshtain was thorough in her following of an Intellectual 
Deviation story which begins with Ockham and ends in the ‘pro-choice’ 
movement. The protagonist of the story is the human sovereign who 
seeks godlike powers. It is essential to indicate that one can legitimately 
use the Intellectual Deviation genealogical trend to unmask the 
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intellectual background of the current phenomenon. It perhaps is difficult 
to argue against it. Nevertheless, it should be added that this does not 
imply that the ‘pro-choice’ movement (or Nazi eugenics) are the only 
results of the new order of concepts and doctrines. As Taylor showed, the 
new order can be understood by a master narrative which explains how 
all of the options (either religious or not) have been affected and re-
ordered. So, this genealogy cannot simply be used to provide an analytic 
tool of condemnation of one option. It was almost behind all other options 
as well. Viewed in that light, a narrative which unmasks the remote 
origins of modern thought also requires seeing how all the rest of the 
existing options have been affected by that origin. Otherwise, the 
narrative might turn into a strategic tool for condemnation of the others. 
As illustrated above, according to Sloterdijk, turning an ‘unmasking 
project’ into ‘a strategic tool of condemnation’ was indeed the original 
mistake of the enlighteners.  
4.2. Löwith and Gregory’s histories of failure 
 The classic version of the second theme can be found in Karl 
Löwith’s narrative (1949) and the most recent version in Brad Gregory’s 
(2012). Löwith was a member of a generation of thinkers who have 
experienced the destructions of both world wars. So it was natural for him 
and his colleagues to be suspicious of human nature, human historical 
achievements and all political ideologies. One intellectual reaction, as 
Wolin recognised, was not to interpret Nazism only as a German 
phenomenon but to connect it with the wider context. The context could 
be Western modernity in general. For instance, Nazism for Hannah 
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Arendt was somehow related to Stalinism, because both share some 
modern conceptions of humanity and both as ‘totalizing ideologies’ and 
are putting forward an idea of ‘mass practice’ (Wolin, 2015: pp. 59-61). 
The other context could be the tradition.  Arendt, yet again, searched for 
the roots of the modern form of barbarity in tradition. For example in her 
essay Tradition and the Modern Age (1961), she wrote:  
The end of a tradition does not necessarily mean that 
traditional concepts have lost their power over the minds of 
men. On the contrary, it sometimes seems that this power of 
well-worn notions and categories becomes more tyrannical 
as the tradition loses its living force and as the memory of 
its beginning recedes; it may even reveal its full coercive 
force only after its end has come and men no longer even 
rebel against it. (Arendt, 1961: p. 26) 
Wolin prefers a biographical interpretation of Arendt’s intellectual 
tendency toward a contextualization of the disasters of the past century. 
He believes that Arendt managed to avoid implicating her country of 
origin. “Perhaps it would have been psychologically difficult for Arendt to 
admit that Auschwitz was in fact a German invention” (Wolin, 2015: p. 
61). We should also recall that most of these figures were living in exile 
which was another source of trauma for them. As Adorno famously wrote: 
“To those who no longer have a homeland, writing becomes home” and 
he concluded that “In the end, authors are not even allowed to be [at] 
home in their writing”. (Adorno, 2015: p. 51) 
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The biographical and psychological interpretation of the post-war 
German thinkers (e.g. Arendt, Voegelin, Löwith, Adorno, Horkheimer, etc) 
would undoubtedly be intellectually gainful. On the whole, it was true that 
they were, each in his or her own unique way, sorrowfully searching for 
some sort of broader explanations for the manmade horrors of modern 
Europe of the time. 
For the same reason, one could effortlessly find a spirit of 
disappointment and frustration in their theories. This was also the 
dominant theme of Löwith’s works. He formulated the answer as follows: 
“we have learned to wait without hope, for hope would be hope for the 
wrong thing” (Lӧwith, 1949: p. 3). Thus in his genealogical study of the 
theological origins of the modern ideological Messianisms, he suggested 
that the modern historian cannot have any sort of overarching and 
comprehensive understanding of man’s history. The historian, therefore, 
should focus on producing some random thoughts about the events as 
some sort of informed hypotheses which will never result in a wide-
ranging theory of history (Lӧwith, 1949: chapter 1; Wolin, 2015: pp. 70- 
100). 
Gregory’s erudite book on the Reformation falls into the same 
category of disappointment about the future of modernity, if nonetheless 
for different reasons (Gregory, 2012). So if Milbank emphasised the 
process of Christian over-piety as one of the contexts of modernity, and 
Taylor’s keyword was hyper-reform, Gregory is more concerned about 
the Reformation’s hyper-pluralism. His genealogy is thoroughly a history 
of failures. That is the history of constant failures of respectively, Middle 
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Age Christianity, the Reformation, and modernity. However, he begins his 
genealogy with Scotist theological revolution, and here he put the 
emphasis on the unintended consequences of the Reformation-- as it is 
clear in the title of his book. Accordingly, for him, the Reformation is 
important not only because of the Protestantism’s novel conception of the 
relationship between God and creation; but because: 
[T]he intractable doctrinal disagreements among 
Protestants and especially between Catholics and 
Protestants […] had the unintended effect of sidelining 
explicitly Christian claims about God in relationship to the 
natural world. This left only empirical observation and 
philosophical speculation as supra- confessional means of 
investigating and theorizing that relationship. (Gregory, 
2012: p. 40) 
Hence the dissent among the Christians of the late Middle Ages, 
and epitomized by the Thirty Years’ War, caused the emergence of the 
secular as the neutral which was, on the cognitive level, represented by 
the scientific (thus neutral) ‘facts’. Yet its political manifestation was the 
separation of the state from the Church.  
Gregory maintains that there are a series of Life Questions, such 
as: “What should I live for, and why?” “What should I believe, and why 
should I believe it?” “What is morality, and where does it come from?” 
“What kind of person should I be?” These are “serious questions about 
life, with important implications for life” (Gregory, 2012: p. 74). Although 
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people usually do not answer these questions explicitly (except probably 
academics in philosophy departments), all of the ordinary people have 
some implicit answers to these questions. Gregory believes that the crisis 
begun by the failure of the Christians of Middle Ages to practice 
according to the teachings of the church. After a series of events in the 
Middle Ages, the hierarchical society became naturalised and eventually 
“caritas was indiscernible in the exercise of power” (Gregory, 2012: p. 
367). So when Christianity turned into the mere ideological validation of 
the socioeconomic hierarchy, the voice of the Church insider critics 
became louder. The problem with the Protestant critics, Gregory argued, 
was that they thought that the corruption is the result of the ‘doctrinal 
errors’ and the Christian teachings (not some sort of, say, institutional and 
social problems). So, their recommended method was a return to the 
original biblical messages. When they challenged the Church’s authority 
in its interpretation of the Scriptures, they unintentionally paved the way 
for questions about the nature of knowledge which ended up in “radical 
doctrinal scepticism and relativism already in 1520s” (Gregory, 2012: p. 
369).  Gregory believes that the ‘open-ended range of rival truth claims 
about answers to the Life Questions’ is “the most important distant 
historical source for contemporary Western hyperpluralism” (Gregory, 
2012: p. 369). So the Reformation figures also failed because of the 
unintended consequences of their doctrinal reform.  
Finally, according to Gregory, mid-seventieth century modernity 
was ‘forged’ and ‘fabricated’ in the context of these failures. Still, he 
believes that the Enlightenment’s faith in ‘reason alone’ was a misstep. 
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So while modern philosophy failed to provide a ‘rational substitute’ for 
religious answers to Life Questions, empirical science also proved not to 
be the discipline able to do so (Gregory, 2012: pp. 373-383). He 
concluded the book with these lines: 
I wish this book could have had a happier ending. But that 
would have happened only if the world in which we are 
living today were different. And our present world would be 
different only if the past had not been what it was, because 
the past made the present what it is. At the outset of the 
twentieth century Lenin asked, “What is to be done?” His 
answers turned out to be disastrous. I am not among those 
who believe in comprehensive blueprints for human social 
engineering backed by political power. That has tended not 
to go so well, especially in the past century. (2012: p. 381) 
Following all these failures, specifically those of the past century, 
Gregory does not seem to be willing to keep hope alive in difficult times.  
Both Lӧwith and Gregory mostly refer to the failures of the past 
century as the cause of absolute frustration about the future. A significant 
analytic gap is discernible here. The methodological presumption of both 
these ideas is that by seeing the past we can predict future. That is to 
say, the first statement is this: the past has made us. We are the results 
of the long march in history. So, human beings are social and historical 
beings which are constantly subject to production and reproduction in 
society. The second statement, though, is this: we (the historically and 
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socially constituted creatures) have failed miserably in the past 
(specifically the twentieth century). The conclusion from those two 
statements would be: Therefore, we will fail in the future or the chances of 
failure are so high. This is a quite different statement that needs more 
evidence which we cannot find in either of the books. Ironically, the 
rejection of this argument is one of the themes of Lӧwith’s Meaning in 
History (1949). Polybius believed, as Lӧwith showed, that it is easy to 
foretell the future by ‘inference from the past’. But the contribution of the 
Abrahamic religions was to reject that idea. According to these religions, 
that is to say, specifically Christianity and Islam, man cannot foretell the 
future unless God reveals it to him through revelation (Lӧwith, 1949: p. 9). 
This conception of the future is also embedded in modern times, seeing 
as it does, the future as a dynamic horizon, not merely the natural 
consequence of the past.  
Yet in returning to Gregory’s conclusion, one cannot find such an 
argument for the unavoidability of disappointment about the future, 
however he might disagree, but the disappointment and the lack of willing 
to even hope is the result of his presupposed assumption about a missed 
and disappeared Golden Age. So, the implicit presupposition is that there 
was a Golden age of harmony between the teachings of the Church and 
the practices of the believers. There is an implication that answering Life 
Questions was only possible in the bygone harmony. Now, we cannot 
return to harmony because the promised balance cannot reproduce itself 
as a result of a disruption in the normal current of history. This could be 
an unintended consequence of the Reformation which derailed and 
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diverted history from its intended course. Whether we believe in such a 
diversion or not, this presumption needs some evidences and arguments-
- well beyond plain reference to the bitter experiences of the past century. 
4.3. Unger’s Experimentalism  
My final claim about the Intellectual Deviation story, represented in 
the rest of the chapter, highlights the way in which it can help us to 
remain hopeful for the future through engaging in co-practice. 
Accordingly, my second pragmatist standpoint is about defending the 
idea of experimentalism. I want to argue that the Intellectual Deviation 
story prepares us with a crucial distinction between two sides of 
Prometheanism (rebellion versus self-creation) which is helpful to engage 
in co-existence and co-practice in a Taylorian age of plurality of options. 
So where does pragmatism and the Intellectual Deviation story 
overlap? Roberto Unger’s take on pragmatism is relevant to this 
discussion (Unger, 2007). However, he traced his pragmatism back to 
Nicholas of Cusa (Unger, 2007: p. 28); I will argue it is more 
understandable and defendable in the Scotist nominalist frame. 
Let us begin with the discussion presented in the former section. 
Unger believes that the miserable heritage of the past century and its 
ideologies affected the Western mind-set. So, he writes: 
After the calamitous adventures and conflicts of the 
twentieth century and the downfall of many of its utopian 
hopes, humanity finds itself tied to a very restricted 
repertory of institutional options for organizing each part of 
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social life. These options are the fate of contemporary 
societies. We can escape that fate only by renovating and 
enlarging this repertory. (Unger, 2007: p. 185) 
The theme of emancipation from the ‘unhappy’, restricted and fate-
centred mind-set is one of the main themes of Unger’s works (Unger, 
1998 and 2007). His answer is summarised in this motto: ‘recapture the 
imagination of alternatives’ (Unger, 2007: p. 185). That is to say, we need 
to get over, Unger suggests, the horrors of the past experiences not by 
restricting our options to the least utopian (thus less dangerous) ones but, 
conversely, through imagining radically different alternative futures.  
The underlying idea of his argument is that human beings are 
more godlike when they are not confined to the present context (Unger, 
2007: p. 43). When we do not let the past dictate to us the form of the 
present, we will be more godlike. So, this is the first fundamental similarity 
between the nominalist voluntarist theological conception of God and 
Unger’s pragmatism. In other words, God cannot be bounded and 
confined with anything determined beyond His powers; even His own 
former decisions. Having godlike powers, hence, is to allow the minimum 
of determination from the past decisions/experiences as well as the least 
effects from the present contexts. 
In other words, Unger’s invitation is to let the future (not the past) 
change and form the present. So, while for Lӧwith and Gregory the 
present is a wretched result of the past bitter experiences, Unger’s 
pragmatist approach urges us to seek a present that is oriented to the 
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future. That is to say, we can create “a present that provides us with the 
instruments of its overcoming” (Unger, 2007: p. 28). Thus, we need more 
alternative options, more imaginary possible futures and thus more 
systematic usage of imagination, not sticking with already existing and 
less-risky options. To the extent that we allow the images of the future to 
change our present condition, we will empower the individual.  By 
empowering the individual, Unger means: raising the individual up to the 
godlike power and freedom (Unger, 2007: p. 28).  
The second area of overlap between Unger’s pragmatism and the 
nominalist theology is this: both (intentionally or unintendedly) provide 
human beings with freedom through preparing him with powers of self-
creation. When we form and shape the present we form and shape 
ourselves. Therefore, the human being is the only creature which has the 
advantage of being able to create and recreate him or herself. One can, 
for instance, extend this idea in politics. A pragmatist politics, for Unger, is 
a politics which is not mere “registering of preferences”. It is, instead, “a 
process of collective learning and self-formation” (Unger, 2007: P. 189). 
Unger supports a form of political democratic system which encourages 
citizens to take risk and learn from those experiments. Any risk, though, 
comes with the possibility of failure. Those failures, should not be 
considered as being merely disastrous, but educational. They should not 
also, Unger demands, be destructive for the risk-taker citizen. They 
should be, alternatively, a source of learning. The fundamental idea is 
that we cannot learn only through the review and internalisation of the 
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formerly existed principles22. We, instead, learn from our own acts and 
experiences. In the same vein, Holbrook and Briggle suggest that 
“principles should only serve the limited role of starting points for 
discussion of particular actions” (Holbrook and Briggle, 2014: p. 62). Why 
is that? Their argument goes like this: “acting requires autonomy”. That is 
to say, “acting requires that we own our actions” (Holbrook and Briggle, 
2014: p. 62). So, if we know in advance, through those principles, what 
we should do on a certain occasion, we are thus determined by 
something which precedes our autonomy (Holbrook and Briggle, 2014: p. 
62). Therefore, we will not be autonomous which was a prerequisite of an 
educational action. Their suggestion and final conclusion is that we 
should treat principles as starting points for discussion and platforms of 
actions not necessary guides. This, I believe, is the spirit of what Unger 
called pragmatist experimentalism. The elements of this sort of 
experimentalism (autonomy, primacy of action, godlike power etc.) were 
firstly explained and highlighted in the fourteenth century nominalist 
theology.  
A political system which is founded on experimentalism not only 
encourages citizens to take risks but it also prepares and guarantees a 
form of safety net to protect them from the misfortune and the 
consequences of risks. Unger tends to call this an anti-fate project 
(Unger, 2007: p. 191). Thus, the government is able to undo fate, so to 
                                                          
22
 In this sense, he came closer to John Dewey who defended the idea of democracy as 
education. Even further, Dewey believed that America is an experiment (Shook, 2014). 
So in this way, American citizens do not receive education to be democratic afterwards. 
Democracy is the process of trying several ways and through all the adventures citizens 
learn something useful. 
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speak, through guaranteeing and securing a level of support for minimum 
income, health care and so on.  Such a safety net, accordingly, 
diminishes the role that “social fortune and misfortune have in shaping 
our life chances” (Unger, 2007: p. 191). It also intrigues and induces a 
sense of curiosity and search that is needed to imagine the unimaginable 
and also act accordingly with the minimum possible concern about the 
unintended consequences.  Unger believes such a society will produce 
more godlike, empowered and free individuals who are able to take risks 
and learn from their own experiences23. 
5. What is to be done? 
The final argument is that the desire of self-formation, self-creation 
and self-actualisation is the second side of Prometheanism. The first side, 
which is well-known, is the rebellion against the transcendental and 
considering the transcendental as the projection of the human mind into 
the sky. The point is that there can never be an overwhelming consensus 
about either this Promethean description of the origins of religion or 
                                                          
23
 There is a relevant point of discussion here which is Beck’s notion of ‘risk 
society’ which is mainly concerned with the idea of ‘risk avoiding’. Risk society’s central 
question, for Beck, was how to prevent, minimize or channel the risks which are 
systematically produced as part of the modernization process (Beck, 1992: p. 19). If the 
central ideal of the industrial society was creation and the fair distribution of wealth, the 
ultimate ideal of the risk society would be safety from the hazards caused by 
modernization (Beck, 1992: pp. 49-50; Beck, 1999: chapter two). It is curious that Beck 
believed that the counterpart to the knowledge of risk society is reflexive knowledge 
which investigates the meta-changes in the risk society (Beck, Bonss & Lau, 2003: pp. 
5-8). Beck’s use of the term reflexivity was different from (but still connected to) the use 
of the term by Giddens and Lash (Beck, 1999: chapter six). Reflexive modernization for 
Beck was the process of the emergence of radical modernization. That is to say, 
modernity demystifies and questions its own structures. “Simple modernization becomes 
reflexive modernization to the extent that it disenchants and then dissolves its own 
taken-for-granted premises” (Beck, Bonss & Lau, 2003: p. 3). A disharmony between the 
conservative ideal of safety and the radical ideal of reflexivity is traceable here. To be 
radical and reflexive makes some levels of risk-taking unavoidable. It thus becomes 
necessary to revise and radicalise the first Beck of ‘risk society’ with the help of the 
second Beck of ‘reflexive modernity’. 
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another description of man being the projection of God on earth. We, 
nevertheless, are living in a society which contains both of those options 
and a lot more alternative possibilities in between. So, while we cannot 
reach an overlapping consensus about the principles, we can 
pragmatically engage in the process of self-formation through what 
Sloterdijk called co-practice (Sloterdijk, 2013: 450-452). In this way, we 
do not need to presuppose that an authentic moment in history should be 
revived, or need a common knowledge and a series of principles to guide 
us all the way. We just need to accept the existing order of the society as 
a start point and also to consider its dynamicity and plasticity. So, as 
Taylor said, the existing order which gives priority to the [Promethean] 
individual was avoidable and was not a necessary destiny of history. It, 
nonetheless, occurred (Taylor, 2007). It still is not the final order and the 
normal state of being (as subtraction stories would suggest). So it can be 
and will be changed and transformed. Finally, as it emerged not only and 
solely through some doctrinal transformations, it cannot only and solely 
be changed through some intellectual amendments. The transformation, 
alternatively, will be the result of practice and co-practice. So, we need to 
realistically recognise that we are living in a secular age. At the same 
time, though, the realist conception would lead us to be pragmatically 
engaged in actively transforming ourselves and thus the society around 
us. Unger’s suggestion for this engagement was an experimentalist 
scheme. I would suggest that to be an experimentalist in a Promethean 
age, we should be able to recognise the second side of Prometheanism 
which is self-creation. 
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We might explain the self-creation side of Prometheanism by 
connecting the previously discussed Sloterdijk’s critique of the 
Enlightenment ‘ideology critique’ and his defence of self-forming 
asceticism. Sloterdijk argues for “an expansion of the practice zone” and 
writes: 
Being human means existing in an operatively curved space 
in which actions return to affect the actor, works the worker, 
communication the communicator, thoughts the thinker and 
feelings the feeler. All these forms of reaction […] have an 
ascetic, that is to say a practicing character—although […] 
they largely belong to the undeclared and unnoticed 
asceticisms or the occulted training routines. (Sloterdijk, 
2013: p. 110) 
Marx, perhaps, was the first and the most significant contributor to 
the recognition of the ‘curved space’ in the Promethean context. In his 
early years, Marx was stunned by Feuerbach’s mode of ideology critique 
and anthropological explanation of religion as a form of alienation. 
However, he gradually distanced himself from Feuerbach by claiming that 
none of the Young Hegelians were radical enough and “they were not 
getting at the ‘roots’” (Bernstein, 1972: p. 68). So the key to our 
discussion is how Marx defined the ‘roots’. In a way, he was not totally 
happy with Feuerbach’s critique of religion because it was incomplete. 
Feuerbach revealed and unmasked the ‘essence’ of religion but he stops 
there. In his sixth thesis on Feuerbach, Marx wrote: 
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Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human 
essence. But the essence of man is no abstraction inhering 
in each single individual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of 
social relations. (Marx Qutd. in Bernstein, 1972: p. 66)  
From this notion of ‘ensemble of social relations’, Marx concludes 
the dynamic potential of praxis to overcome all forms of alienation in 
history. The true Marxian question was what Lenin asked later on: what is 
to be done? Bernstein showed that getting into the roots, for Marx, was to 
understand that ‘[g]enuinely new potentialities arise as a result of human 
praxis’ (Bernstein, 1972: p. 70). It was in his Manuscripts that “practice 
takes on the creative power of the divinity” (Feenberg, 2014: p. 215). 
Namely, nature was treated as a raw material and subject to human’s 
godlike will, manipulation and transformative decision.  
Marx attempted to go beyond the modern unbridgeable gap 
between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ or fact and value through praxis. The attempt was 
“to break through the barrier of alienated and reified cultural forms to a 
reflexive concept of transforming practice” (Feenberg, 2014: p. 215). This 
issue can be addressed by rejection of a common misconception of 
Marx’s role as a moralist. Marx famously invited a revolution in the role of 
the philosopher thus he asked them to change the world not to merely 
interpret it. He was also the writer of the most heated passages against 
capitalism and for the sake of proletariat revolutionary action. However, 
Bernstein, echoing Lobkowicz, convincingly showed that Marx did not 
believe that one can measure the alienated state of human being against 
some image of ‘transcendental human nature’, ‘logically predetermined 
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future’ or a definite self-actualised human (Bernstein, 1972: pp. 69-70). 
So Marx had not begun with such an ‘ought’ as a moral basis of the 
rejection of the existing capitalism. It is crucial to note Marx’s Hegelian 
context. Both Marx and Engels considered the Hegelian tradition as being 
‘essentially completed’ (Feenberg, 2014: p. 16) and it was time to study it 
from ‘outside’. So while for Hegel the resolution of antinomies was a 
merely speculative and theoretical task, for Marx even the philosophical 
categories were the “sublimated versions of concrete social relations” 
(Feenberg, 2014: p. 204). If so, philosophical dichotomies can only be 
transcended through social practice.  
The result of practice is, Marx argued, the possibility of envisaging 
new and previously unknown possibilities of “ultimate human self-
actualisation” (Bernstein, 1972: p. 70). So in this sense, the results are 
‘genuinely new potentialities’ because they cannot be foreseen before 
action. Thus, Marx was not suggesting that man should overthrow the 
existing conditions of production. His whole point was that “the ‘material 
practice’ necessarily does overthrow them” (Lobkowicz, 1967: p. 418). 
The point that Bernstein and Lobkowicz were trying to make was that 
Marx was not a mere moralist and prophet who imagined a revolution and 
the results of his imaginative future were the Manifesto (on the united 
revolutionary action of the workers of the world) or his eleventh thesis on 
Feuerbach (on the necessity of changing the world by philosophers). 
Marx’s answer to Lenin’s question (i.e. what is to be done) was to 
transcend the philosophical dichotomies by practice which will lead to 
new potentialities of self-actualisation. So Marx’s main point is:  
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… human practice is revolutionary by its very nature. It is 
what men do that is decisive in history, not what they do by 
wilfully engaging in social struggles aimed at destroying the 
existing order, but rather what they constantly and inevitably 
do as determined by what past generations have done. 
(Lobkowicz, 1967: p. 418) 
All in all, for Marx, practice is not something that we should do in 
the future to change the existing conditions. It is rather what we do as 
human beings. The new potentialities will emerge out of those practices. 
In this sense, Marx radicalised Feuerbach by seeing not only religion as a 
manmade product, but man himself as a result of the ensemble of social 
relations, social class and labor. He wrote: 
[F]or socialist man, however, the entire so-called world 
history is only the creation of man through human labor and 
the development of nature for man, he has evident and 
incontrovertible proof of his self-creation, his own formation 
process. (Marx Qutd. in Bernstein, 1972: p. 67. Ital. Original) 
Let us say it in this way, from Sloterdijk’s point of view; Feuerbach 
could represent the Enlightenment man of ‘ideology critique’. Feuerbach 
formulated the rebellion side of the Prometheanism by revealing how 
religion is fabricated. In other words, he showed that religion is not what 
religious people assume. Marx, nevertheless, fully represents the modern 
discoverer of the ‘curved space’ and the second aspect of 
Prometheanism i.e. self-creation. Answering the question of ‘what is to be 
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done’ after the Enlightenment is to answer the question of how to go 
beyond ideology critique and unmasking; How to co-practice and to co-
create new possibilities and open new horizons.  
Lӧwith, Elshtain and Gregory would argue that the bitter 
experiences of communism and Nazi eugenic projects were some of 
those ‘new possibilities’. There were, arguably, the radical interpretations 
of self-formation and perfection seeking. Nevertheless, the outcome was 
not as plausible as Marx foresaw. So, finally, according to Marx, there is 
not any human essence or transcendental human nature that can work as 
a criterion of making progress. If the past experiences were also 
miserable failures, what will remain to be considered as a criterion of 
progress? What is the current motivation behind the idea of progress? 
Neither is there a transcendental goal in the future that human beings can 
reach and celebrate its attainment, nor an inside nature according to 
which we act and consequently enjoy the achieved harmony. So, what is 
there that lets us hope for the future? Why do we still ‘irrationally’ believe 
in the new (and also positive) potentialities that will appear following 
practice? How is it possible for us to keep hoping in the modern age? 
Comparative studies with other periods of human history show that the 
belief in science or a better future after a political revolution, are not 
rational and self-evident hopes. In many periods of human history people 
were expecting a coming apocalypse and thus total annihilation. 
Nonetheless, they have never experienced anything close to the horrible 
experiences of the past century. So, why are we still able to hope?  
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Again, at this juncture, the Intellectual Deviation story gives us the 
most satisfactory answer. It puts emphasis on a journey which began in 
the fourteenth century and ended up in the emergence of ‘exclusive 
humanism’ and new conceptions of human flourishing detached from the 
transcendental. It gives us a reasonable starting point to tell a long story 
of the attribution of God’s powers and creativity to human beings and to 
seeing the future as a dynamic horizon potentially still on our side. 
Hopefulness is a common theme of Unger’s experimentalism and 
of Sloterdijk’s invitation to co-practice. In a way, both these pragmatic 
projects are today’s radicalisations of the basic doctrines that firstly 
appeared in the nominalist theology. That is to say, we can and should 
remain hopeful and keep dreaming for a more plausible future because 
the future is different from the past. Thus, one cannot learn and foresee 
the future by looking at the past. Also the future is not predetermined by a 
transcendental being; rather, it is continually created by human praxis.  
6. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have argued that Taylor’s Reform Master 
Narrative, which is a genealogical study of the process of the emergence 
of the modern secular age, is similar to the Intellectual Deviation story, 
which follows the same goal but from a different perspective. The latter is 
more elitist and narrates the story of the emergence of a revolutionary 
theology among the scholastic nominalists of the fourteenth century. I 
have argued that both narratives are sharing a more or less similar 
description of the nominalist theological upheaval and both consider it not 
to be the most important ‘reason’ behind modern secularity but a 
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relatively significant historical factor. I also argued that the Intellectual 
Deviation story is still relevant and important. In brief: First of all, it makes 
a reasonable starting point for a long narrative of the emergence of the 
modern secularity. Secondly, it helps us to give a positive explanation for 
the theoretical invention of the secular which has been ignored by the 
subtraction stories. Thirdly, the Intellectual Deviation story remains 
relevant and important today. It still prepares us with the most convincing 
answer for the question of modern hope: why do we still hope for a 
happier future? The Intellectual Deviation story would answer the 
question by referring to the theological unconscious of the positive view to 
the future. Finally, I have argued that the Intellectual Deviation story also 
can prepare us with a normative judgement. That is to say, it certainly 
contributed in seeing the world as a curved space in which work shapes 
the worker and thought the thinker etc. So, not only descriptively was it 
the unconscious background of the emergence of the modern 
Prometheanism but it can also show us the second more hidden aspect 
of Prometheanism which is the idea of self-formation, self-creation and 
self-actualisation by mimicking the transcendental, that is by attaining 
godlike powers. However, we might not be totally agreed on the rejection 
of the transcendental, we can, nonetheless, agree on co-practice to form 
ourselves. In the next chapters, I will show that tourist atheism is a 
promising starting point for noticing the recent aspect of Prometheanism. 
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Part Two 
Pilgrim and Tourist Atheisms 
 
Pilgrimage, on the one hand, is the experience of travelling 
between the clear borders; between light and dark or true and false. I 
have used this metaphor for those atheists that deeply believe in the 
reason versus faith dichotomy. Today representatives of pilgrim atheism 
are the New Atheists who mostly rely on Darwinism in their rejection of 
religions. So, the scientific reason which is not ‘contaminated’ with faith, 
for them, is the border which divides true from false. Tourism as a 
category, on the other hand, is not compatible with the idea of sanctity 
because sanctity is interwoven with the idea of unity. But tourism is the 
experience of a plurality of goals. Thus, tourists unlike pilgrims do not see 
the world as being clearly divided between true and false. Tourism is the 
metaphor that I employ to describe an emerging type of atheism. Tourist 
atheists are players who do not restrict themselves to one criterion such 
as reason. They instead try to see religions as buffets offering useful 
items for an atheistic life. 
In chapter four, I will show how the myth of warfare between 
religion and science, as the foundational myth for New Atheism, has been 
constructed. In chapter five, I will describe the touristic logic of the central 
figure of today’s tourist atheism: Alain de Botton. I will argue that tourism 
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is the logic behind all of his works, not only those about religion but also 
those on philosophy and art. In chapter six, I will go through the details 
about the theological roots of the tourist atheist conception of the 
individual. The argument of that chapter is that the ‘individual-sovereign’ 
is one part of the Franciscan trinity of God, State and individual 
sovereigns, expanded to the modern age. I will also show the centrality of 
such a theological conception of the individual in the works of atheist 
philosophers such as Peter Sloterdijk. Finally, in chapter seven of the 
thesis, this question will be addressed: is Auguste Comte the forerunner 
of tourist atheism? It is a crucial question because of Comte’s 
understanding of the modern spiritual crisis. 
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Chapter Four 
Pilgrim Atheists and the Myth of Warfare 
 
1.  Introduction 
In this chapter I will write about the theological foundations of the 
scientific approach of those contemporary pilgrim atheists that call 
themselves New Atheists. I will argue that although Richard Dawkins and 
Daniel Dennett, among others, do not like to be called ‘reductionist’ 
because of its semantic implication (i.e. being simplistic), they are 
nonetheless tempted to choose simple, coherent, straightforward and 
easy-going theories. I intend to search for the cause of this temptation in 
the theological ideals of modern science, the most important of which is 
what Amos Funkenstein called the ideal of economy and coherence. That 
ideal was based on seeking a univocal and representational language, on 
the one hand, and presupposing a homogenous nature on the other 
hand. So a scientist of the dawn of the modern age could discover the 
natural laws, which are represented in epistemologically simple but 
ontologically pervasive formulas, and in this way he (in this case 
dominantly male) could gain god-like powers. The main insight of this 
chapter is that we can find the radicalised and ideologised version of the 
ideal of ‘economy and coherence’ in the New Atheists’ naturalistic 
arguments against the existence of God. 
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2.  The God that the New Atheists reject 
Dawkins’ arguments against the existence of God are the most 
explicit amongst the arguments of the New Atheists because he writes 
extensively, not only on the scientific issues but also on the rejection of 
religious beliefs – for example, The Blind Watchmaker (1986) and The 
God Delusion (2006). Nevertheless, explicit does not mean 
philosophically valid. Many philosophers have written about the failures of 
his arguments against God (see: Plantinga, 2011; Taylor, 2013).  
One can find two forms of arguments against God in works by 
Dawkins. Firstly, Dawkins tried to explain the existence of the belief in a 
higher being called God in agreement with his biological point of view. So, 
he coined the term cultural meme which rhymes with biological gene. 
‘Meme’ for him was a unite of transmission and replication within a culture 
(Dawkins, 2006b: p. 192). In this way, he makes a parallel between 
cultural transmission and genetic transmission and this assumes an 
evolutionary process for cultural phenomena. So memes, more or less, 
like genes propagate themselves through leaping from brain to brain and 
particularly by imitation. Dawkins also emphasises that like genes, 
memes are subject to variation. So a meme might be popular in certain 
culture but not because of its ability to improve and increase our chances 
of survival but because of its “psychological appeal” (Dawkins, 2006b: pp. 
191-4). A major difference between gene and meme, nevertheless, is that 
the genetic mutation is blind and cannot be influenced by the organism. 
However, cultural selection, in principal at least, can be manipulated, 
controlled and guided.  
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Dawkins believes that “tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes, 
fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches” are good examples 
of those memes (Dawkins, 2006b: p. 192). Dennett, for his part, believes 
that memes are ‘distinct memorable unites’ such as parts of Homer’s 
Odyssey (Dennett, 1995: p. 344). But yet both Dawkins and Dennett 
argue that the most successful meme is the idea of God. It has survived 
for thousands of years and has been popular among countless 
generations and cultures. Dawkins’s intriguing question is this: “What is it 
about the idea of God that gives it its stability and penetrance in the 
cultural environment?” (Dawkins, 2006b: p. 193). Accordingly his answer 
is: 
The survival value of the god meme in the meme pool 
results from its great psychological appeal. It provides a 
superficially plausible answer to deep and troubling 
questions about existence. It suggests that injustices in this 
world may be rectified in the next. (Dawkins, 2006b: p. 193)  
In other words, God comes about as the reconciling of existential 
questions. The religious idea of God, as an omnipotent but yet invisible 
creator of everything, is a simple, understandable and appealing answer. 
Thus, this turned into a historically successful meme in several human 
civilisations. Memes serve as an answer not only to the question of belief 
in God but also as an attractive response to a deeper and more 
challenging question: can we draw any parallel between the natural and 
cultural spheres? Does culture work according to its specific and 
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independent dynamics? Dawkins’s answer in his The Selfish Gene was 
negative.  
From a sociological point of view, the meme theory is ‘reductionist 
and blind to the roles of agents’ in promoting specific cultural resources 
(Lowe, 2010: p. 296). For instance, Lowe argues that Dawkins’s memetic 
approach rules out and underestimates the role of strategies that the 
agents adopt to disseminate particular idea into a society. Moreover, it 
never addresses this question: why some memes are central in a given 
society while others are marginal? (Lowe, 2010: p. 296). For example, 
why is the idea of God is so central to many traditional cultures while the 
idea of natural laws through which God will control the world is not that 
widespread? The idea of natural laws among the Abrahamic religions 
gave a specifically satisfactory explanation of human existence and the 
mechanisms of the world. Yet, in this form it never existed in, say, the Far 
East. All in all, the point is that by this theory Dawkins gives a simple and 
somehow deterministic argument for a popular belief in God. It is 
deterministic because in a classic way it defines a biological infrastructure 
and a cultural superstructure. Thus, evolution is considered to be a 
common and hidden logic of being. The same laws, also, applied in both 
areas of culture and non-culture. From a sociological point of view, this 
type of metaphorical and analogical explanation is hardly considered to 
be enough. But the point still, is that Dawkins arguments tend toward 
those simple and unifying explanations which explain everything. This is, 
perhaps, a version of the scientific ideal of a theory of everything about 
which I will write below. 
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The second argument is known as ‘the Ultimate Boeing 747’ in 
which Dawkins tried to say that the existence of God is as improbable as 
“the chance that a hurricane, sweeping through a scrapyard, would have 
the luck to assemble a Boeing 747” (2006: pp. 137-8). We might wonder 
why he used such an odd example for the rejection of God. Dawkins 
explained his intention in this way: “a God who is capable of sending 
intelligible signals to millions of people simultaneously, and of receiving 
messages from all of them simultaneously, cannot be, whatever else he 
might be, simple” (2006: p. 184). So, God (or God’s mind) needs to be 
extremely complex, but where does this ultimate complex being come 
from? Dawkins says that there is no chance that God can come into 
existence without another complex designer – just like a highly complex 
machine such as a Boeing 747. Consequently, this discussion will end up 
in a vicious regress which is not logically plausible. Therefore, the 
conclusion is that such a being does not exist.  
James Taylor criticised Dawkins by arguing that the ‘complexity’ 
that Dawkins attributed to the Boeing 747 needs to be different from the 
‘complexity’ that he attributes to God because the first one is a physical 
being while the second one is a supernatural one; he also argued that 
that such a complex being as God does not necessarily need an external 
designer. That is to say, one can attribute such complexity to ‘something 
in God’s nature’ (Taylor, 2013: pp. 739-741). For instance, the God of 
Abrahamic religions has always been considered ‘perfect’. Therefore 
“God does not depend for God’s existence on anything other than God” 
(Taylor, 2013: p. 740). But Dawkins has never clarified his own 
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conception of God, His alleged complexity or the dissimlarities between 
his God and the God of the believers.  
Additionally, most of these criticisms of Dawkins’ conception of 
God share one point that I tend to call the atheistic add-on to the theory of 
evolution. This add-on is a thesis that Plantinga called ‘the naturalistic 
origin thesis’ and is different form the theory of evolution and Darwinism. 
The ‘naturalistic origin thesis’ states that “life itself developed from non-
living matter” and that this is a process which does not need the creative 
activity of a designer (Plantinga: 2011, p. 9). The point is that this belief is 
neither the logical consequence of the evolutionary theory nor that of the 
idea of natural selection. Rather, it is an independent argument, the 
validity of which remains unexamined. For Plantinga, the theory of 
evolution and the idea of natural selection would at best demonstrate 
that: 
[I]t is not astronomically improbable that the living world was 
produced by unguided evolution and hence without design. 
But the argument from  
[1] P is not astronomically improbable  
[2] therefore P,  
is a bit unprepossessing. (Plantinga, 2011: pp. 24-5) 
Thus, there is an inconsistency in Dawkins’ argument against God. 
In other words, he leaps from a scientific, informed guess to an absolutely 
true worldview which shows the absurdity of the idea of God. Alister 
McGrath also has seen such a problematic transition from Darwinism 
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considered as a provisional scientific theory, to Darwinism considered as 
a universal worldview (McGrath, 2010: p. 336). 
Those who criticise Dawkins typically stop here. That is to say, 
they show his inconsistency but they do not go further to ask about the 
underlying reason. But, I tend to assume that there is a significant 
implication behind it. Why do the New Atheists not see this apparent 
inconsistency? Why do they not argue in support of their naturalistic add-
on to the evolutionary theory? McGrath points out a simple but serious 
issue in this vein. He says that New Atheists “tend to assume that this is 
self-evident” (McGrath, 2010: p. 337). To put it another way, the New 
Atheists do not see this add-on as an add-on; rather, they think that this is 
a logical consequence of the evolutionary theory which forced Darwin 
himself to give up his God.24 Thus for New Atheists, relinquishing the idea 
of a God is the ‘self-evident’ consequence of those scientific ‘facts’. But 
why do they believe in such a thing? I want to suggest that we need to 
search for the answer not in a God that the New Atheists reject but in a 
God that they reproduce.  
3.  The God that the New Atheists reproduce 
The God that the New Atheists reproduce, I suggest, is the God 
who became the role model of early modern scientists – a God who 
possessed ‘objective’ knowledge. Jesus, according to the Christian 
narratives, also ‘became God’ when he gained that knowledge through 
his journey along the continuum of being from man’s pole to God’s (see 
                                                          
24
 However, Darwin did not become an atheist – he finally called himself agnostic. 
Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895), known as ‘Darwin’s Bulldog’, coined the term in 
1869. 
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chapter two). How did this theological approach to God, Jesus and (later 
on) scientists appear? Following the main thesis of this study that was 
elaborated on in previous chapters, I will argue that this approach goes 
back to the Scotist revolution in scholasticism.  
For Aquinas and via antiqua, language was full of analogies and 
symbols. But for Scotus, the natural objects were no longer the symbols 
of something beyond themselves (Funkenstein, 1986: pp. 28-9).The 
Scotist univocal conception of language (i.e. the concepts mean the same 
thing when they refer either to man or God) became the basis of the 
modern scientific discourse. Funkenstein called this the drive for 
unequivocation, which means that “the ultimate prospect of science was a 
mathesis universalis – an unequivocal, universal, coherent, yet artificial 
language to capture our ‘clear and distinct’ ideas and their unique 
combinations” (Funkenstein, 1986: pp. 28-9). Nonetheless, the Scotist 
revolution did not remain limited to the language. It also challenged the 
old ontology by presuming a homogeneous, uniform and symmetrical 
nature. That nature was not governed by a body of patchwork laws; 
rather, there are natural laws which apply both to heaven and earth. 
Funkenstein called this the drive for homogeneity (Funkenstein, 1986: p. 
28). The drives for homogeneous nature and univocal language were in 
fact the consequences of the new Scotist conception of the relationship 
between man and God: the omnipresent God who exists in things, and 
the man who has been created in the image of God so can therefore 
become God. Needless to say, Newton’s ideal of mathematisation or “the 
demand to see nature as ‘written in mathematical letters’” was the result 
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of this type of attitude toward nature (Funkenstein, 1986: p. 29). The 
crucial point that Funkenstein makes is that both of these drives (the drive 
for univocation and the drive for homogeneity) are two parts of one ideal 
for the modern scientific pilgrimage: the ideal of ‘economy and coherence’ 
(1986: p. 30).  
This ideal of “the economy of language and the structure of things” 
(Funkenstein, 1986: p. 30) was the underlying motivation behind the 
concentration of the attempts of seventeenth-century scientists to find the 
mathematical language of nature (e.g. Newton). By the second half of the 
nineteenth century this ideal had shifted from physics and astronomy to 
biology. That was when Charles Darwin (1809-1882) coined the term ‘the 
tree of life’. Dennett reformulated Darwin’s main thesis in this way: “Life 
on Earth has been generated over billions of years in a single branching 
tree — the tree of life — by one algorithmic process or another” (Dennett, 
1995: p. 51—ital. mine). The keyword here is the ‘algorithm’ as the 
embodiment of the inner mathematical harmony of nature. Dennet 
believes it is this algorithm which is behind all the diversity of species and 
“all the other occasions for wonder in the world of nature” (1995: p. 59). 
This is also the core, irrefutable and universal argument of Darwinism 
according to Dawkins (Dawkins, 2003: pp. 80-90). 
Therefore, we can claim that the tree of life is a notion premised on 
the scientific ideal of ‘economy and coherence’. For Darwinists such as 
Dawkins and Dennett, it is a “graph that plots the time-line trajectories of 
all the things that have ever lived on this planet” (Dennett, 1995: p. 85). 
The main point about Darwin’s idea of natural selection is the type of 
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‘unity’ that it presupposes for nature (i.e. the idea of the tree of life) and 
also the ‘coherence’ of the theoretical representation of everything (i.e. 
the algorithmic representation of the tree of life). That is to say, by two 
sides of this ideal, Darwin could explain the creation of human beings, 
animals and plants in a very simple, coherent and univocal manner. This 
ontological unity and epistemological coherence are the issues at stake 
here.  
One who lives in contemporary society might think that this kind of 
unity is the prerequisite of any type of science. Thus, if science is about 
the discovery of nature it should give such unity to nature, one way or 
another. The historical facts do not confirm this kind of conception of the 
‘essence’ of the scientific efforts. The point is that not only we can 
imagine a sort of science which does not contain the ideal of ‘economy 
and coherence’ but also such a science did exist in other times and other 
civilisations. For example, for Aristotle, each type of thing in the world 
demands its own version of knowledge. There is no unifying form of 
knowledge that applies to everything in the world (Fuller, 2007: p. 16). 
The ancient Chinese also did not believe in an unmoved mover or God in 
whose image men are created and who controls the world through natural 
laws. Contrarily, they believed that the heaven behaves in reaction to the 
acts of men in society. That is, if the emperor performs badly, floods, 
earthquakes, famines and other natural disasters will follow, but if the 
emperor’s behaviour is good to people the world’s organic order will 
remain in harmony (Fara, 2009: p. 51). This type of modern conception of 
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science through conceivable natural laws could solely be found in 
civilisations with Abrahamic religions. 
The concluding points can be expressed as follows. The New 
Atheists are interested in Darwin’s theory of evolution because it is 
‘simple’, ‘universal’ and ‘coherent’ which is known as the theory of 
everything. Finding this simplicity and coherence as the attractive goals of 
science itself is the product of the Scotist breakthrough in the Christian 
context of Europe. Following this Scotist line of thought, modern scientists 
came to the idea that man could see nature from God’s point of view by 
discovering those distinct and clear natural laws. 
4. New Atheists radicalised the ideal of ‘economy and 
coherence’ 
The New Atheists often defended this type of economy and 
coherence. However, what I call the radicalisation of this ideal faced them 
with another accusation – being reductionist. In response, they tried to 
show that being ‘reductionist’ was not a flaw (Dawkins, 1982: p. 113; 
Dennett, 1995: pp. 80-4). This has been discussed mainly by the ‘radical 
scientists’ during the 1990s. For example, Rose et al. accused Dawkins 
of being reductionist and defined the term in this way: 
[Reductionists] try to explain the properties of complex 
wholes – molecules, say, or societies – in terms of the units 
of which those molecules and societies are composed. They 
would argue, for example, that the properties of a protein 
molecule could be uniquely determined and predicated in 
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terms of the properties of the electrons, protons, etc., of 
which its atoms are composed. (qtd. in Dawkins, 1986: p. 
72) 
Dawkins did not defend himself against this accusation, saying that 
if this is reductionism, “I am a reductionist and proud of it” (Dawkins, 
1986: p. 72). Then he separated it into two types: ‘step-by-step 
reductionism’ and ‘precipice reductionism’. Dawkins says that all 
successful scientists are members of the first category. That is, they take 
a policy of gradual movement from the higher levels of complexity to the 
lower levels to understand what is happening in nature. The precipice 
reductionist on the other hand would try to go all the way in one step and 
choose one element as the cause. Dawkins believes that the category of 
precipice reductionism does not include any member of the real world of 
science (Dawkins, 1986: pp. 72-76). Dawkins concludes that the 
reductionism tag is a ‘dirty word’ that opponents attribute to Darwinists, 
while in fact it is how science works (Dawkins, 1986: p. 75). Dennett also 
believes that reductionism is a ‘term of abuse’ while Darwinism is 
‘reductionism incarnate’, and that this is not a bad thing: 
In itself, the desire to reduce, to unite, to explain it all in one 
big overarching theory, is [not] to be condemned as immoral 
[…]. It is not wrong to yearn for simple theories, or to yearn 
for phenomena that no simple (or complex!) theory could 
ever explain. […] Darwin’s dangerous idea is reductionism 
incarnate, promising to unite and explain just about 
everything in one magnificent vision. Its being the idea of an 
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algorithmic process makes it all the more powerful, since 
the subtract neutrality it thereby possesses permits us to 
consider its application to just about anything. (Dennett, 
1995: p. 82—ital. original) 
In fact, in this case I am more on the New Atheists’ side of the 
argument. Reductionism is a ‘term of abuse’ for the real process of 
making science. The desire for the theory of everything – either in biology 
or physics – is the innate characteristic of modern science which goes 
back to that constitutive ideal of ‘economy and coherence’. The problem 
with the New Atheists’ position is not the ideal in itself but the fact that 
they radicalised it to pursue a political (in the wide meaning of politics) 
goal. How did they radicalise this ideal? They have treated that scientific 
theory as an ideology or worldview which is absolutely true and because 
of that it is considered to be not only a theory but a ‘universal acid’, 
according to Dennett (1995: chapter 3).  
Dennett believes this notion of the algorithmic tree of life is the 
‘universal acid’ that erodes the old-fashioned metaphysical idea of God 
and any other supernatural being. So the idea of God can be replaced by 
the scientific idea of an algorithmic tree of life. The power of that acid 
comes from its simple and coherent justification of the origin of life. 
Dawkins, for his part, believes that this is because the idea of natural 
selection solves the problem of improbability: some natural phenomena 
are ‘too statistically improbable’ which means they are too beautiful or too 
complex to have come into existence by chance. So the Creationists 
come to the conclusion that there is a designer (Dawkins, 2007: p. 146). 
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Rejecting the idea of a design, Dawkins believes that the algorithmic tree 
of life solves the problem of improbability because it is a ‘cumulative 
process’: 
which breaks the problem of improbability up into small 
pieces. Each of the small pieces is slightly improbable, but 
not prohibitively so. When large numbers of these slightly 
improbable events are stacked up in series, the end product 
of the accumulation is very very improbable indeed, 
improbable enough to be far beyond the reach of chance. 
(Dawkins, 2007: p. 147) 
Thus, neither chance nor a designer is the solution but automatic 
algorithms which break up the chain into small components. So, if you 
believe in such a process you cannot believe in the design. Plantinga 
hesitates about this absolute conclusion that one cannot believe in both a 
design and the algorithmic process of creation. That is to say, this idea of 
an algorithm as such never says that it is a guided or unguided process. 
The former is about ‘who creates it’ while the latter answers another 
question: ‘how it has been created?’ (Plantinga, 2011: pp. 11-12). 
Briefly, we can understand the New Atheists’ insistence on the 
idea of the ‘universal acid’ as a ‘logical’ outcome of Darwinism, when we 
look at ‘the economy and coherence’ as the ideal of science on the one 
hand and the historical context of its radicalisation on the other hand. 
First of all, that ideal of science was based on the conception of gaining 
the god-like objective knowledge of the universe. So the fundamental 
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goal of science was a simple, beautiful and univocal theory of the law of 
nature. The mission was then accomplished and man became God 
(Prometheanism as I called it) when that simple theory was discovered by 
Darwin. This atheistic reading of Darwin’s theory is nothing but the 
radicalised version of that ideal of ‘economy and coherence’.  
5. The myth of warfare between science and religion 
Nevertheless, we need to ask why this process, which originated 
from theology, ended up in utter antagonism with religion. The answer is 
detectible in the historical situation of the emergence of Darwinism. The 
story of the ‘essential’ conflict between science and religion is a total 
fabrication of the nineteenth century after the publication of John William 
Drapper’s (1811-1882) The History of the Conflict between Religion and 
Science (1874). This book, which went through fifty reprints and was 
translated into ten languages (Armstrong, 2009: p. 252), was followed by 
another book called A History of the Warfare of Science and Theology in 
Christendom (1896) by Andrew Dixon White (1832-1918). Both of these 
writers tried to attribute the conflict between some scientific discoveries 
and the literal interpretation of the Bible (specifically about the age of the 
earth) to an old historical conflict between science and religion. The result 
of this attribution was the ‘myth of warfare’, as Armstrong calls it – the tale 
of scientific reason which is imprisoned in the cage of religious 
superstition during the ‘dark ages’. According to the tale, reason 
eventually released itself in modern times.  
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In point of fact, the myth of warfare has its own roots in the real 
conflict of two social agendas in Western Europe – state versus church. It 
has been mentioned that modern science has been founded on the 
Scotist interpretation of the imago dei doctrine. The Protestant 
reformation significantly mediated the transition of that Scotist mentality to 
the modern age. During this process, scientific discussions have been 
used by Protestants as a political tool against the establishment of the 
Church and the monopoly of power. Their argument was that while God 
does not have monopoly over reason, and man has been created in the 
image and likeness of God, so man also possesses reason just like Him. 
Thus, man needs nothing more than learning to use his or her own 
reason through education. Finally, since God does not have that 
monopoly, it is evident that no human being (or institution such as the 
Catholic Church) can possess that monopoly either (Fuller, 2007: pp. 20-
21). This theoretical/political position against the centralised Church 
connects Martin Luther (1453-1546) to Galileo Galilei (1564-1642). Martin 
Luther translated the Bible into the local languages of contemporary 
Germany. Before that the Bible was in Latin and only the educated priests 
could read it, and there was a monopoly over the interpretation of the 
Scripture which was challenged by the emergence of Protestantism. This 
coincided with the invention of the technology of printing which let the 
Protestants print the translated Bible for a great number of believers. So, 
more people could read it and understand it for themselves. The 
interesting point which shows how nominalism and Protestantism were 
aligned in that respect is that this movement of the translation of the Bible 
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started with John Wycliffe (1320-1384), the nominalist thinker before 
Luther who translated the bible into English for the first time 25  (see: 
MacCulloch, 2010: pp. 564-574). This was a kind of attempt to 
decentralise the Church from below. Nevertheless, Luther and Wycliffe 
were not the only persons who challenged the theoretical monopoly of the 
Church. Galileo did the same thing in his own time; however, he 
apparently failed. Galileo, in his famous inquisition trial, stated that the 
language of the Bible was the language of the people of the time or the 
common sense which describes the appearance of nature. Thus, one 
cannot use the Biblical language in science. He could easily have 
concluded from this that the Bible is not scientifically valid, or at least 
could have suggested the doctrine of the double truth as a diplomatic 
path in order to rescue himself. As it happens, he did not follow any of 
those directions. He stuck to a non-conformist position which states that 
scientific discoveries when established are not only true but are the truth. 
That is, a capable expositor of Scripture would be a scientist such as 
Galileo himself who has a sound knowledge of natural sciences (Brooke, 
1991: p. 78). That is to say, ‘reason’ for him became the great supporter 
of the revelation and more than that the most sound bedrock for anyone 
who wants to interpret the Bible. So Galileo was more in support of a 
Saint-Scientist, rather than the myth of the warfare between the Athens of 
reason and the Jerusalem of faith.  
The nineteenth-century myth of warfare which misread all these 
historical facts has best been shown in the play Life of Galileo (1943) by 
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 His translation was officially banned by the English church hierarchy in 1407 and it 
remained under that sanction until Henry VIII’s Reformation in the 1530s. 
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the German dramatist Bertolt Brecht. There Galileo was shown as a 
supporter of autonomous reason against dogmatic religious beliefs. For 
instance, in Scene 3 Galileo turns to Sagredo and says: “I believe in man 
and that means I believe in reason. Without that belief I would not have 
the strength to get out of bed in the morning.” All in all, this type of 
misrepresentation of the history of science which takes advantage of the 
dichotomy of reason/revelation was behind the radicalisation of the ideal 
of ‘economy and coherence’ in the works of contemporary atheists. In this 
way, anything supernatural has been considered not only beyond the 
scope of scientific formulas but as downright non-existent. Namely, 
whatever cannot be captured by scientific language turned into the 
imaginary. So, this history is behind the New Atheists’ presumption that 
the ‘naturalistic’ rejection of God is not an add-on to science but a 
necessary part of it. 
6. Atheism as the background belief of science? 
One of the motivations behind the radicalisation of the ideal of 
‘economy and coherence’ in the New Atheist movement was the 
clarification that many respectable, high-profile scientists are in fact 
Creationists (Fuller, 2010: p. 89). It was around the 1980s that pilgrim 
atheism started to adopt an aggressive scientistic worldview. The New 
Atheists who presupposed the myth of warfare between religion and 
science, thus criticizing the Creationist scientists, concluded that religion 
should be weakened (if not completely eliminated) for the sake of 
scientific progress. But are they right in this claim? Would atheism be a 
proper intellectual background for science? It is very unlikely because, 
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first of all, history shows that atheists have never made a great 
contribution to scientific discoveries. Moreover, the very possibility of 
modern empirical science depended on some epistemological and 
ontological presumptions that do not exist in any system of thought 
except the Abrahamic religions. Fuller counts three of the most important 
of these presumptions: 
[The] reality as a whole constitutes (i) a universe (not simply 
multiple realities) with (ii) ontological depth (not simply the 
sum of direct experience), all of which is (iii) potentially 
intelligible to the human mind, by virtue of our (divinely?) 
privileged place in reality. (Fuller, 2010: p. 111) 
 The point is that all of these presumptions are necessary for the 
belief in the existence of natural laws. Those laws also are necessary for 
the idea of scientific knowledge, since science is nothing but knowing and 
controlling natural laws. Still, none of these scientifically necessary 
presumptions is self-evident. For instance, take the last of these 
presumptions about the cognitively privileged position of human beings. 
Even the very definition of humanity as an animal with a privileged 
position which enables him not only to discover but also to control the 
process of evolution would have been totally different from the mere and 
pure Darwinian point of view – if such a thing does exist. John Gray in his 
Straw Dogs (2003) mentioned that the idea of the possibility and 
necessity of men taking charge of their own destinies is a religious belief. 
Darwin, instead, showed us that we are a kind of animal: “Species are 
only currents in the drift of genes. The idea that humanity can shape its 
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future assumes that it is exempt from this truth” (Gray, 2003: p. 6). I want 
to add that the idea of the cognitively exceptional position of man is 
definitely related to the religious idea of man who has been created in the 
image of God. That is, like God we can use our intellect to understand 
nature. Not only this, but we can also gain god-like powers to control the 
universe. Considering this god-like image of man, one can understand 
the history of science as abounding in enormous risks which man does 
not normally dare to take. Cutting-edge scientists need to presuppose an 
indefinite capacity for change in the world along with the endless 
transformational power for human beings to be able to push the 
boundaries of existing science. The Abrahamic religions prepared us with 
those presuppositions and opened up the future as a dynamic horizon. 
Otherwise, the motivation and aspiration behind all these efforts remain 
ambiguous.  
For example, pioneering scientists “act as if no natural obstacle – 
not even death itself – is too great to be overcome” (Fuller, 2010: p. 102). 
This ideals of not only controlling the process of evolution but also gaining 
immortality are the basis of a serious scientific project for Raymond 
Kurzweil (born 1948) – the American author, inventor, futurist and a 
director of engineering at Google. Interestingly, when he writes about 
death, he puts the adjective natural within inverted commas. So, the cycle 
of life which ends in death is ‘natural’ but this does not mean that we 
need to follow the rules of this cycle. Kurzweil says: “I view disease and 
death at any age as a calamity, as problems to be overcome” (2008: p. 
185). His research project is to reprogramme the software underlying 
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human biology. That software was originally ‘natural’ and indispensable 
for our hunter-gatherer ancestors but it is not necessarily suitable for 
modern forms of life. We, Kurzweil suggests, should ‘turn off’ disease and 
ageing with the help of genetics26 and ‘turn on’ our “full human potential” 
(2010: p. 4).  
To put it another way, we know that science is based on endless 
empirical trial and error. The question is, why do we not give up when our 
experiments so often fail? We might wonder why we are not easily 
disappointed. Where is the origin of this optimism about the results of 
scientific studies? The answer is in the theological backdrop of scientific 
efforts. There we can find full faith in the power of man to know the laws 
of nature. So, any failure is considered to be related to our methods, not 
the nature of laws – we never attribute an eternal mysteriousness to the 
laws of nature.  
Additionally, it is helpful to remember that there is a movement 
among transhumanists to take advantage of that theological backdrop. In 
a way, we can make a spectrum on the one side of which is the 
Dawkinsian unintended usage of the imago dei doctrine while on the 
other side is the new transhumanist movement which sees this doctrine 
behind any scientific inquiry and uses that theological precedence as a 
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 Nevertheless, it is necessary to remember that this is not a science-fiction tale. This is 
a highly important scientific project supported by some large companies. Those are 
companies that never invest in unrealistic projects which do not guarantee their future 
benefit. The reason that this looks like science-fiction to some people is that it is still 
hard for us to see the speed of radical scientific-technological changes. Moreover, if this 
is nothing but science-fiction one needs to remember that science-fiction was the 
inspiring engine behind scientific discoveries such as the pioneering submarine designer 
who took the idea from Twenty Thousand Leagues under the Sea (1870) by Jules Verne 
(1828-1905).   
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theoretical background for their projects. If we consider Ray Kurzweil and 
Max More as the first generation of trans-humanists, it would be 
legitimate to assert that a theological sensitivity is behind the works of the 
second generation of trans-humanists who believe that the mere 
manipulation of human genes and enhancement of human capabilities is 
not enough for the future of this movement. Trans-humanism, for Fuller 
and Lipinska (2014) for instance, needs political, legal and economic 
mechanisms; otherwise it would remain a politically shallow movement 
(Fuller and Lipinska, 2014: p. 6). Interestingly, in their political manifesto 
for trans-humanism Fuller and Lipinska pursue a detachment from the 
Darwinistic point of view which they have called ‘Darwin pose’ because it 
considers humankind a simple species among many other animals. But 
for the second generation of trans-humanists we are considered a 
privileged species that can understand and control the evolutionary 
process. Namely, we can reprogramme the whole process, so we might 
be more similar to God on the continuum of being than animals. Here, the 
theological relevance of their project becomes evident: for them, God is 
always within human beings and one will be more God-like when he or 
she achieves the full human potentials. For transhumanists that is more 
attainable through scientific inquiry rather than through religious services 
(Fuller and Lipinska, 2014: p. 5). Fuller and Lipinska conclude the 
discussion about the myth of warfare in this way: 
If ‘evolution’ stood simply for an empirically observable 
process, the ultimate cause of which are subject to 
legitimate dispute, it is unlikely that the science-religion 
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controversy would have acquired its global cultural 
significance. (2014: p. 5) 
In other words, without presupposing the aforementioned atheistic 
add-on as a self-evident outcome of a scientific theory, none of these 
warfare disputes might ever have taken place. With this idea in mind the 
second generation of trans-humanists try to theorise the pioneering 
scientific inquiries but by considering the theological relevance of the 
discussion.  
7. Conclusion 
The fundamental insight of this chapter is that the ideal of 
‘economy and coherence’ was radicalised in the New Atheist movement 
to the point that Ockham’s Razor cuts off any supernatural cause and 
design for the sake of coherence and simplicity of a scientific theory 
which is a theoretical attempt to capture as much as possible of nature.27 
But this radicalisation is not an inherent part of the scientific theory of 
evolution. It has been ideologically attached to that theory and mistakenly 
taken for granted.  
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 The fact that ‘Ockham’s razor’, which was originally an argument for the existence of 
God and is today deployed as a metaphor for scientific methods, reveals a great deal 
about the historical evolution of the meaning of science. 
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Chapter Five 
Tourist Atheists as Players 
 
1. Introduction 
Considering late modern conditions, we need to split between 
homo faber (man the creator) and homo ludens (man the player). Homo 
faber as articulated by Hanna Arendt and Max Scheler is man who 
controls nature through creating tools. That is what we have called the 
extension of the nominalist doctrine of the primacy of the will. The final 
ideal of homo faber is gaining the god-like power of creation. In contrast, 
homo ludens, the term coined by Johan Huizinga, is about possession of 
god’s singularity which is the extension of the nominalist doctrine of this-
ness (haecceitas) in modern times. Accordingly, the God of homo ludens 
has no external aim – or rather, the aim is He Himself. The same is true 
for the man who has been created in the image and likeness of this God. 
Bauman puts it this way: “man does not play ‘in order to’” (Bauman, 1994: 
p. 142). In other words, playing is a goal in itself. For such a man, the 
‘obligatory play’ or ‘play on command’ is meaningless (Bauman, 1994: p. 
143). Homo ludens seeks freedom and aimless wandering. No wonder, 
then, that for him this ‘playing ability’ is the dividing line between man and 
other creatures. 
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Tourist atheists are examples of homo ludens. They see the world 
as a large buffet, from each item of which they take some pleasure. That 
is to say, the aim is no longer considered to be something external (in the 
temple of the universe) but it is the internal pleasure (see chapter two). In 
this chapter I will try to explore the idea of ‘tourist atheists as players’, 
mainly through the idea’s first public appearance in the works of Alain de 
Botton. In the next chapter, I will deal with the theological relevance of 
this idea.  
Today, de Botton is the face of tourist atheism because he has 
successfully publicised its core idea – the atheistic deconstruction of 
religion. He has pursued this goal through the media of self-help books 
(e.g. Religion for Atheists, 2012), documentaries and lectures which 
target a public audience. Below, I will try to clarify the meaning of the 
controversial term ‘atheism 2.0’ which represents de Botton’s version of 
tourist atheism. After that, I will show how atheism 2.0 is embedded in the 
whole works and ideas of de Botton, and I will argue that ‘tourism’ is the 
keyword for de Botton’s ideas in general. So, we need to interpret his 
perspective on religion against the backdrop of his version of touristic 
individualism which is most evident in three of his books: The 
Consolations of Philosophy (2000), Status Anxiety (2004) and Art as 
Therapy (2013). Accordingly, I will show that de Botton’s point of 
departure is the everyday anxiety of the modern subject which is related 
to one’s status in the social hierarchy. Trying to build a shelter for the 
dignity of the atomised modern individual, de Botton found the answer in 
treating different areas of human culture (philosophy, architecture, art, 
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sexual relationships and even religion) as distinctive buffets full of useful 
items for the individual’s consolation. This kind of deconstruction of 
cultural heritage led him to a modern form of hedonism, or as he calls it, 
Bohemianism (de Botton, 2004: pp. 275-303).  
2. Atheism 2.0  
What is atheism 2.0? Atheism 2.0 is a newly-emerged movement 
which gained attention after the publication of Religion for Atheists (2012) 
by Alain de Botton.28 The fundamental idea of ‘atheism 2.0’ is not to reject 
religion as a whole. Conversely, it deconstructs religion and sees it not as 
a true wisdom but as a useful doctrine (de Botton, 2012; Dworkin, 2013). 
Thus, one can reject the central tenets of religions such as the idea of a 
God, afterlife, salvation, heavens and hell, but still benefit from the 
advantageous worldly sides of them; for example, a temple as a place to 
gather and sing together, a beneficial educational system, methods of 
giving effective speeches, or popular religious art (de Botton, 2012: pp. 
101-162 and 208-245). In Religion for Atheists (2012), de Botton 
approached religions as repositories of clever concepts and ideas with 
which “we can try to assuage a few of the most persistent and unattended 
ills of secular life” (de Botton, 2012: p. 13). Thus, de Botton invited 
atheists not to be afraid of religion and instead to try to occupy its 
beneficial aspects for their own well-being.  
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 The focus here will be on that book as the central text of ‘atheism 2.0’ and some other 
lectures and texts by de Botton (de Botton, 2011, 2012 and 2013a). In the near future 
we should expect more on ‘atheism 2.0’ but now we are at the very dawn of this genre. 
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If we assume, de Botton says, that religions are man-made 
doctrines, we therefore need to find out what their functions were for our 
ancestors. The main functions of religion for de Botton are those which 
serve two major needs of individuals. The first is “the need to live in a 
community in harmony” far from selfish impulses, and the second is the 
“need to cope with terrifying degrees of pain” arising from our vulnerability 
to failures (de Botton, 2012: p. 12). The main barrier to such 
aforementioned harmony is what Auguste Comte called ‘egoism’.  That is 
to say, we need to stop being romantic about the nature of man. Man, for 
de Botton as well as Comte, is narcissistic, jealous, spiteful, promiscuous 
and aggressive (de Botton, 2012: p. 58). So, today, the relationship 
between man and society is ceaselessly problematic. The problem is that 
“expressed freely, certain of our impulses would irreparably fracture our 
societies” (de Botton, 2012: p. 58). Therefore, modern individualism has 
become the main barrier to the happiness of the individual. But we know 
that pre-modern religions used to make up some rituals which would 
mediate between the individual and the group. Those rituals used to 
facilitate the process of entering a person into the group by honouring 
and at the same time taming the egocentric demands of him or her (de 
Botton, 2012: pp. 58-9). Thus, the Jewish Bar Mitzvah ceremony or the 
Medieval Feast of Fools were rituals to assuage the internal and external 
tensions of man in a group. This is what we really lack in modern, secular 
life. De Botton, correctly, asks what prevents us from reproducing such 
rituals to cope with the problematic situation of the modern individual. Or, 
in our terms, why do we no longer play that game? In response, he 
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rejects any conception which believes in the sacred/God-given origin of 
those games: “Early Christianity was itself highly adept at appropriating 
the good ideas of others, aggressively subsuming countless pagan 
practices which modern atheists now tend to avoid in the mistaken belief 
that they are indelibly Christian” (de Botton, 2012: p. 15). In fact, he tries 
to “reverse the process of religious colonization” by reclaiming those 
games and separating them from the ‘bad odours of religion’ – 
Nietzsche’s term (de Botton, 2012: p. 14). Subsequently, for instance, de 
Botton’s suggestion for the replacement of those religious rituals is a 
secular, pseudo-ritual gathering in special restaurants at specific times of 
the year and meeting random strangers. This secular ritual is 
accompanied by collective recitals of songs and dance, etc. Additionally, 
in January 2012 de Botton declared that he had a plan to build a one 
million pound temple for atheists at the heart of London which might 
serve as a model for other temples for atheists’ gatherings.  
The other aforementioned need of the modern individual is the 
urge to handle failure. In this case, for example, de Botton draws our 
attention to the Book of Job. That part of the Old Testament addresses a 
central question of human suffering: why do bad things happen to good 
people? The modern ‘ontologically isolated individual’ (Milbank’s useful 
term) tends to be more likely to blame him/herself for the miseries of life. 
However, the point is that the shoulders of the individual are not strong 
enough to bear the burden of the sufferings of life. But in that Book, God 
“goes on at length about how little humans know of anything. Fragile, 
limited creatures that they are, how can they possibly understand the 
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ways of God?” It continues: “given their ignorance, what right do they 
have to use such words as undeserved or unmerited?” (de Botton, 2012: 
p. 198—ital. original). So, religion invites the individual to see the 
immensity of the universe. In comparison with, for instance, the size and 
age of space, our sufferings seem petty and trivial. de Botton believes 
this would be a source of consolation for the individual. The modern 
subject, from the dawn of the Enlightenment, could hear the Kantian 
invitation to stand on their own feet. But this independence caused the 
malaise of the ‘lack of the reminders of the transcendent’. de Botton 
writes:  
The signal danger of life in a godless society is that it lacks 
reminders of the transcendent and therefore leaves us 
unprepared for disappointment and eventual annihilation. 
When God is dead, human beings […] are at risk of taking 
psychological centre stage. They imagine themselves to be 
commanders of their own destinies, they trample upon 
nature, forget the rhythms of the earth, deny death […] until 
at last they must collide catastrophically with the sharp 
edges of reality. (de Botton, 2012: p. 200) 
Thus, the second crisis of modern individualistic life is that 
blindness to what surpasses the individual. Again, in our terms, the rules 
of the games in the past were external. You could trust them because 
they were solid and supported by an almighty being. But now the rules of 
the games are determined arbitrarily. The individual autonomous subject 
knows that everything is entirely arbitrary and dependent on him or her. 
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Thus this caused a bipolar disorder in the individual – anxiety on the one 
hand, megalomania on the other hand. de Botton’s solution to this 
problem is also interesting. He suggests that we use scientific 
achievements not only to control the world but also to help us to see what 
“we will never master” (de Botton, 2012: p. 202—ital. original). This can 
be done by showing the largest known star in our galaxy, Eta Carinae, 
which is 7,500 light years far from us, 400 times bigger than, and 4 million 
times as bright as, the sun. The God of the Book of Job never humiliated 
the believer but delicately put him in his own place. The same thing can 
be done through the wonder of the universe. It will be a practical solution, 
de Botton believes, for our megalomania, self-pity and anxiety (de Botton, 
2012: p. 202). If anything went wrong during the game, we would be 
aware of the immense powers in the world which we can never control. 
This awareness will be yet another source of consolation for us. 
So far, I have tried to show how de Botton, as an atheist, 
approaches religion. He started with two interconnected crises of the 
modern age: the lack of a harmonious relationship between the individual 
and the group on the one hand, and the ever-increasing individual 
anxiety/megalomania on the other. The religious-like rituals, sentiments 
and ideas would help us to face these crises of modernity. Briefly, he 
attempts to revive the clever religious ideas for a secular life and has 
branded these efforts ‘atheism 2.0’.  
3. de Botton’s individual as tourist 
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We might wonder what de Botton’s conception of the modern 
individual is. In this section I want to step back and put the idea of 
atheism 2.0 in the background of the totality of de Botton’s works. I am 
suggesting that we can summarise the underlying thesis of his works in 
this statement: the modern individual is a being whose life is a life in 
between and in anxiety. For that matter, he or she should seek pleasure, 
happiness and consolation in architecture, art, sexual relationships, 
philosophy and religion. This is what I tend to call the touristic point of 
view which in atheism 2.0 has been extended to religion. Below, I will try 
to explain this basic statement in more detail. 
3-1.  The anxious individual 
Status anxiety, which is the title of a book by de Botton (2004), is 
the state of ceaseless worriment about an individual’s position in the 
social hierarchy. To put it more informally, it is a state of concern about 
being called a ‘loser’ or a ‘nobody’ (de Botton, 2004: p. 329). de Botton’s 
criticism is targeted at this attachment of one’s identity to his or her 
achievements, which are confirmed by the standards of society. 
It is common to describe people who hold important 
positions in society as ‘somebodies’ and their inverse as 
‘nobodies’ – nonsensical terms, for we are all by necessity 
individuals with identities and comparable claims on 
existence. […] Those without status remain unseen, they 
are treated brusquely, their complexities are trampled upon 
and their identities ignored. (de Botton, 2004: p. 12) 
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If what Scotus called this-ness (haecceitas) is about the unique 
characteristics of one single individual, then being called ‘nobody’ would 
be the rejection of all the properties of that individual. Thus, de Botton’s 
self-defined mission is to guard the dignity of the individual. Accordingly, 
he wants the individual to be seen in his or her own separate way of 
richness. He finds the roots of this lack of harmony between the needs of 
the individual and the demands of society in the Enlightenment’s idea of 
democracy. 
During the seventeenth century, egalitarian thinkers such as Hobbes 
defended the priority of the individual over the society. That is, they used 
to think of the individual as the authentic entity. Everything else, including 
the government, is based on nothing but human-made contracts. In fact, 
men agreed to give up some of their natural rights in exchange for 
security (de Botton, 2004: pp. 55-6). Thus, we can say that the 
Enlightenment, from the beginning, contained a spirit of equality between 
individuals. de Botton reports that William Thackeray in his Book of 
Snobs (1848) observed that snobs had “spread over England like the 
railroads. They are now known and recognized throughout an Empire on 
which the sun never sets” (de Botton, 2004: p. 20). But the point, for de 
Botton, is that the new thing was not snobbery but the spirit of equality. 
This spirit caused the transparency and consequent rejection of any kind 
of traditional “discriminatory conduct” (de Botton, 2004: p. 20). Therefore, 
the new problem with the ‘snobs’ was that they attribute one’s worth and 
right to one’s social rank (de Botton, 2004: p. 20).  
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What is the problem with this new spirit of equality? de Tocqueville 
was the first to address this issue in his hallmark Democracy in America 
(1835). Among all of his admiration for the ‘new world’, de Tocqueville 
noticed a problem with the modern, ‘equal’ America. That is, the spirit of 
equality destroyed the inequalities not necessarily in real life but in the 
minds of people. As such, each poor American sees himself not as a 
‘loser’ but – as Steinbeck famously said – a “temporarily embarrassed 
millionaire” (Wright, 2008: p. 105). Americans, for de Tocqueville, live in 
their own dreams about an accessible, happy future. I should add that the 
Enlightenment ideal of equality between individuals is rooted in the 
Scotist semantic of the ‘possible worlds’. That is, we are created in the 
image of God. So, like God, we are theoretically able to create endless 
conceivable worlds. And furthermore, “we have an obligation to explore 
those unrealised possibilities” (Fuller, 2012). This religiously inspired 
obligation reinterpreted the idea of the possible which accompanied the 
transformation of the traditional person into the Scotist individual (see 
chapters two and six). Therefore, modern individuals became 
theoretically equal, or rather, equal in hoping for another possible, better 
world with prosperity and happiness. de Botton believes: 
Democracies, however, had dismantled every barrier to 
expectation. All members of the community felt themselves 
theoretically equal, even when they lacked the means to 
achieve material equality. “In America,” wrote Tocqueville, “I 
never met a citizen too poor to cast a glance of hope and 
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envy toward the pleasures of the rich.” (de Botton, 2004: p. 
59—ital. mine) 
The hope for the other possible worlds was the motor-engine of 
modern capitalism. But at the same time the concrete reality never could 
keep pace with the changes in imagination and hope. So, the hope for 
another possible world became the source not only of ever more greed 
but also of endless dissatisfaction about the present situation. This 
caused a state of anxiety and what de Botton calls “the strange 
melancholy often haunting inhabitants of democracies”. Consequently, for 
instance, “in America, suicide is rare, but I am told that madness is 
commoner than anywhere else’” (de Botton, 2004: pp. 57-8). Since our 
goals determine what must be counted as our failures, ever increasing 
expectations along with a limited lifetime and material resources causes 
great humiliation for the individual – that is, the humiliation from which the 
religion protects its believers. In brief, for de Botton, we take our games 
more seriously than we should. 
3-2.  The life ‘in between’ of the individual 
In summer 2009, a company which owns airports contacted de 
Botton and suggested he spend a week’s residence in London Heathrow. 
He was expected to write a treatise on airports during that time. The 
consequence of this collaboration was a book called A Week at the 
Airport: Heathrow diaries (2009). I want to suggest that, rather than being 
a mere accidental theme, the airport has a central role in de Botton’s 
works. de Botton believes that the airport is “the imaginative centre of 
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contemporary culture” (de Botton, 2010: p. 13). It is “a single place that 
neatly captures the gamut of themes running through our civilisation – 
from our faith in technology to our destruction of nature, from our 
interconnectedness to our romanticising of travel” (de Botton, 2010: p. 
13). For example, he reports his experience of an interview with a 
passenger who has an ordinary, routine, boring and sometimes anxious 
life. David, the passenger, decided to travel to Athens with his family. de 
Botton describes David’s feelings in this way:  
As David lifted a suitcase on to the conveyor belt, he came 
to an unexpected and troubling realisation: that he was 
bringing himself with him on his holiday. Whatever the 
qualities of the Dimitra Residence, they were going to be 
critically undermined by the fact that he would be in the villa 
as well. He had booked the trip in the expectation of being 
able to enjoy his children, his wife, the Mediterranean, some 
spanakopita and the Attic skies, but it was evident that he 
would be forced to apprehend all of these through the 
distorting filter of his own being, with its debilitating levels of 
fear, anxiety and wayward desire. (de Botton, 2010: pp. 49-
50—ital. original) 
Thus, we can say that the main problematic is the individual 
himself. The individual is depicted as a tourist in the terminal escaping 
from the boredom of everyday life toward new possibilities and new 
horizons of pleasure. “He had pictured himself playing with the children in 
the palm-lined garden and eating grilled fish and olives with Louise on the 
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terrace” (de Botton, 2010: p. 47). But de Botton’s subject would remain 
anxious and unsatisfied both before and after the travel. After returning 
from an adventure, travellers soon start to forget the journey and its 
pleasures. Concomitantly, they return to tedious, everyday life. So again 
they become curious about another touristic journey, a villa in Istanbul, 
beaches in Spain, and so on. “So we gradually return to identifying 
happiness with elsewhere” (de Botton, 2010: pp. 142-3). This is a 
Sisyphean movement between the boredom of everyday life and the 
hope of a touristic relief. In the airport, the screens placed at intervals 
imply “a feeling of infinite and immediate possibility: they suggested the 
ease with which we might impulsively approach a ticket desk and, within 
a few hours, embark for a country where the call to prayer rang out over 
shuttered whitewashed houses, where we understood nothing of the 
language”. The items on those airport screens are promising images of 
an alternative life and an accessible relief at a time of claustrophobia and 
stagnation (de Botton, 2010: p. 33).  
The airport is the place which represents the tourist experience of 
life in two ways. First, it is the place of the detachment of the possible 
worlds (our hopes, dreams and fantasies) from the real world (our 
anxieties, depressions and everyday life). Thus the airport is the location 
of the double-life of the modern individual. It is the representation of the 
modern subject’s life-in-between. Second, the airport does not divide the 
true from the false. It is the zone which divides anxiety from consolation. 
It splits one condition from the other. de Botton’s subject is a tourist in a 
deeper sense – not only as a person who travels around, but in the fact 
180 
 
that his or her approach to the world is touristic. That is, he or she can 
see different games (the religious, philosophical, artistic or scientific 
game) and choose one of them or a combination of them for a while, not 
as an ultimate truth but as a painkiller. That is to say, the internal goal of 
finding consolation in a game is prior to the pilgrim-like search for the 
truth.  
3-3.  Games in the promenade of culture 
In his book on airports, de Botton wrote about his visit to the airport 
bookshop. He observed something that one might correctly call the 
banality of the tourist experience. He saw shelves of classic novels which 
had been arranged according to the country in which the narrative took 
place (de Botton, 2010: p.76). So if you are going to Prague, you might 
want to choose Milan Kundera’s The Uanbearable Lightness of Being, but 
if you are going to Istanbul, Orhan Pamuk’s The Museum of Innocence29 
would probably be a better choice. The modern individual for de Botton is 
a tourist and de Botton, as a tour-guide, inhabits the airport and consults 
the tourists about fascinating destinations. Such a destination might be a 
religion, an art or a philosophical doctrine which is consoling. Or, we 
could say that culture is a promenade with a lot of booths and games. 
Accordingly, one game would be philosophy. In The Consolations of 
Philosophy (2000), de Botton says that when our heart is broken because 
of our lover’s rejection we can find consolation in the philosophy of 
Schopenhauer. This philosopher taught us that “happiness was never 
                                                          
29
 The intriguing fact about Orhan Pamuk is that he is totally aware of the touristic 
consumption of his novels. So he established a real museum in Istanbul on the basis of 
the narrative of his novel.  
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part of the plan,” and therefore we should not be surprised by misery (de 
Botton, 2000: p. 196 and 198).   
With regard to the question of art, de Botton in Art as Therapy 
(2013) ridicules the academic approach to art. By reviewing the outline of 
an academic course on Italian Renaissance art, he concludes that 
academics tell Renaissance artists, such as Raphael, that “I don’t know 
enough about your perspective on the problems and issues specific to 
your time. I’m sorry about that and I’m going to try very hard to put it right” 
(de Botton and Armstrong, 2013a: p. 85). But for de Botton the right 
question to be asked of a painter like Michelangelo is “what lessons are 
you trying to teach us that will help us with our lives?” (de Botton and 
Armstrong, 2013a: p. 87). In other words, scholars should connect the 
spirit of those masterpieces to the “psychological frailties” of their 
audience (de Botton and Armstrong, 2013a: p. 86). Still the other game in 
the promenade of culture is dedicated to cartoon, comedy and humour. 
By showing the lack of harmony in society, these cultural products 
“reassure us that there are others in the world no less envious or socially 
fragile than we are” (de Botton, 2004: p. 196). Thus these humours are 
also the sources of consolation for our damaged souls. 
Ipso facto we will not be surprised when we return to de Botton’s 
odd way of approaching religious rituals and sentiments, as described at 
the beginning of this chapter. The idea of atheism 2.0 is inextricably 
entangled with this type of touristic way of approaching the world. Thus, 
religion is also nothing but another game in the promenade of our cultural 
heritage.  
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4. Tourist atheists as players  
We need to return to the idea of homo ludens (man the player). 
What we have called tourist atheism is one of the instances of man the 
player. The history of man the player goes back to the flâneurs in Paris 
from the middle of the nineteenth century. They were people who used to 
wander without aim. They stopped once in a while to look around but idly 
(Bauman, 1994: p. 142), and they had a lot of time. There were even 
rumours about flâneurs taking turtles for a walk. A flâneur, Walter 
Benjamin reported, is always in “full possession of his individuality” 
(Benjamin, 1999: p. 429) and for this reason Jonsson called this type of 
man the ‘medium of modernity’ (Jonsson, 2013: p. 146). Flâneurs also 
have three other characteristics: feelings of indecision, daydreaming and 
love of the city (Benjamin, 1999: pp. 422-427). This last characteristic is 
important. Flâneurisme is specifically about the city – it did not appear in 
the countryside. Benjamin believed that the arcades of Paris gave birth to 
flâneurisme and also that it disappeared when, at the time of Baron 
Haussmann (during the rule of Napoleon III), the old medieval arcades 
and small streets were replaced with new boulevards and highways.  
While Walter Benjamin (1999) stopped at that historical moment, 
Zygmunt Bauman (1994) followed the history of flâneurisme into our 
contemporary moment. According to Bauman, mass industries founded 
the modern urge for wandering and took advantage of this idea by 
reproducing it in artificial mini-cities – i.e. malls, shopping centres and 
Disneyland (Bauman, 1994: p. 154). Concomitantly, they have tried to 
blur the line between entertainment and shopping. Thus, the flâneur has 
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turned into the shopper. The characteristic of these mini-cities is that they 
are “the world made to the flâneur’s measure” (Bauman, 1994: p. 150). 
Bauman concludes his discussion about neo-flâneurs by reproducing 
famous passages from Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
of Capitalism (1930):  
The flâneur wanted to play his game at leisure; we are 
forced to do so […]. In Baudelaire’s or Benjamin’s view the 
dedication to mobile fantasy should lie on the shoulders of 
the flâneur like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at 
any moment. But fate decreed that the cloak should become 
an iron cage. (Bauman, 1994: p. 153—ital. original) 
Tourist atheism (and atheism 2.0) is understandable only through 
its connection to this neo-flâneurisme. Atheism 2.0 is an attempt to open 
the doors of religion to man the player,30 and it is a kind of game which 
does not admit any mystery, red line or order either from God or from 
pilgrims. The game is real when it does not accept the orders of the self-
proclaimed authorities, and when the gamer is the only one to make up 
the rules. So in this sense religion can also be (and should be) a field of 
atheistic games.  
For de Botton this game is more psychological and results in a 
kind of postmodern hedonism which he called Bohemianism. de Botton 
likes the audacity of the members of the bohemian movement of the 
nineteenth century: those who decided to be different in their own way by 
believing in the inferiority of tradition and their stress on the superiority of 
                                                          
30
 I use the terms ‘player’ and ‘tourist’ in the same sense. 
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the individual (de Botton, 2004: p. 317). de Botton quotes Victor Hugo in 
the preface to Hernani (1830): “‘No more rules […] for talent to surrender 
personal originality would be like God becoming a servant’” (de Botton, 
2004: p. 317). So de Botton tries to deconstruct the rules of art, 
philosophy and religion, for example, by attributing that ‘originality’ to the 
individual (and for the sake of making a psychological consolation for the 
atheist individual). 
The difference between the neo-flâneurisme which Bauman 
identified and neo-bohemianism which de Botton recommends is that, at 
first glance, the latter does not strike us as consumerist. Even one might 
say that de Botton invites atheists to forget the hierarchy of modern life 
which is based more on economic achievements, and like Bohemians he 
defends limited games of hierarchy. For example, in the eyes of a 
bohemian those who write better poems deserve a higher status in the 
group. de Botton’s project has a bohemian spirit. He tries to define 
smaller circles of truth (artistic, philosophical, etc.) and tells us that one 
can find some ‘breathing space’ in those circles.  
Philosophy, art, politics, Christianity and bohemia did not 
seek to do away with a status hierarchy; they attempted to 
institute new kinds of hierarchy based on sets of values 
unrecognized by, and critical of, those of the majority. […] 
They have provided us with a set of persuasive and 
consoling reminders that there is more than one way […] of 
succeeding at life. (de Botton, 2004: p. 329) 
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The crux of the issue is that under this claim of supporting the 
individual’s dignity by building small shelters for him or her, there is an 
appeal for the commodification of philosophical doctrines, artistic 
masterpieces, classic novels and religious rituals. The castration of their 
principles would be the price of turning philosophy, art and religion into 
collections of therapeutic tips. Through this castration they would be 
ready to be consumed as any other commodity.  
5. Conclusion 
In brief, de Botton suggests to us that modern man’s perpetual 
anxiety is owing to the fact that the games of the pilgrims are no longer 
entertaining for us. So, we can return to that promise once more and 
revive this dignity through defining smaller games which are better able to 
include everyone – and no one would be the ‘loser’ in such a world. 
However, I have argued that this idea resulted in the commodification of 
different areas of culture including religion. Thus, one might say that in 
the second round of the disenchantment of the world, man the player tries 
to deconstruct religion or even very modern philosophy to address the 
individual’s wishes and interests. Tourist atheists, in de Botton’s version, 
should wander like flâneurs in the atheistic Disneyland of culture. So he 
or she might want to adopt some ideas from Judaism along with some 
consolations from Wittgenstein’s philosophy and probably some 
inspiration from staring at René Magritte’s The Castle of the Pyrenees. 
For the tourist atheist, this is the authentic mission of the individual.  
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Chapter Six 
Tourist Atheists’ Religion as Act 
 
1. Introduction 
In what follows I will explain some ideas that have been touched 
upon in the last chapter. Previously, I have tried to describe the public 
face of tourist atheism (Alain de Botton’s atheism 2.0) but the theological 
relevance of those ideas remains to be scrutinised. I have claimed that 
tourist atheism is the extension of the Scotist doctrine of this-ness or 
haecceitas (see chapter two). Here, I will try to show how the idea of God 
who acts or God the player of nominalists of the fourteenth century is 
implicit within the idea of tourist atheism. The focus of this chapter is on 
the theological shift from wisdom to will and its counterpart in modern 
philosophy from truth (Plato) to act (Nietzsche). 31  Arguably, tourist 
atheism is more influenced by the latter, seeing an act at the centre of 
both myth and religion. One might say that a tourist atheist is a player 
who sets the rules of the game arbitrarily. I will argue that for tourist 
atheists the human being is created in the image and likeness of God, not 
                                                          
31
 There is a subtle difference between ‘act’ and ‘action’. These two terms represent two 
ways of thinking about the creation. The God who acts or God the player of nominalists 
constantly creates from moment to moment, act by act, through repeated decisions to 
create. God of Aquinas, conversely, decides to create something at one moment 
through one whole action. God who episodically acts is God who influenced tourist 
atheists. 
187 
 
because like Him we can gain ‘objective knowledge’ but because we are, 
like Him, individuals who set the rules of the game. Therefore, while there 
is no criterion beyond this inner goal of fulfilment of the individual-
sovereign’s will, the religious claim of truth cannot be deemed to rival 
another truth (e.g. scientific truth). In this way, religion is not considered 
to be the enemy but a different mode of approaching the world which our 
ancestors devised. Therefore, man the player (homo ludens) also can 
change the rules of the religious games or make his own versions of the 
games. Finally, I will examine the strategies which tourist atheists adopt 
regarding whatever is not logos (i.e. myth, including religion). What I tend 
to call the expropriation of assets of religion and myth is the main strategy 
of tourist atheists. That is, a strategy of not engaging with religion on a 
normative level (through acceptance or rejection) but an anthropological 
way of looking at it. Doing this, one can see religion as a game set by our 
predecessors. This strategy, indicatively, has three major characteristics: 
first, rather than knowing something it is about doing something; second, 
it starts from the conception of the individual in danger; and third, it 
presumes that the individual-sovereign can re-assemble and re-make 
religion for its own purposes. In the next two sections I will first start with 
the theological shift from wisdom to will and then I will show its 
counterpart in modern philosophy.  
2. The theological shift from wisdom to will 
In the second chapter, I stated that the world for the touristic type 
of modern man is the ‘chaos of the plurality of individuals’. In such a 
chaotic world, tourists find the Archimedean point inside the individual. 
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That inner element is the individual’s will which should be strong enough 
that one can call it a goal. This image of the chaotic world, on the one 
hand, and the wilful man, on the other hand, has originally been shaped 
in the Scotist theology. The God of Thomas Aquinas was an unmoved 
mover or a ‘Supreme Being’ but Saint Francis and his followers (among 
them Scotus) “referred to God by the personal title ‘Dominus Deus’ or 
Lord God” (Oberman, 2003: p. 26). The word of this God was his deed 
and one needed to know God through His deeds; let us call Him ‘the God 
who acts’. Therefore, the act of creation by the God who acts depends on 
His hidden divine will. In the same vein, this doctrine of the primacy of the 
will leads us to the conclusion that divine intellect is not something in the 
nature of the created. The whole story of creation is comparable to 
playing a game. The almighty being sets the rules and other beings 
should play it. The rules of the game are the arbitrary decisions of that 
almighty being. Scotus, for instance, believed that all laws are positive, 
i.e. the result of a decision (Brague, 2007: p. 237). Therefore, the 
decision of a single being is at the centre of creation. Any question about 
the wisdom behind those rules would be idle. Furthermore, the creatures 
of such a God should obey Him without asking any question. Therefore, 
the creatures of that God should merely accept the divine commands 
(Brague, 2007: p. 237). 
Scotus’s description of the God who acts or God the player led 
scholars to the hypothesis that Scotist theology led to the ‘possible 
worlds’ semantics, which were adopted by Leibniz in the seventies-
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century (see: Normore, 2003; Knuuttila, 1986).32 Distinguishing between 
God’s intellect and His will, Scotus suggested that the divine intellect 
“surveys all the possible worlds and the divine will chooses among them” 
(Normore, 2003: p. 154). Thus, God could have created other worlds or 
other sets of rules and other games but He created this one. The 
important point which derives from this argument is that ‘the possibility of 
being’ is the primary constituent of whatever is, and furthermore this is 
the ‘real basis’ for the univocal concept of being. In other words, the non-
actual things are in principle identifiable and since God’s intellect gives 
them the right to be, and man is created in the image of God, man’s 
intellect can therefore also identify the possible but non-actual things 
(Knuutila, 1986: p. 208). That is to say, man can set new rules for new 
games and in doing so reproduce God’s characteristic of singularity and 
sovereignty. 
In brief, for via moderna, God was a person who acts or plays 
(Oberman, 2003: p. 26). The parallel of God the player is the man who 
plays, homo ludens, or the individual-sovereign about whom I will write 
below. This man follows the inner rules which have been set by his or her 
will. More importantly, nothing beyond that will can help us to find our way 
in this eternally chaotic world.33 In the modern time, a shift also occurred 
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 For an opposing argument see: Wyatt, N. 2000, ‘Did Duns Scotus Invent Possible 
Worlds Semantics?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 2, 196-212. 
33
 This will in its human version can be easily translated into imagination. This is what 
Petrarch (as a Renaissance figure who first anticipated the concept of tourism) did in the 
first half of his life. He was obsessed with poetry but poetry for him was not a way to 
show sentiment. On the contrary, it was a way to overcome his inner passions. By 
suppressing these passions he was hoping to allow room for the iron fist of human will, 
which should play the role of an inner goal (Gillespie, 2008: pp. 52-5). In the second half 
of his life, Petrarch noted religion but not for the sake of any spiritual feelings. There are 
even, Gillespie claims, persuasive arguments against his belief in Christianity (Gillespie, 
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from the Platonic knowing-centred point of view (i.e. pilgrim ontology) to 
the Nietzschean doing-centred outlook (i.e. tourist ontology) which 
resonated with that theological shift. In the next section, I will briefly 
review the expansion of this shift from truth to act in modern philosophy. 
The latter, I will suggest, is the main motif of tourist atheism.  
3. The philosophical shift from truth to act 
Richard Rorty, in a paper entitled Pragmatism and Romanticism 
(2007b), stated that “at the heart of romanticism is the thesis […] that 
reason can only follow paths that the imagination has broken” and it can 
“only rearrange elements that the imagination has created” (Rorty, 2007b: 
p. 112). Saying this, he put forward a division between two kinds of myths 
which were the basis of two kinds of philosophical quests. The first myth 
was founded by Plato’s quest for something authentic that is not human-
made. Following that myth, the mission of philosophy became about 
helping us get back to that authentic origin. Thus, this is a myth and Plato 
was a successful mythmaker – he made an intellectual project for 
centuries after himself. This goal was the shared element of Greek 
philosophy, Christianity and the Scientific Revolution. These were 
respectively about finding the truth, seeking God and getting into the mind 
of God. As I have argued above, this temptation of finding god-like power 
to control nature and society is at the heart of pilgrim atheism as well. In 
The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche raged against that myth of finding 
                                                                                                                                                             
2008: p. 56). Religion for Petrarch was important because of the way it approaches the 
individual in this world. Following the Scotist line of argument, Petrarch needed to base 
theoretical reason on an act (the adoption of poetry and religion). That act was based on 
premises that can never be tested. In this way he reproduced the shift from God’s 
wisdom of via antiqua to God’s will of via moderna in his works. He did not seek the 
divine, ‘objective’ point of view, but the divine ‘subjective’ decisionism. 
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“unmediated access to the real” which he believed was at the heart of 
both German idealism and British empiricism (Rorty, 2007b: p. 110). 
The other myth which Rorty has prefers originated in the Romantic 
Movement. This myth stands against the Platonic quest for the logical, 
indubitable and neutral point (Rorty, 2007b: p. 118). Its central question is 
about “how human beings continually strive to overcome the human past 
in order to create a better human future” (Rorty, 2007b: p. 118), but there 
is no necessary progress imaginable in this new scheme: neither any 
objective goal, nor any pilgrimage. Moreover, any achievement in this 
way is a result of using the power of imagination34.  
Around the 1950’s and 1960’s, another wave of philosophical 
projects which considered the mythical foundations of philosophy 
happened35 (McMullin, 1988: p. 1). The epistemologists and philosophers 
of science started to ask about the meanings of rationality and its 
relationship with science (McMullin, 1988; Wilson, 1970; Hollis and 
Lukes, 1984). Bernstein, for his part, described that mythical foundation 
as a tale, story or narrative that every philosopher makes up and that 
“has its own heroes and villains” (Bernstein, 1988: p. 189). By saying this 
Bernstein and his fellow philosophers used to put an act (i.e. making a 
myth) at the very basis of every philosophical enquiry.  Thus, in an anti-
Platonic time, they started to give priority to doing in contrast with 
knowing. 
                                                          
34
 The central text of this anti-Platonic myth is Shelley’s A Defence of Poetry (1821) in 
which Shelley considered poetry as the centre of knowledge.  
35
 Mainly after the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(1962). 
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Accordingly, the two sides of this spectrum are the truth-centred 
enterprises of Ancient Greek philosophers, Scholastics, fathers of the 
Enlightenment and pilgrim atheists on the one hand, and the imagination-
centred mission of Romantics, poets, and postmodern thinkers on the 
other hand. By replacing imagination with truth, the process of 
secularisation would be complete. In other words, not only we will give up 
on the idea of God the creator but also we will overcome the desire for 
the “non-linguistic access to the real” – the Platonic myth (Rorty, 2007b: 
p. 119). Hence, the focus would be on the subjective goal and condition 
of the individual. The progress would not be considered to be from the 
false to the true, but from a bad condition (i.e. the past) to a better 
condition (i.e. the future).  
I suggest that this transition from knowing something to doing 
something lies at the heart of tourist atheism. That is to say, it more 
concerns about the manipulation of society by anticipation of a better 
future for the individual. I need to specify what this individual is and how it 
relates to that theological background. In the next section, this will be 
explained by defining the term individual-sovereign. 
4. The individual-sovereign 
For the Franciscans of the fourteenth century there were three 
sovereigns: the divine, the state and the individual (Milbank, 2012). While 
the Franciscan idea of the divine’s absolute power survived in the modern 
time and constituted the modern scientific point of view (Funkenstein, 
1986: chapter 3), the idea of the absolute sovereignty of the state has 
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been reproduced in the works of Hobbes and Kant (Milbank, 2012: p. 
205). But what about the third sovereign or the individual-sovereign?  
 I want to argue that this individual-sovereign is at the heart of the 
other two sovereignties. Let us start from this claim that the Franciscan 
conception of the individual and its modern lineage was a revolutionary 
break with the medieval conception of the individual. Consider the case of 
the human right:  
The medieval attribution of an ‘exercise right’ was rather a 
grant to the right kind of person to exercise according to right 
judgment a certain restricted authority in specific 
circumstances and with respect to certain intrinsic 
relationships in which he or she stood to certain other 
people. (Milbank, 2012: p. 215) 
 But this conception of the human right has completely changed 
with the shifting image of the individual from that medieval image to the 
Franciscan image of the individual-sovereign. When God is considered to 
be a will-full being and He is God because of this will, and when man is 
created in the image and likeness of God, as a result man is considered 
to be a will-full being as well. Essentially, the crucial element in any 
individual (either the divine individual or the earthly one) is that will. 
Milbank reports that Franciscans used to believe that whatever they 
owned was merely on loan, and therefore they used to live in poverty, but 
the hidden assumption under this poverty was their absolute ownership of 
the self (Milbank, 2012: p. 223). As such, in a very radical and 
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unmediated way they owned themselves, their bodies and their lives. 
That is because they were created in the image of God and they 
possessed that will which is the most inalienable thing and the divine 
essence inside man. Milbank suggests that this self-possession 
foreshadowed the modern idea of the human right as ‘possessive 
individualism’ (Milbank, 2012: pp. 323-4).  
 This radical break constituted a new conception of God as the 
wishful being and man as the individual-sovereign whose main 
characteristic is his or her self-possession. Even the ideal state in the 
Franciscan-Hobbsean lineage is a regime with an absolute power, but its 
power is there to secure that private freedom and property. So, one can 
conclude that the central element in this scheme is the will of the 
individual. This will originates from God’s will – man inherits it from God, 
and finally the state is there to secure it in society. Viewed in that light, we 
can say that the Franciscans of the fourteenth century were more 
concerned with the divine-sovereign – Hobbes and Kant were concerned 
about the state-sovereign but tourist atheism adopts the individual-
sovereign of this Franciscan trinity.  
 Let us conclude the discussion at this point: first, we showed a 
shift in the scholastic tradition from God’s wisdom to God’s will and we 
showed its counterpart in modern philosophy from truth to act. In this 
section, we tried to show the second underlying assumption of tourist 
atheism which is the conception of the individual-sovereign and its 
theological relevance. As I will show in the next sections, tourist atheists 
start their projects with the problematic of the individual in danger, and 
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end up in the expropriation of the assets of religions for the sake of the 
well-being of the individual.  
5. The discourse of the individual in danger 
The point of departure of tourist atheism is a pathological 
description which I have called the discourse of the individual in danger. 
Two main figures of this discourse are Hans Blumenberg and Peter 
Sloterdijk. The first is more concerned about the self-protection of the 
individual while the latter is more obsessed with the individual’s self-
assertion. Nevertheless, both try to take advantage of the irrational (in the 
Weberian sense of irrationality, i.e. myth, religion, etc.) for their 
emancipatory project.  
5.1. A search for breathing space for the individual 
Hans Blumenberg (1920-1996) is well known for The Legitimacy of 
the Modern Age (1983). It served as a long reply to Meaning in History 
(1949) by Karl Löwith (1897-1973). Thus, let us start with Löwith, whose 
project was showing how the philosophy of history as the “systematic 
interpretation of universal history in accordance with a principle” is 
dependent on the theology of history (Löwith, 1949: p. 1-2—ital. mine). 
For this goal, he moved backwards in history from Burckhardt, Marx, 
Hegel and Comte to Joachim, Orosius and the Bible. Briefly, the thrust of 
his argument is that the philosophy of history is possible when we have 
access to this underlying principle. But at the same time, that principle is 
only achievable when there is a goal for us. Christians used to be 
prepared with such an eschatological goal but this is not true today. 
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Löwith believed that the philosophy of history depended (and is based) on 
the theology of history (Löwith, 1949). One can argue that Löwith was 
more on Burckhardt’s side of the argument, who believed that the 
“philosophy and theology of history have to deal with beginning and 
ultimate end, and the profane historian cannot deal with either of them” 
(Löwith, 1949: p. 21). The only accessible thing for the historian, Löwith 
thought, is “man, as he is and was and ever shall be, striving, acting, 
suffering” (Löwith, 1949: p. 21). Thus, the truly modern historian has one 
mission: to focus on the needs of the individual by linking up a number of 
observations to a series of random thoughts (Löwith, 1949: p. 20). This is 
a radical rejection of any systematic thinking that deals with the beginning 
and the end, but for Löwith, modernity is more about a kind of suspension 
and lack of certainty.  
Several years after the publication of Löwith’s book, Hans 
Blumenberg criticised Löwith’s scheme in several ways (see: Wallace, 
1981). His main point was that interpreting this structural similarity 
between the theology and philosophy of history as a type of ‘dependence’ 
is a misreading of history because one is presuming that religion 
originally possessed that structure. Thus, one presupposes that religion is 
independent of history (Blumenberg, 1983: pp. 8-9). In the rest of the 
book, Blumenberg tried to reject the attribution of such independence to 
religion. He simultaneously believed that this problem arises from a 
deeper misconception of history. According to that misconception, there 
is something authentic in history. Even the Renaissance figures made a 
similar mistake by defining their project as the recurrence of a structure 
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that has already disappeared (Blumenberg, 1983: p. 8), while this 
presupposition made them blind toward the uniqueness of the 
Renaissance (i.e. the Renaissance as the historical individual). The same 
is true for modernity. Blumenberg defends the legitimacy of modernity. He 
supports the uniqueness of the modern approach, but how can we justify 
the undeniable similarities between the structures of the Christian faith 
and the modern approaches? Blumenberg suggests that this is the 
recurrent process of occupation and reoccupation of the concepts – not 
only that the moderns borrowed some ideas from Christians, but the early 
Christians also did the same with pagan philosophies. Therefore, the right 
term to describe this process is not ‘dependence’ but ‘occupation’ – and 
reoccupation (Blumenberg, 1983: part I). Blumenberg continued this 
thesis in his Work on Myth (1985) in which he used the term ‘Darwinism 
of words’ for this process of occupation and reoccupation. In fact, the 
most interesting thesis of his comes after the clarification of his approach 
to historical changes, when he suggests that we can intentionally 
reinterpret (then reoccupy) old myths for protecting the modern man by 
making ‘breathing space’ for him or her. 
Myth, for Blumenberg, is the “archaic accomplishment of reason” 
(Blumenberg, 1985: p. 166). Thus there is no contradiction between logos 
and myth because “[m]yth itself is a piece of high-carat ‘work of logos’” 
(Blumenberg, 1985: p. 12). This is a way to reduce what Blumenberg 
called the absolutism of reality which is the bitterness that we feel when 
we cannot control our conditions of existence (Blumenberg, 1985: p. 3-
16). Contrary to this is myth, which is the result of thousands of years of 
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‘storytelling’. Myth is the manifestation of ‘overcoming’ or ‘gaining 
distance’ from that bitterness (Blumenberg, 1985: p. 16).  
The problem is that the modern age exposed men to ‘the 
absolutism of reality’ by melting away those myths. This led us to the 
perpetual situation of existential anxiety which is “related to the 
unoccupied horizons of the possibilities of what may come at one” 
(Blumenberg, 1985: p. 6). Subsequently, at this juncture only myth can 
make a protective shell for modern man. This thesis reminds us of a 
classic study by Paul Veyne, the title of which is absolutely illustrative: 
Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths? (1988). The question is, were the 
ancient Greeks such credulous people who used to think that if they 
climbed Mount Olympus they would see Zeus sitting there with a 
thunderbolt at his right hand? Answering that question, Veyne started 
with the same presumption as Blumenberg’s – that myth and logos are 
not contradictory (Veyne, 1988: p. 1) – and concluded that myths were 
certainly not doubted (Veyne, 1988: p. 17), and that myth goes beyond 
true and false. That is to say, the question of the validity of myth never 
occurred to the ancient Greeks (Veyne, 1988: p. 23). Finally, myth was 
considered to be something like the historical, contemporary novel. The 
audience of modern historical novels is certain that the author’s 
imagination is based on true events; for instance, take the love between 
Napoleon Bonaparte and Josephine. Those two figures were real, and 
the love story was also real, but this does not mean that every single 
dialogue that the author writes in the novel is historically precise. 
Substantively, these are the details which are merely ‘editorial’ (Veyne, 
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1988: p. 21). More or less, the same is true for myths. The function of the 
mythical stories was to explain the beginning and the end of things 
(Veyne, 1988: chapter 2) – answering questions that no one can answer 
but which exist in man’s mind (and will exist forever). So a city does exist 
and its name is Athens but where does the city’s name come from? Who 
built it? Why here but not somewhere else? These could be the questions 
for mythical contemplation. 
In Blumenberg’s terms, myth is a tool for “maintaining the position 
in the face of an overpowering reality” (Blumenberg, 1985: p. 7). Thus if 
we want to maintain our position, and do not give up in the face of 
existential anxiety, we need those myths which have survived the long 
process of ‘natural (historical?) selection’. By prescribing the wielding of 
mythical stories for the moderns, Blumenberg based his theory on an act 
– he founded his theory on the premise that its validity can never be 
tested. 
Blumenberg in Work on Myth (1985) went through the details of 
myths and how we can take advantage of them. I particularly want to 
raise one of his points: the division between the ‘fundamental’ myth and 
the ‘original’ myth. He believed that the pursuit of the latter is as wrong as 
the pursuit of anything ‘authentic’ – in other words, such a thing does not 
exist. But the fundamental myth (Grundmythos) is the myth that “remains 
visible at the end”. This is the myth which is “able to satisfy the receptions 
and expectations” (Blumenberg, 1985: p. 175). That fundamental myth for 
him is the myth of Prometheus, the fire thief. Why? 
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If Zeus had wanted to drive the humans to despair so as to 
make them bring about their own obliteration from the 
cosmos, Prometheus had frustrated this by giving them a 
reality, fire, and an illusion, ‘blind hope.’ The illusionary 
element points to the fact that it could not be a question 
purely of making the humans happy; they were deceived 
about their status naturalis [state of nature], and that also 
was misfortune. (Blumenberg, 1985: p. 310—ital. mine) 
Through this myth, and the metaphors of fire and blind hope, 
human beings remain in a sort of harmony an existential situation which 
enables them to remain hopeful but not to the point that they completely 
ignore the discontents of life. This myth can be extended to the modern 
era because it will restrain human beings from looking the harsh reality of 
existence in the eye. But it still does not make them naïvely optimistic 
about their ‘objective existential state’. 
In his theory, Blumenberg took up a protective position toward the 
modern individual. He tried to keep modern man from the malaise of 
modern life (and its most destructive form, ‘the absolutism of reality’) 
through the revival of the thousands-year-old myths. The tourist atheists 
who support this negative function of myths consider modern man as 
homo pictor or man the painter, who draws the images of the horrible, 
unknown things around himself on the wall of the cave. So, through 
representing, recreating and also controlling those dangers on the wall he 
can maintain his own self-esteem. That is to say, he considers them in 
this way. But there are other ways of approaching the irrational elements 
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of culture, such as seeking the positive goal of self-assertion. The most 
recent instance of this position is Peter Sloterdijk’s thesis of considering 
religions as spiritual regiments. To use his own metaphor, he supports 
homo artista, or the man in training.  
5.2. Religions do not exist 
Peter Sloterdijk’s project is to rotate the modern cognitive stage 
ninety degrees to the point that religious, spiritual and ethical issues can 
be seen from a new angle (Sloterdijk, 2012: p. 9 and 2013a: p. 5). This 
new angle is represented in the subtitle of his The Art of Philosophy: 
Wisdom as a Practice (2012). But the main text for this project is his You 
Must Change Your Life (2013a) in which he has criticised New Atheism 
for its ‘simplistic’ doctrines (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 5). For him the point is 
that New Atheists share an idea with religious believers – the very idea of 
the ‘existence of religion’. Instead, Sloterdijk supports the curious thesis 
that religions do not exist (Sloterdijk, 2013a: pp. 83-105). What do exist 
are “misinterpreted anthropotechnic practice systems” (Sloterdijk, 2013a: 
p. 84). The term ‘anthropotechnic’ for him is the sets of rules that we 
make up and through them we mould our inward and outward behaviour 
(Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 84). Thus, a human being for him is a self-forming 
animal and for the same reason there is no difference between two 
thousand-year-old Christianity or Sant-Simonism: both are simply 
anthropotechnic practice systems. 
Whether Christian or non-Christian, all of them are both 
materially and formally nothing other than complexes of 
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inner and outer actions, symbolic practice systems and 
protocols for regulating traffic with higher stressors and 
‘transcendental’ powers –in short, forms of anthropotechnics 
in the implicit mode. (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 87) 
In recent times, he believes, we have concentrated on homo faber 
at the cost of ignoring homo religiosus (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 3) – the man 
who changes his life through some surreal and spiritual exercises and 
rituals. In the same vein, religion for Sloterdijk is not a bad idea but an 
anthropological phenomenon which persists to the point that man exists.  
The question he raised is whether we need to reject all of those 
spiritual exercises, as New Atheists do. The game of supporting or 
rejecting religion is exactly the stage that Sloterdijk wants to rotate. He 
suggests that the true dichotomy is not between the believers and the 
non-believers but between the trained and the untrained (Sloterdijk, 
2013a: p. 3). He is concerned with the fate of the individual in an age of 
disbelief. That is, if religion is a system of spiritual exercise for man, what 
would happen for the modern individual without any religion/spiritual 
exercise? He does not want to see human beings lose their sense of 
perfect and imperfect in an age of disbelief. If God does not exist, this 
does not mean that we cannot spiritually ‘get in shape’. We can arguably 
see the Nietzschean spirit in Sloterdijk’s words, to whom he dedicated a 
whole chapter: “that God is supposedly dead is irrelevant in this context. 
With or without God, each person will only get as far as their form carries 
them” (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 39). Viewed in that light, the discourse of the 
individual in danger shows itself when Sloterdijk talks about the untrained 
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individual and its wickedness. Those people do not belong to our time. As 
he believes: “Just as the nineteenth century stood cognitively under the 
sign of production and the twentieth under that of reflexivity, the future 
should present itself under the sign of the exercise” (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 
4—ital. mine).  
We might wonder what this prescribed exercise should look like. 
Sloterdijk does not hesitate to suggest a physical interpretation of the 
exercise, such as sport. He writes about the modern religion of neo-
Olympism which was established by de Coubertin (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 
88). This religion was at the heart of the modern revival of the Olympics, 
yet it was later forgotten. This universal symposium of sportsmen was 
about to “reconcile the torn ‘society’ of the day” (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 91). 
More substantively, what makes it interesting is that we know the athletes 
of ancient Greece were not only similar to gods but that this resemblance 
could result in a kind of identity (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 26). Therefore, de 
Coubertin’s clever idea was that the individual athlete could become a 
god (or Jesus: half-god, half-man) even today, and this is achievable 
through various exercises. These athlete-gods become role models of 
modern society. Their images and statues will invite people to a moral 
principle mentioned in a poem by Rilke: “you must change your life”.36 
                                                          
36
 Rilke composed this poem after seeing a beheaded torso of Apollo:  
We never knew his head and all the light  
That ripened in his fabled eyes. But  
his torso still glows like a gas lamp dimmed  
in which his gaze, lit long ago  
holds fast and shines. Otherwise the surge  
of the breast could not blind you, nor a smile  
run through the slight twist of the loins  
toward that centre where procreation thrived.  
Otherwise this stone would stand deformed and curt  
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If we rotate the stage with Sloterdijk’s version of tourist atheism, 
we can go further than finding consolation in religious rituals (as de 
Botton suggests) or redefining the old myths for the present day (as 
intended by Blumenberg). Sloterdijk tries to unearth the technics that old 
religions have used and the ways that they have built various systems. 
His project is to equip the modern man with those technics, so that 
religion can return to its real realm of anthropology and also so that the 
modern man will be able to build new anthropotechnic systems according 
to his new needs. In brief, the goal of Sloterdijk’s project is more like 
Petrarch’s. Sloterdijk tries to empower the modern individual by technics 
of self-transformation and giving form to one’s life.  Thus for him, man is 
the self-forming animal.  
6. The strategy of expropriation  
The malaise of modern life for de Botton is ‘status anxiety’. 
Blumenberg, for his part, saw the danger in the ‘absolutism of reality,’ 
while Sloterdijk recognised the individual’s wickedness and the ‘lack of 
training’ as the source of crisis. Although these figures have defined the 
danger in different ways, they all started from a discourse of the individual 
in danger. More importantly, they followed one general strategy – to 
protect and emancipate the individual. As I mentioned above, the way 
                                                                                                                                                             
under the shoulders’  transparent plunge  
and not glisten  just like wild  beasts' fur  
and not burst forth from all its contours  
like a star: for there is no place  
that does not see you. You must change your life. 
The poem begins with admitting that we cannot see the light of the eyes of Apollo 
because the torso is beheaded but we are able to see his well-shaped body which is 
enough for us. This metaphor is true for religion. That is to say, however the religious 
wisdom is not valid anymore (and God is dead), but still religion gives us some models 
of spiritual practice (Sloterdijk, 2013a: chapter 1). 
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tourist atheists approach religion is understandable under the category of 
the strategy of expropriation. That is, not entering the game of 
rejection/acceptance but seeing religion as an anthropological 
phenomenon. Doing this, one can see religion as a game set by our 
predecessors. Thus there is no doubt that we can do the same thing – 
i.e., make a religious game. This expropriation of the assets of religion37 
can be the gamesome search of the consolation in the buffet of old 
religions (de Botton) but also can find the deeper goal of overcoming and 
redefining it for the well-being of the modern man (Blumenberg). The 
extreme point of this spectrum is the rejection of the very existence of 
religions. In this final point, religion completely disappears through 
reinterpretation of it as a set of human-made anthropotechnics, or 
arbitrary decisions (Sloterdijk). Here, not only does the proselytising 
mission of atheism (saving men from religious ignorance) become 
irrelevant but, furthermore, participation in any acceptance/rejection game 
seems self-defeating. Therefore, the idea is to use those 
anthropotechnics in new games for the goal of self-fulfilment.  
Accordingly, the image of God who plays ended up in the 
conception of a man who should play and set the rules of the game 
arbitrarily. This is probably the final point of the process of secularisation: 
when a tourist atheist does not reject religion but alternatively considers 
the arbitrariness of the rules of the game and expropriates its technics. In 
this way man becomes god-like by reproducing God’s sovereignty. For 
tourist atheists this sovereignty is attainable first through this 
                                                          
37
 This also recalls the motto of the Marxists of the Russian Revolution of 1917: 
“expropriate the expropriators” or “loot the looters”. 
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consciousness that any religion is based on an act, and then by the 
knowledge that one can remake religion, reassemble its elements, or 
reset the rules of the religious game according to one’s will.  
7. Conclusion 
A few months after the death of Richard Rorty (1931-2007), his 
final essay, The Fire of Life (2007) was published in the Poetry Magazine. 
There he narrated his feelings about life and death after being diagnosed 
with inoperable pancreatic cancer. He recalled a day when his cousin (a 
Baptist minister) asked him if he had any good feelings about religion. 
Rorty’s answer was negative. Then his son asked if he found philosophy 
of use in his last moments. The answer, again, was negative. Then Rorty 
said that in his last moments of life he found deep comfort and 
consolation only in poetry and recited these lines of Walter Landor's On 
His Seventy-Fifth Birthday:  “I have strove with none/ for none was worth 
my strife/ Nature I loved/ and next to Nature, Art/ I warmed both hands 
before the fire of life/ It sinks, and I am ready to depart.” Rorty adds that “I 
now wish that I had spent somewhat more of my life with verse” (Rorty, 
2007a), but this was not because of the ‘truths’ of which the poets are 
aware. “There are no such truths” (Rorty, 2007a). Rather, Rorty believed, 
it was because he would have “lived more fully” if he could have imbibed 
more poems (Rorty, 2007a). The idea of ‘living more fully,’ it seems to 
me, is the central point of tourist atheism. That is, tourist atheists 
disregard the truthfulness of any statement and search for comfort for the 
individual-sovereign. In this way, they see an act at the centre of any 
religion and following this consciousness they have no problem with 
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expropriating religious assets for the sake of the well-being of the 
atheists. Ipso facto, tourist atheism is defined by that concern about the 
well-being of the individual, seeing an act at the centre of religion, and an 
attempt to expropriate the assets of religion for the well-being of the 
individual. This is, one might think, what Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte 
did. So, was Comte the forerunner of tourist atheism in 19th century? I will 
address this question in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Revival of the Comtean Dream? 
 
1. Introduction 
Many branches of atheism are set against both the institutional 
form of religion and its theistic content. In our time the most famous 
representatives of this category of atheists are those whom we have 
called pilgrim atheists (see part two). New Atheism, for example, is mainly 
known for its strong hostility towards religion in any aspect (specifically 
the idea of a God), scientism and naturalism. It rejects religion as a whole 
and argues that scientific truth is a substitute for religious certainty. 
Everything related not only to God but also to any religious mentality, 
rituality, symbols and institutions is considered to be old-fashioned, 
regressive, against ‘reason’ and in some cases inhumane (Dawkins, 
2006a; Harris, 2005; 2008; Hitchens, 2008). But as we have seen in the 
past two chapters, tourist atheism challenges that hostility and tries to 
take advantage of religion through its deconstruction. Previously, I dealt 
with de Botton’s project as the public face of tourist atheism (see chapter 
five). But it appears that there are some similarities between ‘atheism 2.0’ 
and tourist atheism in general, on the one hand, and August Comte’s 
(1798-1857) project on the other hand. In the nineteenth century, the 
atheist Comte had been attracted to the institution and hierarchy of the 
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Catholic Church while the idea of God for him was absurd (Comte, 1875; 
1876; Pickering, 2009). He wanted to reject the content of the religious 
tenets and keep some aspects of its form. de Botton also acknowledged 
the relevance of Comte’s project at the end of his book (de Botton, 2012: 
p. 309-312). In this chapter, I will examine the relevance of the Comtean 
project. First, we need to remember that there are deep differences 
between de Botton and Comte. It is more precise to say that Comte 
typified the pilgrim atheists while de Botton falls into the category of the 
tourist atheist. Comte had certain apocalyptic ideas about the end of 
history. According to him, science gives man the only noteworthy 
knowledge, and he was also sure that religion in its traditional form does 
disappears. Neither de Botton nor other tourist atheists share any of 
these ideas. But the point about ‘atheism 2.0’ is its theological 
engagement. The novelty is in the shift of the major strategy from the 
rejection of religious ideas to their expropriation. It seems that Comte was 
a pioneer of the expropriation strategy. Disregarding other differences, I 
will assess the possibility of attributing that strategy to Comte. The central 
question here is: is there any revival of the Comtean dream in recent 
atheism? 38 Or, one might ask this question the other way around: was 
Comte the forerunner of ‘atheism 2.0’? 
                                                          
38
 Before going through the details about Comte’s point of view, two points are 
necessary to mention. In recent years, after many decades of accusing Comte of 
insanity or even ignoring him, there has been a movement – still marginal but flourishing 
– toward a reinterpretation of his ideas in the British and American social sciences (cf. 
Fuller, 2006; Gane, 2006; Pickering, 2009; Wernick, 2001). However, more interesting 
phenomena is the recovery of the Comtean discourse among some contemporary 
thinkers, even without any reference to his works, which shows the relevance of his 
ideas even today. For example, Comte could entirely agree with this assertion from The 
Faith of the Faithless (2012): “Although we can be free of the limiting externalism of 
conventional morality, established law, and the metaphysics of traditional religion, it 
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Briefly, regarding the separation of law from counsel after the 
Enlightenment, Comte attempted to re-join them once more in response 
to the ‘spiritual crisis’ of the secular age. That ‘spiritual crisis’ was caused 
by underestimating the role of counsels in human society. Since ‘atheism 
2.0’ starts from that spiritual crisis, it would be a kind of return to what I 
would call the Comtean crisis-consciousness. The very existence of the 
spiritual crisis justifies the necessity of that change of strategy from 
rejection to the expropriation of religion. I will, then, distinguish between 
the two faces of Comte: Comte the philosopher and Comte the poet. 
While Comte the philosopher recognised the necessity of changing the 
strategy, Comte the poet, pragmatically, tried to expropriate Catholicism. I 
will argue that ‘atheism 2.0’ is a return to the crisis-consciousness of 
Comte the philosopher and the pragmatism of Comte the poet. 
First we need to ask what the ‘Comtean dream’ was. The Comtean 
strategy of the atheistic occupation of religion was an answer to a spiritual 
crisis of the modern age. Below I will address the question of the 
separation of laws from counsels and the subsequent ‘spiritual crisis’ 
which was the motivation behind the rise of the Comtean dream. 
2. The theological background of the ‘spiritual crisis’ 
The motto of the philosophes of the Enlightenment was “no 
spiritual power should exist in society” (Comte, 1998: pp. 191-2). The 
                                                                                                                                                             
seems that we will never be free of that “sordid necessity of living for others.” The latter 
requires an experience of faith, a faith of the faithless that is an openness to love, love 
as giving what one does not have and receiving that over which one has no power” 
(Catchley, 2012: p. 7). That is, we might be able to live without religion (in the limited 
sense of the term) and even without law but not without that binding love of other human 
beings. That is very much in the Comtean spirit. 
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dangerous idea of the necessity of the extinction of spiritual power alerted 
Auguste Comte and filled him with such foreboding that he dedicated 
most of his life to theoretical criticising and practical challenging of that 
motto. His basic thesis, in the last phases of his life around 1844-1857, 
was the necessity of an atheistic return to religion as a way of assuaging 
the spiritual crisis of the modern era (Acton, 1974). Thus the nature of the 
crisis for Comte was the prioritisation of law and the extinction of spiritual 
power following the strict separation of law from counsel during the 
Enlightenment. 
Let us quickly review the origins of that separation. The division 
between counsel and law is a biblical division in origin. “Premodern times 
thrived on a dialectic between the two: the law bathed in counsel as in a 
nourishing environment. Counsel preceded the law that was based upon 
it, but it also surpassed the law by adding a further stage to it” (Brague, 
2007: p. 232). In fact, counsels were there for the perfection of one’s 
behaviour which was not included in the law. The story of the modern, 
prioritising law goes back to the Middle Ages and the nominalist 
movement. Two shifts of doctrines in Christianity in the fourteenth century 
should be accommodated to have a firmer grasp of the modern 
conception of law separated from counsel. First, Scotus challenged the 
Thomistic doctrine of analogy according to which the divine attributes are 
equivocal. He alternatively conceived of God’s attributes univocally. That 
is to say, God’s characteristics have the same meaning as those of man. 
The difference between the creator and the created (man) is in degree 
not in kind (Funkenstein, 1986: p. 26). The second shift was the 
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emergence of the idea of the primacy of the will. Scotus attributed the 
unrestricted freedom of will to God. It means that “unforeseeable 
decisions spring from within” God’s nature (Gilson, 1940: p. 310) and 
those decisions are unknowable for human beings. Thus, God 
determines law and in a way law is the decision of God according to the 
unknowable divine will (see chapters one and two). “The law eventually 
came to be reduced to the divine will […]. That conception fits within an 
overall movement that shifts the centre of gravity of the divine attributes 
from wisdom toward power” (Brague, 2007: pp. 236-7). 
Following those two doctrines of the univocity of being and the 
reduction of law to the will of God, the nominalistic version of Christian 
theology “ensured that men […], when enjoying unrestricted, unimpeded 
property rights and even more when exercising the rights of a sovereignty 
that ‘cannot bind itself’, come closest to the imago dei” (Milbank, 2006: p. 
16). The modern conception of the law has been grounded in this kind of 
(borrowing Heidegger’s term) ‘onto-theological’ point of view which sees 
man as a miniature of God with ‘free will’ at the centre of its being (i.e. 
God the player). In this line of thought the law was reduced to a contract 
or commandment of the sovereign.  
The law, for its part, extricated itself from the counsels that 
formed a protective gauge around it, now showing forth in 
its full might as commandment. This was the result of a 
long-term evolution that had begun within scholasticism. […] 
For the moderns, that reduction became an axiom. […] 
consequently, everything that might claim to be a law 
213 
 
without presenting itself as a commandment is relegated to 
the realm of metaphor. (Brague, 2007: pp. 233-4—ital. 
mine) 
Accordingly, the residue of that process in the modern era was a 
law with a sovereign backing it. Among the moderns, it seems that 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was the one who “gave this position its most 
impressive presentation” (Brague, 2007: p. 234). He famously defined law 
as merely formal. In the next section Kant’s separation of law from 
counsel and his invitation to wipe out spiritual power will be taken into 
consideration. This Kantian scheme was objected to by Comte, mainly 
because Comte considered the Kantian annihilation of ‘spiritual power’ as 
the cause of the ‘spiritual crisis’ and in reverse he tried to revive the 
centrality of counsel. Atheism 2.0 also shares this diagnosis. That revival 
of counsel is at the heart of both the Comtean dream and ‘atheism 2.0’.  
3. Kant’s maturity: no spiritual power should exist in society 
Kant defended law and a political system as a hard shell (with the 
support of an authoritative sovereign). For him, people should submit to 
the sovereign for the sake of ‘maturity,’ and should also reject the 
guardians and counsels. As such, Kant translated ‘the prioritisation of law’ 
as ‘the prioritisation of the modern state’ inside which there is no room for 
‘spiritual power.’  
The historical figure of Fredrick II in Kant’s scheme was the 
modern sovereign who is at the top of the hard shell of laws during the 
Enlightenment. Kant considered all forms of protest against this 
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authoritative ruler as illegitimate39. It is noteworthy that, for him, the reign 
of Fredrick was a mere transitional step toward ‘maturity.’ This transition 
has been shown in his famous essay What is Enlightenment? (1784). 
Kant believed that his age was not the enlightened age but the age of 
Enlightenment. However, “we still have a long way to go before men as a 
whole can be in a position [...] of using their own understanding 
confidently and well in religious matters, without outside guidance” (Kant, 
1999: p. 58). But it seemed to Kant that there were some clear signs that 
prove that “the obstacle to universal enlightenment, to man’s emergence 
from his self-incurred immaturity, are gradually becoming fewer. In this 
respect, our age is the age of enlightenment; the century of Frederick” 
(Kant, 1999: p. 58—Ital. original). Here, Kant used teleological metaphors 
to make sense of the wide historical transformations (Collingwood, 1994: 
pp. 93-6). He believed that there is an ultimate end for our historical 
movement and that is the ‘enlightened society’ with ‘mature’ men who can 
use their own reason independent of external guardians, either clergymen 
or monarchs. But he lived in the time of Fredrick II; the time of the 
Enlightenment. Making progress toward that end in history, we are still in 
the midway.  
Accordingly, the hard shell of law with a sovereign at the top, in 
Kant’s political scheme, was just a form to protect modern society from 
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 Protest and revolution were not permitted in Kant’s scheme because they challenge 
the hard shell and would put us under the threat of a return to the situation of 
chaos/anarchy and the state of war of all against all which for Kant, as for Hobbes and 
Locke, was a Damocles Sword above the head. Kant “avoids theories of a right of 
revolution based on breaches of the social contract by rulers. Since for Kant the ruler’s 
authority is derived not from consent or a promise to obey but from his being the 
executor of a public legal justice […] he is able to say that imperfect legality being better 
than “anarchy,” subjects must obey even if a ruler violates the idea of the contract” 
(Riely, 1982: p. 127). 
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falling into the state of anarchy during the transition (Kant, 1999: p. 31). 
But the sovereign has no responsibility for the content. We need to recall 
that Fredrick’s motto was “Argue as much as you like and about whatever 
you like, but obey!” (Kant, 1999: P. 59). Kant was, indicatively, optimistic 
about this motto because he believed in the sublime final outcome of this 
process. He wrote: 
Thus once the germ on which nature has lavished most 
care – man’s inclination and vocation to think freely – has 
developed within this hard shell, it gradually reacts upon the 
mentality of the people, who thus gradually become 
increasingly able to act freely. (1999: P. 59—ital. original) 
Behind this call for the trust in one’s own understanding, there is 
an invitation to live according to the ‘individual will’. In the period of 
tutelage we act as a means for the will of the guardians. But there is a 
possibility and inherent potentiality inside human nature which lets the 
individual to will the good40.  
To recap the discussion, Kant wanted a political/legal form (i.e. the 
hard shell) which is nothing but the instrument which guarantees the 
realisation of that ‘unqualified good’ or that good will. The pursuit of the 
good (the moral) is equal to the pursuit of freedom and for him this was 
an individual enterprise (Owen, 1994: p. 11). Thus politics is not about the 
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The moral good for Kant is based on the only unqualified good in the world, ‘good will’, 
as he famously wrote in his Groundwork: “It is impossible to think of anything at all in the 
world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except 
a good will” (Kant, 2008: p. 7). Thus, “enlightenment here is represented as moral 
autonomy” (Owen, 1994: p. 10). Man is an end-in-itself because he is the source of the 
will (Riely, 1982: p. 149) and thus the source of the good. This conception of autonomy 
reminds us of the Scotist mentality. 
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good (in its Platonic sense as an absolute measure of justice); rather, it is 
about a legal form under which the individual pursuit of the good 
becomes possible while this form does not guarantee that goal (Reiss, 
1999: pp. 25-26). So finally we have a formal law, behind which is a 
sovereign (i.e. one who sets the rules of the game). We do not need not 
to challenge that hard shell (i.e. the rules of the game) but it would be 
necessary to get rid of counsels and guardians inside the shell in order to 
create enough space for the pursuit of the moral autonomy. 
There is, then, a dounle movement here: first, the necessary 
submission to the authoritarian ruler inside the hard shell of the powerful 
state, and second, the indispensable and enduring challenge of the 
spiritual power to open the space and pave the way for the pursuit of 
one’s own will which would gradually lead to ‘maturity.’ The consequence 
of this double movement is the separation of law from counsel and the 
challenge of the legitimacy of the power of the guardians of counsels. 
Maturity for Kant is attainable by this double movement of submission to 
the sovereign and rejection of the spiritual power. Although Comte agreed 
with the idea of the hard shell, he held that challenging the ‘spiritual 
power’ and the authority of those whom Kant called ‘guardians’ would be 
treacherous. In the following sections, I will write about the two faces of 
Comte which coherently matched each other in terms of his character: 
Comte the philosopher and Comte the poet. While Comte the philosopher 
grasped the problem of the Kantian Scheme, it was Comte the poet who 
pragmatically tried to make the change possible.  
4. Comte the philosopher: the necessity of the spiritual power 
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Comte could see the immature parts of the human soul which 
could not be grasped in the Kantian scheme. Comte the philosopher 
captured an insight into the emotional side of the human. His conception 
of the spiritual crisis of modern times has been famously formulated in his 
division of the three fundamental stages of history – theological, 
metaphysical and positive (Comte, 1903: pp. 1-37; Comte, 1875: pp. 505-
510). Accordingly, he believed that our nature includes intellect and heart. 
In the theological regime (regime theologique) the intellect was vitiated by 
the heart. The second stage was the Enlightenment, “a transitory, bastard 
stage” (Voegelin, 1999: p. 244). During the Enlightenment (which Comte 
used to call the metaphysical stage) the intellect needed to become 
revolutionary in order to emancipate itself from the chain of heart (and 
counsel), which put an end to the impotence of the intellect in the 
theological regime (Voegelin, 1999: p. 186). Comte believed that the 
situation at that time, during the nineteenth century, was characterised by 
the angry and aggressive reason/intellect. One might say that Kant’s 
‘dare to know’ was the motto of the revenge of the intellect against the 
heart during the Enlightenment which caused a kind of disharmony in 
human life. In other words, both Kant and Comte could see the 
paradox/crisis side of the Enlightenment. But Kant (whom Comte might 
have called a metaphysician) believed that modern men, after the 
‘emancipation’ from the ‘guardians’ and the ‘leading strings’, would see 
that “Now this danger is not in fact so very great, for they would certainly 
learn to walk eventually after a few falls” (Kant, 1999: p. 54). Thus Kant 
was optimistic about the immature parts of the human soul and the 
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potentiality of the spontaneous generation of maturity. Thus, it would 
seem enough for him to liquidate the barriers on the way toward maturity. 
But Comte was more pessimistic about the self-generation of maturity. 
That is to say, what Kant called the ‘free thinking’ inside the hard shell 
was for Comte ‘the most complete mental anarchy’ (Comte, 1998: p. 196; 
Comte, 1877). 
Comte, between 1825 and 1826, right after his break-up with 
Saint-Simon, in an essay called Considerations on the Spiritual Power 
(Comte, 1998: pp. 187-227), tried independently to define the very 
fundamental ‘crisis’ and the ‘mental anarchy’ in the modern age. He 
reached a formulation about the crisis to which he remained loyal to the 
end of his life. 41 Comte’s basic thesis was that what Kant used to reject 
as the old ‘guardians’ of pre-Enlightenment times were the ‘spiritual 
powers’ of the theological stage of history. Thus, while Kant was 
pessimistic about the function of social and religious institutions like the 
Catholic Church, Comte could see the determining functions of those 
institutions. Comte, without addressing Kant directly, blamed 
Enlightenment philosophes for the crisis which he saw as the final 
product of the Kantian invitation to melt away all the religious solids. For 
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 As Gane believed, “All his works even his early essays, were composed with the 
intention of constructing the first adequate explanation of the long ‘modern crisis’ and of 
indicating how it might be ended” (Gane, 2006: p.1). Comte himself rejected any sort of 
discontinuity among stages of his works from this respect. Comte “lashed out at ‘some 
sophists’ who had ‘denied the continuity’ between the Cours [Cours de Philosophie 
Positive, 1830-1842] and the Système [Système de politique positive, 1852-1854]. In 
order to demonstrate that he had not changed direction, he emphasized that the 
Synthèse [La Synthèse Subjective, 1856] was intended to ‘continue’ the Système, his 
work on politics and morality (or religion), just as the Système ‘prolonged’ his Cours, 
which founded his philosophy and originally established the importance of Humanity. All 
three works making up his ‘great trilogy’ were of ‘equal grandeur’ and made a ‘normal 
progression,’ one that realized his opuscules’ plan to reconstruct the spiritual power” 
(Pickering, 2009: p. 489). 
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Comte, that problematic invitation was arguably based on a major dogma: 
“that society”, inside the Kantian hard shell, “should not be organized” 
(Comte, 1998: p. 192). The most important branch of this dogma 
according to Comte is the rejection of the spiritual power. 
Of all the revolutionary prejudices engendered over the last 
three centuries by the decay of the old social system, the 
oldest, the most entrenched, the most widespread, and the 
general foundation of all the others, is the principle by virtue 
of which no spiritual power should exist in society, or, what 
amounts to the same thing, the opinion that completely 
subordinates this power to the temporal power. (Comte, 
1998: p. 192) 
Long after this early text, Comte, in System of Positive Polity 
(1851-1854), still thought that the ‘obsession with reason’ and 
forgetfulness of heart was just one of those ambivalent results of the 
Enlightenment. As he wrote, “The spiritual power of the West in its three 
social attributes of counsel, consecration, and regulation has more and 
more fallen into desuetude since the end of the Middle Ages, by virtue of 
the gradual downfall of the provisional beliefs” (Comte, 1877: p. 8). For 
Comte this process of ignoring and attacking the spiritual power and its 
institutions might even have caused the dissolution of society. 
While retrograde theologians are alarmed at the thought 
that nothing short of miracle can prevent the entire 
dissolution of society, the metaphysicians [Enlightenment 
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philosophes] who advocate progress justify their opponents’ 
alarm by their aspirations, for the practical issue of those 
aspirations would be the overthrow of all the institutions on 
which society ultimately rests. (Comte, 1877: p. 10) 
Thus, the crisis, for Comte, was that kind of disharmony between 
intellect and heart or between law and counsel which was the product of 
the Enlightenment (Comte, 1998: p. 215; Comte, 1877; Gane, 2006: p. 
90). The final harmony is attainable only in the positive stage of history. 
The general formula of this expected harmony goes as follows: “While it 
is for the heart to suggest our problems, it is for the intellect to solve 
them” (Comte, 1875: p. 14).  
In brief, Kant was afraid of the anarchy resulting from the collapse 
of the past regime and he prescribed the hard shell of an authoritative 
state negatively to prevent that kind of anarchy and, positively, he hoped 
that it would gradually lead us to maturity. Accepting the Kantian idea of a 
hard shell,42 Comte saw many dangers in a society which lacked ‘spiritual 
power’ and a society which was ‘disorganised’ in terms of morality 
(Comte, 1998: pp. 197-207).  
5. ‘Atheism 2.0’: the heir of the Comtean crisis-consciousness  
In this section I will argue that both Alain de Botton and Auguste 
Comte started their theologically engaged projects as a response to a 
crisis. As mentioned above, the significance of Comte’s scheme does not 
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 Comte in the last years of his life supported Napoleon III which caused many of his 
disciples to think that he had betrayed them (cf. Pickering, 2009: p. 478). 
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come from its historical originality. Thus, we might wonder what is unique 
about Comte’s ideas. Voegelin argued that 
Neither Saint-Simon nor Comte has a place in history 
because of the originality of his ideas or the profoundness of 
his systematic thought; their ideas were a common 
possession of the age, and their achievement in systematic 
penetration is at best dilettantic. They hold their 
distinguished place because of their keen sensitiveness for 
the critical character of the epoch, and because of their 
ability for concentrating the apocalyptic atmosphere into 
blazing symbols of doom and salvation. (1999: p. 228) 
The significance of Comte’s ideas, therefore, was in his 
consciousness about the spiritual crisis.43 The argument here is that the 
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In the nineteenth century a generation of thinkers (including Comte, Saint-Simon, de 
Maistre and, even before them, Voltaire) were not “unconcerned with the intellectual and 
emotional vacuum left by their rejection of the Christian faith” (cf. Charlton, 1963: p. 24). 
It was fearsome for them to abandon religion because of the imminent but unintended 
consequences of the disappearance of the moral unity of the society. Unlike the 
Enlightenment deists, like Voltaire, the attack of the next generations of the heirs of the 
Enlightenment did not remain limited to the Church. It targeted the very existence of the 
Supreme Being, whatever that is. The spread of this disbelief even magnified the sense 
of crisis for the thinkers of the time (Voegelin, 1999: p. 186). We can see this fear clearly 
in Voltaire’s epistle to an unknown writer of a controversial atheistic treatise called The 
Three Impostors (De Tribus Impostoribus). The book targeted the theistic core belief of 
the three Abrahamic religions. In response Voltaire defended the idea (or even the 
illusion) of a God. Voltaire wrote: “If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent 
him” for the sake of the functions of the mere ‘illusive’ existence of this ‘imaginary’ entity 
in the people’s mind: “Whom the sage proclaims, and whom kings adore” (McGrath, 
2004: p. 25). The historical narrative of the spiritual crisis at the end of the eighteenth 
century was, more or less, similar. First, Europe had been united under the umbrella of 
Catholicism, i.e. a moral unity. Second, by the time of the emergence of the Reformation 
this unity had collapsed. Third, the Enlightenment had challenged the residual religious 
beliefs through negative philosophies (Comte, 1875: p. 10; Gane, 2006: pp. 2 and 80). 
Finally, the French revolution “had marked the end of a religious as well as of a political 
regime”. But while “The critiques of the eighteenth century had ruined the prestige of 
Catholicism and monarchy,” they “were too near to see how much was left standing of 
the old civilisation in spite of the general destruction. They believed that nothing 
survived, that the future had to be made anew, and enthusiasts in great numbers felt the 
call to preach the moral and political gospel for the new age” (Voegelin, 1999: p. 168). 
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crisis for Comte and de Botton is the same in nature – a spiritual crisis 
caused by the large improvement of the revolutionary and aggressive 
reason which resulted in the marginalisation of emotion, heart and 
counsel in the secular age. That is, both could see the forgotten, 
‘immature’ parts of human soul. And both started from a kind of crisis-
consciousness. de Botton, in reviewing Comte’s pathology of the atheistic 
life, approvingly wrote: 
He [Comte] believed that capitalism had aggravated 
people’s competitive, individualistic impulses and distanced 
them from their communities, their traditions and their 
sympathies with nature. He criticized the nascent mass 
media for coarsening sensibilities and closing off chances 
for self-reflection, seclusion and original thought. (2012: p. 
303) 
Atheistic life would, as de Botton says, result in some calamities: 
“A secular society devoted solely to the accumulation of wealth, scientific 
discovery, popular entertainment and romantic love […] would fall prey to 
untenable social maladies” (de Botton, 2012: p. 300). These are also 
what Comte categorised as the outcomes of egoism. de Botton’s basic 
argument is that good ideas will never change our everyday life unless 
they are supported by “institutions of a kind that only religions have so far 
known how to build” (de Botton: 2012, p. 307). So, the strategy of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
On the one hand Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821), pursued restoration of the old as the 
only way out of the crisis. On the other hand, Auguste Comte and Henri de Saint-Simon 
(1760-1825) chose a secular version of religion as a soft shell inside that Kantian hard 
shell represented by the powerful state (Acton, 1974; Charlton, 1963: p. 24-37). 
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rejection of religion as a whole has failed and caused these calamities. In 
other words, both Comte and de Botton start their projects from this 
failure or crisis. The solution would lie in a new poetic vision and 
prophetic mission of fabricating new secularised religions (in the case of 
Comte) or deconstructing religious ideas to take advantage of them (in 
the case of de Botton). The underlying strategy of both is an atheistic 
expropriation of religions.  
6. A return to Comte the poet 
In this last section the poetic vision of Comte and de Botton will be 
addressed through answering two questions: what do we mean by the 
poetic vision? How have Comte and de Botton, respectively, tried to 
make the real changes possible? 
Poetic vision, for Comte, is the prerequisite for any fundamental 
change (Voegelin, 1999: p.247), and imagination, which is the origin of 
poetry, has a creative power. More substantively, the creative power of 
poetry challenges the mere representational function of poems. Poetry 
here loses its innocence. It is not about the mere representation of 
personal emotions, but is a tool at the hands of a political reformer to 
fabricate a myth and to explore new horizons. One can conclude that 
poetry is a way to explore new horizons by the occupation of the existing 
ones. From this point of view, Kant’s myth of ‘maturity’ was the result of a 
certain poetic point of view which was contrarily the function of his 
imagination. The outcome of that poetic revolution was the suppression of 
human spiritual needs. The Comtean mission was to revive that 
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imagination to rejuvenate humanity after the eclipse of love during the 
resurrection of the Enlightenment version of aggressive reason.  
How did Comte establish his poetic vision? The mission of 
expropriation and occupation of religious ideas was at the centre of 
Comte’s poetic vision in the last years of his life44 when he started to sign 
his letters as the First Great Priest of Humanity (Pickering, 2009: p. 525). 
He tried to revive that moral unity of society by establishing a secularised 
Religion of Humanity. The secularised religion was a necessary step 
toward giving birth to the harmonious society in the last stage of history 
which he grasped in his philosophical works. He returned to Catholicism 
because of its high-level organisation, hierarchy and discipline to resist 
the ‘undisciplinable souls’ of modern men (Pickering, 2009: pp. 521-2). 
Comte makes abundantly clear in this opening section of the 
Système [System of Positive Polity (1851-1854)], society is 
not yet in the normal state, and will not be there until the 
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 There is a difference between my interpretation of Comte’s last years and some other 
sociological conceptions. My suggestion is that we need to ignore the unproductive 
division between Comte the sane philosopher versus Comte the ‘insane’ prophet and 
replace it with the division between Comte the philosopher versus Comte the poet. The 
myth of Comte’s insanity and melancholy, because of his invitation to the secularised 
religion, first originated in a treatise by John Stuart Mill, which was published in the 
Westminster Review under the title Auguste Comte and Positivism (1865). In that 
treatise, Mill started with a fair examination of Comte’s positive philosophy and ended by 
pitying his melancholy: “Others may laugh, but we could far rather weep at this 
melancholy decadence of a great intellect” (Mill, 1866: p. 199). The myth has been 
repeated by many sociology textbook writers until recently. Even Norbert Elias in What 
Is Sociology? (1978) stated: “he [Comte] was very likely a little mad” (Elias, 1978: p. 33). 
But here, I consider Comte over his whole life (except in the period of his psychological 
breakdown 1826-1827) as totally sane and rational, first because there were no signs of 
insanity in his later years (Gane, 2006: p. 14; Voegelin, 1999: pp. 163-168), and second 
because we can trace back the seeds of his prophetic mission to his early writings 
(Gane, 2006: p. 40; Voegelin, 1999: pp. 234-245). For example, in his Course de 
Philosophie Positive (1975), while he was referring to the military organisations, he 
never separated counsels from commands (Gane, 2006: p. 75). In fact, the seeds of the 
necessity of rejoining counsels and commands were in his earlier courses. Finally, this 
kind of prophetic mission was completely normal among his contemporaries – thinkers 
like de Maistre and Saint-Simon (Charlton, 1963: pp. 43-44). 
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positive, the new religion, is in place. To define that polity in 
anticipation of its being put into practice is the objective of 
the Système. (Dale, 1989: p 37) 
Arguably, Comte’s conception of religion and its role in society is 
significant in understanding his poetic vision. Religion for Comte was 
more about the non-sacred bind of society (Comte, 1875: p. 10). To keep 
alive this binding power one does not necessarily need to adhere to the 
idea of a transcendental being. Comte as a poet/prophet was about to 
keep that binding/attaching function of religion at work in the 
‘disenchanted’ world45. Comte used to see his own time the time of crisis 
(or a transitional level in history). His Religion of Humanity was an 
attempt to overcome that crisis which was the result of challenging the 
‘spiritual power’ by Kant. As explained above, the spiritual crisis was a 
crisis following the intentional blindness toward the immature parts of the 
human soul. For ‘Comte the poet’, then, human imagination should create 
a unifying umbrella of religious-like spiritual power.  
But how does de Botton use poetry to occupy religion? de Botton 
also believes in the necessity of the change of the strategy from rejection 
to expropriation, and holds that the human imagination has a pivotal role 
in the process of fabrication of the new solids. 46 But while Comte is so 
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 “In place of the idea that society becomes less religious as it moves into the positive 
epoch, Comte suggests that it becomes even more religious – religion is redefined as 
‘religare’, rebinding, rather than as a system of worship and ethics oriented towards a 
transcendental sacred order” (Gane, 2006: p. 121). However, the full emergence of a 
secular religion as an ideal ‘rebinding force’ has been considered to be a gradual 
process. 
46
 For example, the genius point that Christianity grasped was that the soul is like a child 
inside us which needs to be educated. de Botton observed that in the Christian frescoes 
of the Middle Ages, the soul was portrayed as a child inside the human body (de Botton, 
2012: pp. 112-121). The child enters the human body at the time of birth through the 
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elitist in his usage of the imagination, de Botton sees it as a collective 
‘wiki-project’ (de Botton, 2011). While Comte’s target audiences were 
emperors and rulers of Europe, feudal society and bankers, de Botton 
does not concern himself with an organised spiritual power as a solution. 
He supports more individualistic and psychological solutions. The self-
                                                                                                                                                             
mouth and is dragged out by an angel or Satan after death while it is still a child. The 
inner child remains a child because some parts of our soul, for Christians, remain 
eternally immature. de Botton sees this underlying thesis of the Christian doctrine as still 
true in the secular age (de Botton, 2012: pp. 115). He mentiones that modern atheists 
disagree with Christians about the needs of human soul, still “it is hard to discredit the 
provocative underlying thesis, which seems no less relevant in the secular realm than in 
the religious one – that we have within us a precious, childlike, vulnerable core which we 
should nourish and nurture on its turbulent journey through life” (de Botton, 2012: p. 
115). de Botton and Comte, following Christians, developed their conception of human 
nature, in which there is an eternal desire for the maternal safety and the support of the 
guardian. Comte, after the tragic death of his mistress, Clotilde de Vaux (1815-1846), 
established the cult of Clotilde and, from her, Comte extended his prayers to Humanity 
as a whole (Pickering, 2009: p. 314 and 337). To answer the question of necessary 
maternal safety, de Botton showed the mechanisms of dealing with the immature parts 
of the soul in religions. For example, Christianity presupposes that immaturity for the 
audience then manages the counterpart simplicity in its messages. Furthermore, the 
Christian educational system, unlike its secular academic counterpart, focused on 
repeating that message regularly in speeches and Sunday ceremonies (de Botton, 
2012: p. 135). While Comte called himself the pope of secular religion, de Botton 
suggested psychotherapy for dealing with the soul-related support of the modern man 
(de Botton, 2013b). For de Botton, Dawkins’ version of atheism (in which the Christian 
longing of comfort through the figure of Madonna and child is radically ridiculed) seems 
right in theory but not productive in practice. de Botton believes that the question about 
the historical validity of the existence of Mary and her story is not the right question. 
“The apposite point is not whether the Virgin exists, but what it tells us about human 
nature that so many Christians over two millennia have felt the need to invent her. Our 
focus should be on what the Virgin Mary reveals about our emotional requirement – and, 
in particular, on what becomes of these demands when we lose our faith” (de Botton, 
2012: p. 168). The Virgin embodies the missed and lost supporter of the mature people. 
“While for long stretches of our lives we can believe in our maturity,” de Botton writes, 
“we never succeed in insulating ourselves against the kind of catastrophic events that 
sweep away our ability to reason, our courage and our resourcefulness at putting 
dramas in perspective and throw us back into a state of primordial helplessness” (de 
Botton, 2012: pp. 169-171). At the time of psychological crisis, our real supporter is 
either not accessible or our dignity does not let us to refer to him/her. But religion, 
according to de Botton, as our invention, fabricated the solid figures of the imaginary 
‘sympathetic adults’ — figures such as “Mary in Christianity, Isis in Ancient Egypt, 
Demeter in Greece, Venus in Rome and Guan Yin in China” (de Botton, 2012: p. 171). 
Those figures function as spiritual supporters when no adult feels embarrassed to refer 
to them at times of crisis. de Botton praises religions for what he calls the ‘fabrication’ of 
these sound and solid supporters, and believes as such that human beings need these 
solid moments. The underlying thesis of his Religion for Atheists (2012) is that the 
secular world should not be ignorant toward these thousand-year-old solids just because 
of the rejection of the core message of religion and the belief in God. But the atheists 
should use the buffet of religions and choose their plausible solids to rest on them 
against the calamities and sufferings of modern life.  
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help book is also a suitable medium for that reason. de Botton’s project, 
as well as his age, is quite different from Comte’s. 
Religion, for him, is no more than a ‘buffet’ open to us (de Botton, 
2012: chapter 5). Therefore, Atheism 2.0 is not a mere ‘return’ to religion. 
It would be more precise to say that it is the ‘reverse engineering’ of 
religion. That is to say, we can choose any combination of religious items 
that fits us. de Botton defends the process of the selection of ideas, 
manners, rituals and beliefs to be operative and he targets not only 
Catholicism but also Buddhism and Judaism. ‘Atheism 2.0’ for de Botton, 
then, is first of all not a centralised enterprise and does not need any 
pope; rather, it is a collective project (de Botton, 2011). Second, ‘atheism 
2.0’ is a method – a method of taking advantage of religions. Thus, no 
specific goal or option has been prescribed for these new atheists – as 
science and reason are the only legitimate options for the New Atheists. 
The revolutionary element of ‘atheism 2.0’ is that it, with the mediation of 
Comtean ideas, opens this buffet for atheists and in this way gives birth to 
tourist atheism. 
7. Conclusion 
The spiritual crisis of the secular age started with the rejection of 
the necessity of the spiritual power in society in any form. Kant’s treatise, 
What is Enlightenment?, was the manifesto of this rejection. In that 
treatise he separated law from counsel and their counterpart institutions, 
the state and the church. In addition, Kant’s idea was that modern men 
will become mature by getting rid of the latter. But Comte from the 
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beginning of his career, as a thinker, was concerned about this rejection 
of religion and in many texts addressed it as a crisis. During the final 
decade of his life he found the solution in the constitution of a secularised 
religion. I distinguished between Comte the philosopher and Comte the 
poet which, I suggest, prefigures the division between pilgrim and tourist 
atheisms. Comte the poet tried to open new horizons by using 
imagination to fabricate a new secular religion. That fabrication, in his 
mind, would pave the way for harmony between mind and heart. ‘Atheism 
2.0’ is a return to the crisis-consciousness of Comte the philosopher, and 
it revived the basic theme of the Comtean poetic vision which is an 
atheistic return to religion to occupy it. In the first chapter, I wrote about 
Comte’s calendar and his odd exclusion of Jesus from it. Now I should 
add that when for the first time Comte heard about Percy Shelley, he did 
not hesitate to add him to his calendar. The priority of Shelley over Jesus 
in the Comtean scheme is symbolic of the way he used to approach 
religion. The basic insight of this chapter was that de Botton, starting from 
that Comtean crisis consciousness, also shared this poetic view of 
religion with Comte.  
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Part Three 
Beyond Prometheanism 
 
The term post-secularism refers to series of possibilities for 
modern forms of knowledge which refrain from accepting secularism as a 
meta-discourse. In chapter eight, I will argue that the environmental crisis 
is the result of the poor use of science and technology. And theology 
which made modern science and technology possible can contribute in 
solving taming the beast of the modern crises. In that chapter, I will also 
argue that Prometheanism has never been an appropriate background 
ideology for science. In chapter nine, I will put Sloterdijk’s idea of giving 
priority to the Nietzschean concept of perfection against the Rorty’s thesis 
of the priority of democracy to philosophy. With the help of that 
comparison, I will argue for a thesis inspired by Sloterdijk’s philosophy 
which will be called the primacy of training over truth. I will argue that 
unlike Rorty’s scheme, ‘the primacy of training’ is not based on the 
outright exclusion and privatisation of religion. The difference between 
these two theses is that the latter sees democracy founded on (not a 
mere static trade of truth with freedom) but a dynamic educational, co-
working and co-training process through all the religious and irreligious 
exercises. The last chapter of the thesis considers the significance of the 
idea of public sociology for co-practice in a post-secular age. The major 
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insight of the chapter is that there are two theses originally put forward by 
Michael Burawoy but still need to be highlighted; those are the necessity 
of challenging the assumed neutrality of social sciences and also the 
necessity of public engagement in the form of encouraging co-practice in 
society. I will suggest that an idea of a much needed post-secular public 
sociology is the result of such reading of Burawoy’s thesis.  
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Chapter Eight 
Taming the Beast: Prometheanism and the 
future of natural sciences 
 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will examine the relationship between modern 
atheisms and the ‘question of science’. By the ‘question of science’ I 
mean a question about an explanatory theoretical framework to 
understand the history of science and also adopt a suitable science 
policy. I divide this question into two parts about which I will write here. 
The first is about the history of science: what kind of system of belief 
made science possible? Was that theology or some sort of atheism? The 
second concerns the future of science: what kind of background ideology 
is suitable for protecting the benefits of science while still enabling us to 
cope with the great disasters caused by science and technology?  
These questions seem necessary to be addressed in society, the 
distinguishing feature of which is risk. Ulrich Beck (born 1944), in his Risk 
Society (1986), establishes a division between the old meaning of 
accident as the outcome of human miscalculations and the new meaning 
of the term, which shows itself most conspicuously in nuclear power 
plants. The consequences of any sort of accident in the new meaning of 
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the term (such as in the case of Chernobyl disaster) last for a long time, 
often more than a generation. That means the consequences of the 
accidents in our time will affect many people who will be born years later 
and who will probably be a long way from the place of the accident. Beck 
concludes that “[t]his means that the calculation of risk as it has been 
established so far by science and legal institutions collapses” (Beck, 
2002: p. 22—ital. original). Hence, we need a new policy to take that risk 
into account. The ‘beast of science’ – which was known to the romantics 
of the nineteenth century such as Mary Shelley (1797-1851) the writer of 
Frankenstein; or The Modern Prometheus (1823) – has been released 
and caused destruction and has instilled fear in people. No individual or 
even single state alone is able to control the consequences of the actions 
of this beast. Take the case of climate change which is the ultimate result 
of the industrialisation process and greenhouse gas emissions through 
the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas). The UN, at least after 
2002, continuously tried to find an international consensus for controlling 
the environmental crisis and warned that no single country will remain 
unharmed following this disaster. In another case, fracking or Hydraulic 
Fracturing is a method designed to recover gas from the shale-rock 
through drilling down into earth and injecting a mixture of water, sand and 
chemicals into the earth. This technique causes a lot of concern because 
of the possibility of contaminating the groundwater or even causing 
earthquakes. A writer has described it as “the tornado on the horizon that 
is poised to wreck on-going efforts to create green economies, local 
agriculture [and] investments in renewable energy” (Steingraber, 2011: p. 
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350). Long before this, in the 1990s, many theoreticians talked about ‘the 
end of nature’, which means that after the greenhouse effect, acid rain 
and the depletion of the ozone layer no one can talk about ‘the natural’ 
since everything in the world is manipulated and even ruined by human 
beings (see: McKibben, 2000). Thus, the question of the disasters caused 
by science and technology is no longer a cause of concern for the distant 
future (as Mary Shelley used to think); rather, it is one of the central 
problems of our age. The main question of this chapter is about a way to 
tame the beast of science and the capability of atheist ideologies to 
undertake such a task. Let us start from the top. The first question is 
historical: who made this beast? 
2. Who made the beast? 
The beast of science is essentially the result of the ‘heretical’ 
readings of some Christian theological narrations that presuppose the 
ontological existence of natural laws and assume the epistemological 
possibility of fathoming those laws by men with god-like powers – which 
means by the will to control nature. Steve Fuller coined the term 
theomimesis for the theological process of the transition of God’s powers 
to man (Fuller and Lipinska, 2014: chapter 2).  
Theomimesis, which in Greek means God-playing, is humankind’s 
attempt to see the world from God’s point of view, the ultimate objective 
view or the view from nowhere. As is evident in the term, theomimesis is 
about an act of mimicry. That is, man tries to reproduce God’s knowledge 
and power through science. As I discussed in the first two chapters, this 
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became possible in the Christian context because of the presence of a 
figure like Christ. The very being of Christ shows that humankind’s 
existence overlaps with that of God’s, because Jesus was neither wholly 
man nor wholly God. In fact, theomimesis refers to the moment that is 
described in several books of the Bible (Matthew, Mark and Luke) that 
Jesus and his apostles on the top of a mountain understand that Jesus is 
son of God (Fuller and Lipinska, 2014: p. 47). Thus, the God of 
Christianity can give what He has (e.g. his knowledge) to man as a gift. 
This is the way to overcome the Original Sin which is related to Adam’s 
and Eve’s eating of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge in the Garden of 
Eden, and exactly because of that act of overcoming, Jesus has been 
called the second Adam. Accordingly, a follower of Christ can overcome 
his or her sinful nature by making paradise on earth and this is mainly 
through science. I tend to see this Christian onto-theological premise as 
the cornerstone of the modern scientific viewpoint which was the privilege 
of the Western countries. One can easily see that in the other parts of the 
world, from China to Persia and Egypt, there were highly advanced 
civilisations which regardless of their achievements could never even 
think of this level of manipulation in nature. The difference between the 
West and the rest does not stem from a special talent or the level of 
sophistication of the thought which the Westerners possess; rather, it 
emanates from those theological narratives that allowed the mimicking of 
God and which did not exist in non-Western civilisations. Deirdre 
McCloskey in Bourgeois Dignity (2011) argues that economics cannot 
explain the emergence of modernity in general and especially in modern 
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sciences. That is to say, the growth of science in Europe was not the 
result of the pressures of external factors such as market forces. Quite 
contrarily, the internal factors played more significant roles. McCloskey 
argues that this internal factor was the innovation of the practitioners who 
were trying to solve technical problems and complete experiments. 
Moreover, there was a society which “honour[ed] and liberate[d]” those 
practitioners. That type of practitioner, McCloskey believes, was the 
bourgeoisie of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, specifically in 
England (McCloskey, 2011: 326-7). Thus, innovation in terms of finding 
new ways of solving the practical problems was the result of the 
constitution of science and this is what can be found in the European 
bourgeoisie. Yet McCloskey fails to answer one question: where does 
that innovation come from? Why cannot this factor be found in other 
civilisations? As illustrated, theomimesis is the best answer to this 
question. This argument can also be used against the pilgrim atheists’ 
misreading of the history of science. They have always denied the 
theological foundations of the scientific viewpoint. But what is the real 
contribution of atheists themselves to the scientific discoveries? Fuller 
and Lipinska believe that: 
‘Atheism’ has only ever contributed to the advancement of 
science and the empowerment of humanity when humans 
have arrogated for themselves divine powers, while refusing 
to credit God for the inspiration; in this respect, such self-
avowed ‘atheist’ movements as idealism, positivism, 
Marxism, etc. are properly called ‘Promethean’ […]. And it is 
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just these crypto-theistic atheists who need to figure out 
which game they are playing when they are ‘playing God’. 
(2014: p. 56—ital. mine) 
Although Dawkins and Dennett believe that atheism is the ‘logical’ 
result of the scientific viewpoint, the truth is that science became possible 
only within a certain onto-theological framework which let us mimic God. 
Modern Prometheanism was not the end-point of that mimicry. Contrarily, 
Prometheanism is about the sublimation of that instinct of mimicry – the 
moment when modern man intentionally decided not to see that he or she 
was mimicking God, and thus through this denial he or she became God. 
The very reason for choosing Prometheus as the metaphor was to evoke 
the story in which hope and fire are endowed on man. Fire stands for 
civilisation while hope is the symbol of progress. Zeus did not want man 
to have fire, but Prometheus, who loved human beings, stole fire from 
gods and gave it to man and successively paid a heavy price for 
disobeying. Prometheus, more or less similar to the Christian definition of 
Satan, was a disobeying angel. Both severed man’s relationship with 
God. The same is true for pilgrim atheists, who see modern civilisation in 
contrast with the religious form of life. They also tend to deny the 
theological roots of modernity. Akin to the story of Prometheus, pilgrim 
atheism is about a radical break with the theological past and defining 
humanity against God not in continuation of Him, as if ‘the stolen fire’ 
authentically belonged to man or was the natural product of human 
history.  
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Let us articulate theomimesis in another way to answer the pilgrim 
atheists’ cynicism towards the theological relevance of science. We know 
that risk is the motor-engine of modern science. Without taking enormous 
risks, scientists could never have achieved this level of technological 
advancement. In fact, technological advancement becomes possible by 
moving from the uncertain, which is the unknown unknown, to risk, or 
known unknown. When scientists dare to take risks in their own research, 
there are still unknown elements at work and huge uncertainty about the 
very possibilities and also the consequences of the given scientific 
inquiry. An example from the history of science will vindicate this claim. 
The Green Revolution was one of the most ambitious scientific-political 
projects of the 1960s. The idea was to get rid of starvation in the poorest 
parts of the world with the help of genetic engineering. Genetic 
modification is principally what many farmers have done for hundreds of 
years by selective breeding for special purposes, but the new 
improvement was biotechnology which let us manipulate the genes from 
the inside. Subsequently, a scientific miracle happened. In 1980, India 
became self-sufficient in wheat and rice and in several other countries the 
result was in favour of the poor. Nevertheless, the side-effects were also 
huge. For example, the survival of the genetically modified crops caused 
other local species to die out or in some cases the vast usage of the 
chemicals led to resistant weeds. “In Europe, although not in the USA, 
genetically modified (GM) products were denounced as ‘Frankenfoods’” 
(Fara, 2009: p. 360). 
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The idea of making these Frankenfoods in itself is highly risky, but 
combined with the very goal of the scientific retiring of the concept of 
starvation, it creates an objective which is beyond the aspiration of a 
human being who is merely another type of animal. This ambitious 
aspiration needs an animal which blurs the borders of its material 
existence with God. Thus, historically speaking, the theological narratives 
that let modern man mimic God were responsible for making such an 
ambitious beast. Those narratives were based on this presupposition that 
we can ‘get into the mind of God’, not only that we can play God, because 
we possess a divine potential. Thus, taking risks and pushing the 
boundaries of existing knowledge are our distinctive features as human 
beings. That is to say, there are no borders for God. Yet the historical 
relevance of theology does not imply that it is still theoretically relevant. 
Knowing the historical interdependence between science and theology, 
we still need to argue for the theoretical relevance of theology to the 
current state or the future of science. Regarding this issue, I will argue 
that whatever made the beast of science can also tame it – i.e. theology. 
3. Who can tame the beast? 
Max Weber (1864-1920) in his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
of Capitalism (1930) suggested that the malaise of the Western modern 
form of life is shallowness (Weber, 2001: pp. 18-32). This shallowness is 
related to the fact that in modern life the economic acquisition became an 
end in itself. Thus, it led us to restless activity without any meaning. It is 
as if man exists for the sake of business not vice-versa (Weber, 2001: p. 
32). He famously found the theological roots of this capitalistic ethos in 
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the theological concept of work-in-calling (beruf) which is central in the 
Calvinist doctrine of proof. 47  In that doctrine intense, regular and 
systematic labour has been considered as proof of the salvation of the 
businessman in his or her afterlife (Weber, 2001: pp. 70-100). That 
religious narrative, Weber believed, has died out. It does not exist any 
longer. What really exists is the iron cage of capitalism with its “specialists 
without spirit, sensualists without heart” (Weber, 2001, p. 124) and they 
are at the service of the capitalists. What has remained from that religious 
passion, in the end, is only capitalistic greed. One can assume that the 
same destiny applies to science as a form of knowledge expanded under 
the capitalist system. Science might have started with the mimicry of 
God’s knowledge, but ended up in mere greed. While capitalism for 
Weber was more about economic greed, today, science is about greed 
for power and endless appetite for the manipulation of nature. Along 
these lines, the question is who can tame this beast? Which theoretical 
framework is more capable of saving the world from the disasters caused 
by science, but, at the same time, retaining its undeniable benefits? 
Imagine a rhombus on each corner of which are (1) humanism, (2) 
posthumanism, (3) traditionalism, and (4) transhumanism. Can we find a 
method for taming the beast of scientific greed in any of these schools? I 
will suggest that those schools that prescribe a return to the lost 
theological foundations of capitalism and the capitalistic forms of 
                                                          
47
 Weber also recognised the importance of Duns Scotus and nominalism for the 
emergence of capitalism, and hinted that the doctrine of the primacy of the will is 
common between Calvinism and its Scotist roots. He mentioned it in a footnote to his 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (see: Weber, 2001: pp. 195-6). 
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knowledge are the ones that can tame the beast (which they have 
created in the first place).  
3-1. Humanists 
Both types of atheists (pilgrims and tourists) are members of this 
category. Let us start with pilgrim atheism (I will write about tourist 
atheists’ ideas about science in the next section). The problem with 
pilgrim atheists, especially Neo-Darwinists, is that they describe humanity 
as another type of animal among other species. Thus, their conception of 
humanity is a very ‘path-dependent’ conception. They consider us parts 
of the nature. Ipso facto, we might be able to control this nature through 
science but at the end of the day we are in the same process of evolution. 
Therefore, we might become extinct in the same way that other species 
have (Fuller and Lipinska, 2014: pp. 2-3; Fuller, 2006: chapter 11). The 
essential difference between humanity and the rest of nature is in the 
language and the reasoning ability, neither of which guarantees any 
special superiority over the power of nature. We, our bodies, our cultures, 
distinct languages and all of our entity are destined to extinction at some 
point in the (probably distant) future (cf. Dennett, 1995: pp. 511-515). 
Such a conception of humanity as part of nature cannot be the 
background ideology which supports science. As I mentioned above, 
science is about the huge manipulation of nature which needs not to 
presuppose any inherent sanctity for flora and fauna. If we imagine that 
evolution is the only valid universal method which determines our destiny, 
we will not have enough motivation to control this process. This seems to 
be a legitimate conclusion if we look at the history of the Homo sapiens 
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which, compared to the history of the earth, is a recent phenomenon with 
several thousand years’ precedence. We can, ipso facto, draw a 
spectrum on the one side of which is God and on the other side of which 
is ape. For humanists, the position of humanity on this spectrum is 
somewhere around the ape. Humanists do consider humans different 
from animals in terms of rationality and reasoning capabilities but that 
ability in itself is not enough for taking part in scientific adventures.  
3-2. Posthumanists 
Posthumanists also share this idea with humanists that a human 
being is more similar to an ape than to God, but they tend to see that the 
cognitive ability of Homo sapiens does not mean that human beings have 
a privileged ontological position in comparison with other animals (Wolfe, 
2010). In other words, posthumanism is about recalling the animal side of 
humanity which was suppressed during the Enlightenment. 
Posthumanists are critical of the humanistic rationalism which has led us 
to this dangerous environmental situation. Rationalism, for them, is also 
responsible for the disregard of animal rights. This kind of naturalisation 
of human beings, for the same reasons that apply to Neo-Darwinists, 
cannot work as the background ideology of science which enables us to 
tame the beast of the disastrous side-effects of science and at the same 
time does not ruin its achievements. This is because posthumanism does 
not theoretically support risk-taking as the pivotal concept in scientific 
research. They alternatively support the precautionary principle in science 
policy which is about minimising risk for the sake of keeping the harmony 
of nature.  
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3-3. Traditionalists 
Traditionalism is a philosophical school which is based on 
comparative religious studies. The fundamental methodological premise 
of the traditionalists, who are mostly Islamic, Christian or Jewish 
philosophers, is that the religious truth is common between world leading 
religions, and therefore the search for this perennial truth should be the 
common ground of dialogue between world religions. For the same 
reason this school has also been called perennialism (see: Nasr, 1989). 
Such perennial common truth, for traditionalists, is set against modern 
secularism and, evidently, science. Subsequently, they see modern 
secular science as responsible for the recent unprecedented destruction 
of nature and other fears of the modern world. Hossein Nasr, the leading 
traditionalist philosopher, in his Religion and the Order of Nature (1996), 
goes further and searches for the roots of the scientific destruction of 
nature in the modern philosophies of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. He correctly found the roots of the modern destruction of 
nature in the modern conceptions of man as the torturer of nature – 
Francis Bacon’s term. Contrary to this modern point of view, Nasr’s goal 
is to rediscover and revive the traditional sacred science which used to 
keep the harmony between earth, human beings and heaven (Nasr, 
1996: p. 153). That sacred science was based on tradition but this term 
does not – as may seem prima facie – mean something perfect in the 
past. Tradition “means truths or principles of a divine origin revealed or 
unveiled to mankind and, in fact, a whole cosmic sector through various 
figures envisaged as messengers, prophets, avataras, [or] the Logos” 
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(Nasr, 1989: p. 64). Therefore, if tradition is about the perennial truths 
that have been revealed, then they are equally valid in the past, present 
and/or future. I mean, tradition refers to the truths which are considered to 
be eternal, and therefore time is irrelevant in this discussion; we can 
always revive those truths, a traditionalist would argue. Exactly because 
of this accessibility of those truths, we can become God-like (mute’alleh 
in Arabic). In other words, for traditionalists we are more like God than 
apes. But how can we, God-like creatures, revive that sacred science and 
more importantly, in terms of our current situation, how can we tame the 
beast of modern science? It does not seem that the traditionalists have 
clear answers to those questions. 
It would be helpful to compare the traditionalists’ intellectual 
position on modernity (i.e. their absolute rejection of it) with that of the 
followers of Radical Orthodoxy. For example, John Milbank is also a 
Christian philosopher who believes in the revival of Christian wisdom to 
cope with the malaise of the modern world. He defines Radical Orthodoxy 
not as an anti-modern movement but as a movement to go beyond 
modernity (Milbank, 2000: p. 44). No wonder that he, well known as a 
postmodern theologian, described his tendency toward postmodernism in 
this way: “back in the 1980s, I certainly saw postmodernism as a moment 
of opportunity for theology, because it seemed to qualify and diminish 
secular claims to truth” (Milbank, 2000: pp. 41-2). Seeing postmodernism 
as a moment of challenging the secular and paving the way for the 
theological is a policy that might or might not work, but it is certainly an 
intellectual policy which does not exist in isolation in academia and the 
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existing situation. Accordingly, Milbank clearly describes the goal of this 
project as opposing modernity, not through the search for the ‘perfect pre-
modern’ but through seeking “an alternative version of modernity” 
(Milbank, 2000: p. 45). This political side of Radical Orthodoxy, I argue, is 
its advantage over traditionalism. But still we cannot see the Radical 
Orthodoxy’s policy toward secular science and its consequences. How do 
they want to deal with the environmental crisis? It seems to me that we 
can guess that both traditionalism and Radical Orthodoxy are more 
greatly inclined toward the precautionary principle of posthumanists. They 
have followed the policy of blaming science for all these disasters which 
is correct but not sufficient.  
3-4. Transhumanists 
Transhumanists, unlike Neo-Darwinists, believe that human beings 
are on the God side of the spectrum of being. This idea has been 
elaborated further in the works of the second generation of 
transhumanists 48 , Steve Fuller and Veronica Lipinska (2014). If 
traditionalists are anti-modernity, and if posthumanists are critical of the 
Enlightenment, transhumanists are pro-modernity and pro-Enlightenment. 
It might even be more precise to say that they are ultra-moderns. They 
believe that moderns have not manipulated and controlled nature 
enough, an outlandish claim that seems more understandable if we look 
at their definition of humanity. Fuller in his Humanity 2.0 (2011) reviewed 
the traits that used to be considered unique to humans, such as culture, 
                                                          
48
 The first generation of transhumanists contains figures such as Julian Huxley (1887-
1975) and Max More (born 1964). The difference between the two generations is in the 
consistent ideological background belief that the first generation lacked and the second 
generation prepared for transhumanism.   
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emotion, personality and morality. He asserted that scientists recently 
found out that there are some animals that have all or some of these 
traits (Fuller, 2011: p. 102). So, these are not the proper attributes with 
which we can define humanity; rather, humankind’s power for controlling 
and altering nature is the distinctive feature of human beings. Moreover, 
today this feature is more vivid in modern converging technologies, “that 
is, the integration of cutting edge research in nano-, bio-, info- and cogno-
sciences for purposes of extending the power and control of human 
beings over their own bodies and their environments” (Fuller, 2011: p. 
103). These technologies give us God-like power but it is important to 
realise that for them the ‘God-like’ adjective is not only a metaphor. The 
novel contribution of the second generation of transhumanists is their 
attempt to prepare that school with a more solid theologically motivated 
background belief. As a result, they have achieved three main tasks: first, 
they have rejected the pilgrim atheists’ misreading of modern history as 
the history of warfare between religion and science; second, they have 
found the roots of modern science in the fourteenth century nominalist 
movement (see chapters one and two); and finally, they have 
theologically redefined the proactionary principle, which was first 
suggested, against posthumanism’s precautionary principle, by the 
pioneering transhumanist Max More. Fuller and Lipinska believe that 
“embracing risk” is the “constitutive of what it means to be human” (2014: 
p. 3). This principle, for them, is rooted in the Scotist theological 
interpretation of the relationship between man and God. In that sense, 
transhumanism would be about the indefinite expansion of those qualities 
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that separates us from animals even to the point that we replace our 
carbon-based body with a silicon-based body which is more durable 
(Fuller, 2011: p. 3; Kurzweil, 2008). 
Before going further in this discussion, I need to conclude this 
section by returning to the first question I asked: who can tame the beast 
of science? Based on the points expatiated so far, it is safe to conclude 
that posthumanism, because of its tempering humanity toward ‘mother 
nature,’ and traditionalism, because of its evident rejection of modern 
forms of knowledge, are ideologically disposed to kill the beast of science 
– not tame it. The pilgrim atheism of Neo-Darwinists also fails to support 
science because of its inherited determinism that presupposes the 
indispensable extinction of human beings – just like other species – as 
the consequence of evolution. This intellectual position is against the 
spirit of risk-taking as the main motivation behind any scientific and 
technological progress. What remains in the end are tourist atheism and 
transhumanism, which are more open to the new modes of interpreting 
the theological past. Below, I will compare these two movements 
regarding their policies toward science. 
4. Theomimesis versus Theokenosis  
The second generation of transhumanists by the theological 
reading of the proactionary principle, more than trying to invent a 
theoretical basis for this school, are attempting to retrieve the 
consciousness about the theological elements which are already at work 
in science. Fuller’s neologism for that existing theological potential in 
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science is theomimesis, about which I wrote above. His suggestion is that 
if we take that theological background seriously, the proactionary 
imperative would be the future alternative to the precautionary imperative 
in science policy. In other words, it has been mentioned that according to 
some Christian doctrines, we are created in the image and likeness of 
God, and thus we can gain God-like power. Science was the result of this 
conception of man. Although scientists may create some evil (without any 
bad intentions) as a result of gaining those powers, we still need to find 
the solution to those evils in science itself, and not in counter-science. 
Thus, the question of science policy, like any other policy question, is 
about a mere value judgement. Do we need to search for the solution to 
human-made disasters inside science or out of it? On the one hand, the 
supporters of the precautionary principle (post-humanists and 
traditionalists) say that we need to search for the answer outside science 
or by stopping ‘doing’ science. On the other hand, the advocates of the 
proactionary principle believe that we need to find the solution to the side-
effects of science in science itself – manipulate nature further to save 
nature (see: Fuller and Lipinska, 2014; Fuller, 2011).  Hence, theology, 
for them, fuels scientific inquiries and also determines their future. Pilgrim 
atheists could agree with the main part of the proactionary policy but not 
that theological background. In other words, although pilgrim atheists 
reject that theological genealogy, they do already mimic God (see chapter 
four).  
All in all, if pilgrim atheism is based on theomimesis which 
metaphorically means that God gave man His knowledge, for tourist 
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atheists God gave man His very being. Slavoj Žižek in describing his 
‘atheist theology’ says that 
God does not give what he has, he gives what he is, his 
very being. That is to say: it is wrong to imagine the divine 
dispensation as the activity of a wealthy subject, so 
abundantly rich that he can afford to cede to others a part of 
his possessions. From a proper theological perspective, 
God is the poorest of them all: he ‘has’ only his being to give 
away. His whole wealth is already out there, in creation. 
(2009: p. 59) 
The theological term for this process of self-emptying is the divine 
kenosis (Greek word for emptiness). Thus, following the term 
theomimesis which applies to the pilgrim atheists’ ideal of ‘getting into the 
mind of God’, we can also talk about theokenosis which means mimicking 
God not in his objective knowledge but in his very singularity. Christ, in 
this sense, was not only the material representation of God but he was 
God’s self-endowed to the world. Therefore, what happened during the 
transfiguration (the biblical term for Jesus and Apostol hearing God on a 
mountain calling Jesus His beloved son) was not about giving a special 
divine power to Jesus. It was about God self-empting Himself. Thus, 
Christ became God and God is nothing but Christ. Accordingly, the 
moment that he, on the cross, cried out “my God, why have you forsaken 
me?”, is the moment at which Christ understood that there is no God but 
himself. In other words, Christ became an atheist. God, after that 
moment, became an entity suffering for the sake of our redemption, but 
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the difference between the God of Christianity and the God of tourist 
atheism is that the second one never saves His son. This new God does 
not ‘pull the strings’ of the creation. We humans, Žižek believes, “are left 
with no higher Power watching over us, just with the terrible burden of 
freedom and responsibility for the fate of divine creation” (Žižek, 2009: p. 
25). That process of self-empting is at the centre of the works of tourist 
atheists (Boscaljon, 2010; Ward, 1998).  
This type of interpreting the ‘death of God’ is a crucial point in 
tourist atheism which is relevant to the future of science. We human 
beings, for tourist atheists, are alone and responsible for the fate of the 
rest of creation. There is no other force, neither God nor nature, that can 
prepare us with a map for our journey. It is evident to us that an atheist, 
such as Žižek, does not accept the existence of God, but how can he 
reject the authority of nature? He believes that the true materialists 
should fully embrace the “ultimate void of reality” because they have 
accepted that no “substantial reality” does exist (Žižek, 2009: p. 97). 
Žižek, here, mostly based his ontology on the interpretation of quantum 
physics. That is, the quantum particles that “make up the atoms that 
comprise the ‘solid’ reality of the objects around us are, in themselves, 
fuzzy and undetermined” (Boscaljon, 2010: p. 6). The simplest articulation 
of this principle of ‘undetermined matter’ in quantum physics can be found 
in the double-slit experiment. In a nutshell, the experiment shows us that 
if we fire atoms to a screen in a way that they pass through a wall with 
two slits while we detect the process, the atoms will shape a series of 
light and dark fringes on the screen. It can be deduced that atoms must 
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move like waves otherwise they would have made only two fringes in the 
shape of the slits through which they have passed. But if we do the same 
experiment without any detectors, the atoms will act normally – there will 
be only two fringes on the screen. This second result shows that the 
atoms move as particles. The strange conclusion is that atoms change 
their behaviour depending on the presence or absence of a detector or 
witness. This mystery of un-undetermined matter is at the centre of 
quantum physics.  
One of the philosophical implications of this physical theory is that 
when the very presence of the witness can change the reality, then the 
outside reality cannot be solid at all. Can we say that physical reality in its 
most components is incomplete? Žižek’s answer is positive, and 
subsequently, he searches for an alternative ontology which can 
represent this new, intellectual position. He calls it the ‘open ontology’ 
which asserts that reality is essentially incomplete (see: Žižek, 2009: p. 
99; Boscaljon, 2010: p. 6). The second important implication of that 
quantum mystery is about the role of the witness. In the end, it is the 
witness-scientist that needs to decide about the authenticity of the 
ultimate reality – i.e. whether two fringes on the screen are the distorted 
reality or multiples of them. This is in a way the end to the ultimate ideal 
of the scientist who witnesses reality from nowhere without any change in 
what really happens. This discovery of physics undermines the claims not 
only of classic physics but of all the existing sciences including biology. 
Hence, this new open ontology helps Žižek to reject the authority of not 
only God but also nature.  
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Let us return to the atheism discussion. How does this new 
ontology shape Žižek’s version of tourist atheism? Žižek’s intellectual 
project here parallels Sloterdijk’s. Both want to rotate the cognitive 
platform of modern thought ninety degrees to see the backstage of 
religion. And there, they both find atheism to be the secret of religion. 
That is to say, they both reject Dawkinsean atheism for its direct rejection 
of religion, which Sloterdijk calls superficial and Žižek calls reductionist. 
Dawkinsean atheism is, to borrow John Gray’s metaphor, like chastity: 
defined by what it denies (qut. in Žižek, 2009: p. 96). That is to say, 
pilgrim atheism concerns reason and is against religion. Alternatively, 
Žižek, as a tourist atheist, suggests turning Gray’s argument around by 
asking this question: “what if the affinity between monotheism and 
atheism demonstrates not that atheism depends on monotheism, but that 
monotheism itself prefigures atheism within the field of religion?” (Žižek, 
2009: p. 96). God, for him, is nothing but the symbolic representation of 
the material density. Therefore, the right formulation for atheism is not to 
reject God but to “refuse to accept the objective reality” (Žižek, 2009: p. 
100). The clear formulation of this argument against God is 
understandable by using Kant’s triad of positive, negative and infinite 
judgements. That is to say, the positive assertion is in what Christians 
believe: ‘material reality is not all there is’. This means that in addition to 
the material reality, there are other higher and transcendental beings. 
Dawkins negates this statement by saying that ‘material reality is all there 
is’. But Žižek negates it by infinite judgment: ‘material reality is non-all’. 
We can re-write this triad by replacing reality (or what there is) with God: 
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(1) I believe in God, (2) I do not believe in God and (3) I believe in un-
God. This third statement should represent tourist atheists’ central idea 
but Žižek goes further by searching for an ‘un-belief’ which would make 
the right infinite judgement (Žižek, 2009: p. 101). So, the result is: ‘I un-
believe in un-God’. In a way, tourist atheists try to escape from the zero-
one mode of thinking about God by using infinite judgement about reality 
and redefining materialism as the belief in the ‘ultimate void of reality’, 
which is another term for theokenosis.  
5. A theoretical framework for the future of science 
Both transhumanists and tourist atheists acknowledge the 
importance of the theological constitution of modernity and both try to 
activate that historical heritage for the sake of the future of modernity. 
Previously, I also mentioned traditionalism and Radical Orthodoxy as two 
schools that engage with theology; however, they tend more notably 
toward defending religion against modernity. What is common between 
these schools is their attention to theology. It seems that by the 
emergence of this new wave of theologically-oriented theories, we should 
expect significant changes in the field of science studies. First, the 
reductionist division between reason and revelation (which is always 
followed by the prioritisation of reason) will face significant challenges. 
While the first round of criticisms of the reign of scientific reason began at 
the end of the Second World War in the works of the Neo-Marxists of the 
Frankfurt School (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002), and the second round 
started in the works of analytic philosophers in the 1970s (McMullin, 
1988; Wilson, 1970; Hollis and Lukes, 1984), the final round was initiated 
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by criticising the misreading of the history of science in the works of the 
pilgrim atheists by showing how science and religion are mixed together 
(Funkenstein, 1986; Fuller, 2010; Gillespie, 2008). Being successful in 
their criticisms, the recent intellectual movement will weaken the 
theoretically fundamental reason versus revelation dichotomy of pilgrim 
atheists through showing the role of theology in the constitution of 
modern science (that is, the science which has been considered the 
ultimate product of human reason without any contribution of religion). 
Following that, the political rivalry between pilgrim atheists (such as 
Richard Dawkins who defends ‘reason’) and religious apologetics (such 
as Alister McGrath who defends Christianity) is likely to lose its popularity. 
It is more likely that the new political division is between theomimesis and 
theokenosis, between transhumanism (as the progressive promoter of 
science) and tourist atheism (as the defender of individualism), or 
between proactionary and precautionary imperatives (see: Fuller, 2012).  
I have set the tourist atheist ideology against the transhumanist 
one by attributing the posthumanist precautionary imperative to the 
former. I will argue for the attribution: how do tourist atheists face 
science? Do they support the precautionary principle or the proactionary 
one? What would be their reaction to the disasters caused by science? 
One cannot explain the tourist atheists’ ideas about the future of science 
except by describing hypothetical situations. That is to say, since tourist 
atheists have not extended their ideas to the point that one can write 
about their attitudes toward science policy, we have no option other than 
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to construct their (to-be) policy by extending their core beliefs. For this, 
we need to work on the idea of theokenosis.  
In other words, on the one hand, pilgrim atheists (who are either 
scientists or admirers of science) constructed a contradictory dichotomy 
between two types of truths: religious versus scientific. Inhabiting the 
realm of ‘reason’, they became hostile to the rival religious claim for truth. 
On the other hand, tourist atheists lack that hostility to religion because 
they challenge the Platonic idea of ‘the truth’, the ultimate reality and 
God, altogether. For them, a human being becomes God-like through 
representing his or her own unique singularity. The keyword here is 
freedom: freedom from truth, from God, from reality, from religion, and so 
on. Thus, a science which follows this path should not be about getting 
into the mind of God but about serving the personal wishes of gods who 
are walking on earth. It seems to me that the final consequence of 
expanding this logic is lowering the epistemic expectations from science. 
That means that the will to control nature and to manipulate even in 
human body will not benefit from any theoretical support in the doctrines 
of tourist atheists. Therefore, it is very likely that they will be on the 
precautionary side of the argument.  
In summary, we can trace a political spectrum on the one side of 
which are the proactionary transhumanists and on the other side of which 
are precautionary tourist atheists and posthumanists. Fuller (2012) 
suggests that the proactionary/precautionary divide will be the new left 
and right of the twenty-first century. “One group will be grounded in the 
earth, while the other looks toward the heavens” (Fuller, 2012: p. 171). I 
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want to add that the transhumanism/tourist atheism divide makes the new 
ideological spectrum that is consistent with the aforementioned 
dichotomy. It seems to me that the question of taming the beast of 
science finds its answer in the proactionary/precautionary battlefield. The 
point is that one can tame the beast of science and use it for the good 
that made it in the first place-- a theological mode of approaching the 
world. The second generation of transhumanists return to those roots as 
believers, and tourist atheists as expropriators. 
6. Conclusion 
I started this chapter with the question of science which is about 
the right theoretical framework to understand the past, present and future 
of science. This framework, I have concluded, is going to be shaped in 
the debate between two types of intellectual positions toward the 
theological foundations of modernity. One of the effective argumentative 
contributions to this significant debate is that of transhumanists, who 
believe in the infinite extension of human powers to distinguish them from 
the rest of the animals towards being a god-like creature. The other 
contribution belongs to tourist atheists, who would support the 
precautionary principle which is about minimising the human manipulation 
of nature to minimise evil. As I mentioned, the similarity between both 
sides of this debate is their recognition of the theological foundations of 
modernity and its theoretical relevance in science policy. Their 
disagreement, however, is about the theoretical support of risk as the 
inherent motor-engine of science. Transhumanists are equipped with 
those theoretical tools through taking a theological Unitarian position into 
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account. That is to say, they adopt a positive theistic position which not 
only sees the historical affiliation between science and religion but also 
makes a religious judgement in favour of the existence of a supernatural 
being which is a unite and unique God (Fuller and Lipinska, 2014: p. 5). 
In this way they turn capitalism on its head by returning to the lost 
theological roots. That is to say, one can control the consequences of the 
capitalist form of life through rediscovering the lost faith behind it.  
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Chapter Nine 
The Primacy of Training over Truth: 
Sloterdijk approaches Rorty 
 
1. Introduction 
Previously I have reviewed Taylor’s answer to the question about 
the plurality of options for belief and unbelief in the secular age. To 
answer the question of the co-existence and public representation of 
theism and atheisms, unavoidably we must refer to the broader context. 
How can the varieties of options of belief and unbelief live together in a 
secular age? Accordingly, I wish to extend my former pragmatist 
arguments in this chapter by referring to Sloterdijk’s idea of the necessity 
of co-training. 
If he  were to criticise Jürgen Habermas’s understanding of the 
role of religion in the public sphere, Richard Rorty could begin with two 
targets; first Habermas’s separation of reason from action in the public 
sphere and secondly belief in a neutral secular reason which is 
something common somewhere inside all human beings. Rorty rejects 
both that separation and the existence of any kind of principle 
independent of human being. Likewise, if Peter Sloterdijk wanted to 
criticise Rorty’s conception of the privatisation of religion, he could reject 
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Rorty’s conception of religion as something that we do with our solitude. 
Sloterdijk alternatively, believes that religions are misinterpreted 
anthropotechnic systems of practice which have been designed to mould, 
enhance and generally form human beings (Schinkel & Noordegraaf-
Eelens, 2011: pp. 18-19). One can assume a contemporary transition 
from an old modern assumption to a recent hesitation. On the one hand, 
the assumption of a universal, neutral and secular reason which is the 
basis of the exclusion of religion from the public sphere and on the other, 
the hesitation about the possibility of that secular reason and subsequent 
different levels of pragmatic engagement with religion (still without 
accepting religious truth-claims). 
We might call this a post-secular transition. Post-secularism here 
scarcely means ‘after secularism’ or ‘the end of secularism’. Rather, it is 
an intellectual movement of challenging the conception of the secular as 
the neutral (see the last chapter). This is the peak of a movement of 
hesitation about the adequacy of theories of secularism. As Calhoun puts 
it, it is an intellectual tendency to see the secular not merely as the 
normal and ordinary form of the world after the subtraction of religious 
illusions (Calhoun, 2012: p. 335ff; Taylor, 2007: p. 294). Alternatively, the 
secular is considered to be a sort of presence. Thus, it is something that 
has been shaped historically and like any other historical phenomenon 
needs explanation and elaboration (Taylor, 2011b: pp. 31-3). This 
transition recently caused Habermas to amend his formulation of the role 
of religion in the public sphere (Habermas, 2008; Calhoun, Mendieta & 
VanAntwerpen, 2013). Rorty’s neo-pragmatist anti-essentialism does 
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resonate with the post-secular transition as well. As I will argue below, the 
post-secular transition also means that Rorty’s defence of the 
Jeffersonian compromise (over the privatisation of religion) needs a 
serious reconsideration.  
In this chapter I will try to put Sloterdijk’s idea of giving priority to 
the Nietzschean concept of perfection against the Rorty’s thesis of the 
priority of democracy to philosophy. In his thesis, Rorty supported the 
idea of exclusion of philosophical as well as religious truth-claims from 
the public sphere and wrote:  
Just as Jefferson refused to let the Christian Scriptures set 
the terms in which to discuss alternative political institutions, 
so we […] must refuse to answer the question ‘What sort of 
human being are you hoping to produce?’ (Rorty, 2008: p. 
190) 
I instead would argue for a thesis inspired by Sloterdijk’s 
philosophy which I would call the primacy of training over truth. 
Concomitantly, I will argue that unlike Rorty’s scheme, ‘the primacy of 
training’ is not based on the outright exclusion and privatisation of 
religion. This can be a way of real dialogue between the religious 
believers and non-believers in society. Like Rorty’s Jeffersonian 
compromise, the primacy of training to truth proposes that no one, either 
secular or religious can enter the public sphere with his or her truth-
claims. The difference between these two theses is that the latter sees 
democracy founded on (not a mere static trade of truth with freedom) but 
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a dynamic educational, co-working and co-training process through all the 
religious and irreligious exercises.  
Sloterdijk, one might suggest, invites us to step back from the 
public sphere (i.e. the level of dialogue between different versions of 
truth) to a pre-truth area of exercise. This way of approaching democracy 
will shape a new public sphere which is based on the deep dialogue 
between different groups in society, not a mere trade off at the 
‘superstructure’. So the main question in this chapter will be; do we want 
constant and educational co-practice of different segments of society or a 
relatively fair trade off of some parts of everyone’s beliefs to enjoy 
freedom? I will argue that if we want either of the options, we do not need 
to assume an increasingly problematic idea of a neutral secular reason. 
Secondly, if we prefer the former, i.e. co-practice and co-working, we 
need to give priority to utilising, what Sloterdijk called, anthropotechnics. 
Thus, this chapter tries to radicalise the Rorty’s thesis of the priority of 
democracy to philosophy by trying to reconstruct a dialogue between him 
and Sloterdijk. That is a dialogue about the role of religion, ir-religion and 
atheism in the modern world that never took place during Rorty’s life-time.  
2. Rorty’s atheism and exclusion of the Comprehensive 
Doctrines 
The American controversial pragmatist philosopher Richard 
Rorty’s (1931-2007) version of neo-pragmatism49 is distinguished by the 
                                                          
49
 During his academic life Rorty (1931-2007) was in a constant process of negotiation 
with other philosophers and frequently revised his former intellectual positions following 
these encounters with his colleagues. This broad-mindedness and intellectual flexibility 
can be connected to his general pragmatist view-point. Pragmatism for Rorty had at 
least three meanings: firstly, anti-essentialism applied to ‘truth’, ‘morality’ and 
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recognition of a transition in the history of philosophy; that is a transition 
from the Platonic conception of truth to the Nietzschean act (Rorty, 
2007b). A set of other transitions, explained in Rorty’s oeuvre, echo that 
philosophical shift. Those are the shifts, for instance, from ‘general theory 
of truth’ to contingency (Rorty, 2007b), from political ideal of redemption 
to the pragmatic ideal of maximum happiness for the largest number of 
people (Rorty, 2011: p. 13), etc. Additionally, there is yet another 
transition which Rorty makes during the last years of his life through a 
series of academic exchanges with Jeffery Stout, another American 
pragmatist, about the role of religion in the public sphere. That is the 
transition from atheism to anticlericalism. The Rorty of the first phase 
attached his atheism to what he called the Jeffersonian compromise. That 
is a compromise based on the privatisation of religion and its exclusion 
from the public sphere. The Rorty of the second phase, nevertheless, 
found out that ‘atheism’ is a quite essentialist term which was not going to 
fit into his general view of pragmatism as anti-essentialism (Rorty, 2003; 
                                                                                                                                                             
‘knowledge’ secondly, the view that there is not any metaphysical difference between 
value and fact, and more relevant here, “the doctrine that there are no constraints on 
inquiry” except “those retail constraints provided by the remarks of our fellow inquirers” 
(Malachowski, 2002: pp. 83-4; cf. Rorty, 1982: pp. 162-165). Thus he was rejecting the 
age old correspondence theory of truth. For him ‘foundationalism’ in modern 
epistemology is closely related to that theory and he could not accept either of them 
(Malachowski, 1992: pp. 139-155; Guignon and Hiley, 1996: p. 339-364). Rorty 
consequently believed that holding an idea as essentially and ‘objectively’ true is a form 
of ‘banging on the table’ (Rorty, 2015). One cannot possess an birds-eye neutral point of 
view to confirm that our mind images of reality are corresponding with it (hence 
objectivity). As a pragmatist, he also believed that there is not any significant difference 
in terms of consequences between these two statements: ‘it is true because it works’ 
and ‘it works because it is true’ (Van Niekerk, 2013: p. 302). So instead of asking about 
the truthfulness of a statement we should ask “whether there are new ways of describing 
and re-describing the world that better serve our variety of goals” (Ryerson, 2006, p. 8). 
And as long as the conversation lasts we should hope for a new and more promising 
agreement and compromise. In this way, challenging one’s own standpoint was the 
indispensable part of his pragmatism, not merely a supplementary element 
(Malachowski, 2002,  p. 67ff). 
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2005). So he chose ‘anticlericalism’ as a political standpoint against the 
religious institutions (against an atheistic anti-theological position against 
the religious idea of the divine).  
Let me begin with a common ground between these two phases. 
Despite his transition from atheism to anticlericalism, the Enlightenment 
version of rationalism remained one of Rorty’s main targets of criticism all 
along. In fact, in his first seminal book Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature (1993) he rejected any form of rationalism by trying to use and 
update some insights from three philosophers that he believed were “the 
most important philosophers of our century”: Wittgenstein, Heidegger and 
Dewey (Rorty, 1993: p. 5). Accordingly, the idea of human ‘Reason’ as 
‘an internal truth-tracking faculty’ has been constantly criticised and 
rejected by Rorty. He held the idea that by contemplating on something 
inside us, or in our nature, that we would be able to find an indubitable 
truth (as Descartes suggested) or the idea that there is a stable inward 
truth which imposes limits on our empirical inquiry (as Kant believed) is 
philosophically unjustifiable (Rorty, 1993: p. 9). So in his atheist phase 
too, he was opposing the pilgrim atheist position. For, that is sot say, 
Rorty could not be on the Sam Harris side of the argument in calling 
religion one of the sources of ‘irrationality’ and against science as a 
rational enterprise (Harris, 2005: p. 165; Robbinson, 2011: p. x). 
Conversely, Rorty was seeing “human beings as historical all the way 
through” (Rorty, 2008: p. 176). So along with rejecting the theological 
quest of an ahistorical/metaphysical truth, he was also refusing to appeal 
to ‘Nature’ or ‘Reason’. He believed that these concepts are the doubles 
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of God (House, 1994: pp. 9-22; Robbins, 2011: p. x). So the appeal to 
Nature or Reason would be “a misguided attempt to make philosophy do 
what theology failed to do” (Rorty, 2008: p. 181). That is, theology wanted 
to prepare us with a set of universal principles which would allow us to 
distinguish between either right and wrong or true and false. Rorty 
believed such principles simply do not exist. Thus neither theology nor 
philosophy can prepare us with a reliable, permanent and neutral 
framework for inquiry (Rorty, 1993: p. 380).  
If he did not define atheism as an achievement for reason and 
‘overcoming the irrationality of faith’, how did he actually define it? In his 
first phase which was around 1990s, he hardly defined the term. The 
central text here is a short essay called Religion as Conversation-Stopper 
(1994). The essay originally a critical review of the main thesis of a book 
by Stephen L. Carter called The Culture of Disbelief (1994). Carter in that 
book criticised the American limiting religion to the private sphere and 
considered it as a ‘trivial hobby’ that we do in our privacy. So the 
important and real decisions, Carter believed, are made in the public 
sphere with adults while religious people are considered to be not mature 
enough to bring their point of views to what Carter called the public 
square (Rorty, 1999: pp. 169-70). Rorty on the contrary, and quoting 
Whitehead, stated that religion is “what we do with our solitude” (Rorty, 
1999: p. 169) but this does not mean that it is trivial. He showed 
compellingly that our family lives and love lives are also private but not 
trivial. So equalising the private with the trivial is not a valid formula 
(Rorty, 1999, p. 169-70).  
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Thus if religion is not trivial, why should it be marginalised in 
society? It seems that Rorty was convinced that the best way to have a 
healthy and free public debate is to drop our references to a text, the 
authority of which is not accepted by all members of that society. Yet his 
position was not based on the Kantian presupposition of a ‘common 
reason’ which is a universal bedrock and equally accessible by 
everybody. If we accept the existence of that common reason, we can 
conclude that the goal of free and open debate is to find or produce ‘one 
right answer’. This was what the Enlightenment rationalists did. 
Nevertheless, this was not Rorty’s answer. Several times, he approved 
Habermas’s theory of the replacement of ‘subject-centred’ reason with a 
‘communicative reason’ (Rorty, 1999: p. 173; Wolterstorff, 1997: p. 24). 
So Rorty’s main proposal is a political one; how to “gain assent” from 
people who hold hugely diverse point of views, not how to discover one 
single true answer (Rorty, 1999: p. 173). 
Therefore, so far, we can conclude that Rorty in his first phase did 
not base his atheism on either a sort of Enlightenment rationalistic idea or 
on rejection of religion as a trivial enterprise, dangerous illusion or mere 
prejudice. Moreover, he admitted that religion might be one of the ways of 
seeking ‘perfection’ for some people. However, he clearly stated that it 
was not his own option because he had not accepted the authority of the 
religious sacred texts. It seems that he was more tended to see his 
intellectual position as a result of his life experiences. That was a 
movement from seeking religious truth, to Platonism and finally anti-
philosophy (Bernstein, 2010: pp. 200-216).  
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In his autobiography, Trotsky and the Wild Orchids (1999), Rorty 
recounted how as a teenager he sought some intellectual framework 
which would let him “hold reality and justice in a single vision” 
(Rorty,1999: p. 7) which was an attempt to find some power to escape 
from high school bullies. When he failed to become religious he became 
convinced that Platonic absolutist philosophy would give him such a 
power.  
It also seemed clear that Platonism had all the advantages 
of religion, without requiring the humility which Christianity 
demanded, and of which I was apparently incapable. For all 
these reasons, I wanted very much to be some kind of 
Platonist, and from 15 to 20 I did my best. (Rorty, 1999: p. 
9) 
Then he concluded that the rest of his life was dedicated to 
recycling the Platonic ideal. One aspect of the recycling project was to 
show the dangers of the presence of religion in public debate. It is 
dangerous not because it is an epistemological danger i.e. religion as a 
faulty reason. Instead, he used to see the religious or Platonic ‘mega-
truth’ as a conversation-stopper. 
So he attached his atheism to the defence of the exclusion of 
religion from the public sphere and said: ‘we atheists, are doing our best 
to enforce Jeffersonian compromise” which was a compromise “that the 
Enlightenment reached with the religious” (Rorty, 1999: p. 169). That is 
the compromise that one keeps his or her religious beliefs for his or her 
private sphere.  
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[W]hen the individual finds, in her conscience, beliefs that 
are relevant to public policy but incapable of defence on the 
basis of beliefs common to her fellow citizens, she must 
sacrifice her conscience on the alter of public expediency. 
(Rorty, 2008: p. 175)  
As mentioned above, he did not limit this exclusion from the public 
sphere to ‘religious truth’ and treated ‘philosophical truth’ in the same 
way. For instance he wrote:  
Rawls puts democratic politics first, and philosophy second. 
He retains the Socratic commitment to free exchange of 
views without the Platonic commitment to the possibility of 
universal agreement […]. He disengages the question of 
whether we ought to be tolerant and Socratic from the 
question of whether this strategy will lead to truth. He is 
content that it should lead to whatever intersubjective 
reflective equilibrium may be obtainable, given the 
contingent make-up of the subjects in question. Truth, in the 
Platonic way […], is simply not relevant to democratic 
politics. (Rorty, 2008: pp. 191-2) 
Thus, Platonic philosophical truth is as irrelevant to the political 
public sphere as the Scriptures while both can be followed by people in 
their private lives. Let us use ‘comprehensive doctrines’ as a handy 
Rawlsian catchphrase to describe both versions of truths (Rawls, 2010: p. 
205; Wolterstorff, 1997: pp. 90-1). This way of reading Rawls was the 
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basis of Rorty’s doctrine of the priority of democracy to philosophy, that 
is, Rorty believed that such an exclusion of the comprehensive doctrines 
from the public sphere is at the heart of the Jeffersonian compromise50 
(Rorty, 1999: p. 170).  
Here I need to emphasise a crucial point: Rorty did not call 
Jefferson’s idea of religious tolerance a ‘doctrine’ or a ‘principle’; rather, 
he always referred to it as a trade and compromise (Rorty, 1999: 170; 
2008: 175-191; 2003: p. 141-149). Yet again a pragmatist and political 
term: one trades some aspects of his or her comprehensive doctrine with 
freedom of belief and practice. This trade, like any other trade and 
exchange in the market of society, is the result of the past intersubjective 
negotiations of ‘radically situated individuals and communities’ (Rorty, 
2008: p. 189). Consequently, it is all about making something work, not 
discovering or unveiling something a priori.  
One of the results of choosing the market rhetoric is that he also 
needed to talk about ‘the price’ of the trade. He acknowledged that the 
result of this trade of perfection with liberty might not be that heroic: 
 
                                                          
50
 Rorty used Thomas Jefferson as a symbol of the Enlightenment privatisation of 
religion because of a quotation from him that says: “it does me no injury for my 
neighbour to say that there are twenty Gods or no God” (Rorty, 2008: p. 175). But it is 
noteworthy that many philosophers, intellectuals and specifically the Enlightenment 
figures said more or less the same thing; and those are the people that deserve to take 
the credit for the principle of tolerance. Rorty, nonetheless, preferred a politician to be 
the symbol of the doctrine. It seems that in this way he wanted to remain loyal to his 
main post-philosophical/ post-truth pragmatism. That is to say, it does not matter who 
talked about this principle and formulated it philosophically but the politician who 
practiced that doctrine and brought it to life should be the main figure. So Jefferson is 
more relevant than, say, John Stuart Mill who for the first time used the term in its 
modern sense (Forest, 2012). 
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[E]ven if the typical character types of liberal democracies 
are bland, calculating, petty and unheroic, the prevalence of 
such people may be a reasonable price to pay for political 
freedom. (Rorty, 2008: p. 190—Ital. Mine) 
Rorty’s disagreement with another Nietzschean intellectual, Peter 
Sloterdijk, can be indicated exactly at this moment of negotiation over the 
price of the Jeffersonian trade. 
3. Sloterdijk and primacy of perfection  
Rorty and Sloterdijk could be really quite in agreement in certain 
aspects. For example, both challenged the Platonic conception of truth51 
and believed that there is not any teleological, theological or 
transcendental goal for man’s cultivation. So there is not any truth or 
authentic self that needs to be discovered as many ancient Greeks and 
teachers of Abrahamic religions suggested. Also and positively, both 
                                                          
51  Sloterdijk just like Rorty cannot be in more agreement with Nietzsche on his 
conception of truth. Nietzsche answering to the question of the quiddity of truth wrote: 
A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in short 
a sum of human relations which became poetically and rhetorically 
intensified, metamorphosed, adorned, and after long usage seem to a 
nation fixed, canonic and binding […] to be truthful, that is, to use the 
usual metaphors. (Nietzsche, 1997: p. 92) 
That is to say, for Nietzsche, the weak have made up those metaphors to survive 
(Mendieta,  2012a: p. 65) but with the eclipse of God any reference to ‘substantive truth’ 
will be problematic (Hatab, 2008: p. 11). In the same vein, Sloterdijk does not invite us to 
engage with any sort of comprehensive doctrine. Conversely, in his first influential 
project, Critique of Cynical Reason (1987) he preferred a kynical resistance of Diogenes 
against the Platonic idealism. Diogenes refused the language of the philosopher not by 
a better or more philosophical language but by living against it through showing 
“contempt for fame”, ridiculing the architecture and refusing to respect (Sloterdijk, 2008: 
p. 103). Socrates wished to begin a conversation with Diogenes because he was the 
dominant master of refutation through dialogue. This was Diogenes, though, that never 
fall into the trap. For Sloterdijk, Diogenes’s kynical materialism was the “dirty 
materialism” in which animalities challenges the public square to overcome the idealist 
arrogance (Sloterdijk, 2008: p. 105). 
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argued that what remains to be defended is the idea of man as a self-
forming animal. Nevertheless, Rorty and Sloterdijk come to the parting of 
the ways when the latter usesNietzsche’s overman (übermensch) as the 
basis of his main thesis in a book called You Must Change Your Life 
(2013). That is something that does not fit well into Rorty’s American 
version of pragmatism because it does not simply presuppose the 
shallowness of life and the existence of unheroic characters in society as 
an acceptable price for liberty. In fact in an interview Rorty made a 
distinction between ‘good Nietzsche’ and ‘bad Nietzsche’ and said: “The 
stuff about the Overman can safely be neglected […]. There is still a lot of 
valuable stuff left in his writings” (Rorty and Mendiata, 2006: p. 93). 
Sloterdijk instead reads Nietzsche mostly through the emphasis on the 
overman and his main contribution is to suggest that man creates himself 
not through work as Marx suggested but through practice and exercise 
(Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 212) and religion is only one way of doing those 
exercises (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 10). He ingeniously argued for the 
necessity of rotating the modern cognitive stage ninety degrees and to 
focus not on the comprehensive doctrines (i.e. the ‘superstructure’ of 
religious claims about an afterlife and so on) but on the ‘anthropotechnics’ 
which have been defined as domestication of humans by humans 
(Mendieta, 2012a: p. 72). Anthropotechnics became important at the age 
of (as Mendieta named it) hyper-humanism 52  which is the age of 
intensification of the Renaissance idea of man creating himself through 
education and training (Mendieta, 2012a). So Sloterdijk, puts perfection 
                                                          
52
 Sloterdijk’s original term is überhumanismus. 
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ahead of any knowledge or truth claim. The idea of training through 
spiritual exercises is yet another step forward in Sloterdijk’s projects of 
focus on ‘design’. Latour believes that with Sloterdijk’s question of design 
we have returned back to Prometheus but in a different way: 
it is so important to talk of design and not of construction, 
creation or of fabrication. To design something […] allows 
us to raise not only the semiotic question of meaning but 
also the normative question of good and bad design. This is 
true of DNA manipulation, as well as of climate control, 
gadgets, fashion, cities or natural landscapes, a perfect 
case of design from beginning to end. (Latour, 2011: p. 161) 
The idea of designing oneself through training comes after 
Sloterdijk’s other controversial readings of Plato and Heidegger on “how 
humans voluntarily and deliberately put themselves in ‘theme parks’, 
‘human zoos’” (Mendieta, 2012a: p. 72). He maintains humans are the 
only animals that can design and re-design themselves, and as Plato 
believed, in this way they become an ‘earthly copy of the True Shepherd’ 
i.e. God (Sloterdijk, 2009: p. 27). 
Approaching all this with the Heideggerian rhetoric of human 
breeding, one might legitimately hesitate as to whether ‘perfection gained 
through training’ is just another name for a dangerous ‘comprehensive 
doctrine’? Or indeed, we might wonder whether there is any direction for 
training? One might ask who has the authority to give us the order ‘you 
must change your life’ (or any other order at this level)? Sloterdijk is 
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cautious in his interpretation of overman not to reproduce a pseudo-
theological transcendental being. He warned the readers of Nietzsche 
that:  
As always when reading Zarathustra, one should not be 
misled by the evangelizing tone. These are not neo-religious 
instructions, but rather directions for the neo-ascetic trainer. 
(Sloterdijk, 2013a: 112) 
The overman is an acrobat that invites the modern man to look 
upwards and ‘up’ in this context is wherever that the overman is active 
(Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 116). This invitation is for getting closer to “an extra-
human dimension” (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 115) not anything beyond. Just 
like an acrobat that makes people to look up to see him walking on a 
tightrope. For the same reason, the tightrope of the acrobat, red carpet of 
Hollywood celebrities or catwalk of fashion models are technically not that 
different (Sloterdijk, 201: p. 116). Thus, activity, áskēsis, asceticism and 
training are vital, but not their direction, because there is not any right 
direction (i.e. there is no Platonic truth). A human being, is for Sloterdijk, 
just like Nietzsche and Rorty, a self-making, self-shepherding and self-
fencing animal. But the specific emphasis of Sloterdijk is on the idea of 
training as “de-spritualized asceticism” or “Methodism without religious 
content” (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 335). That is a sort of training for the sake 
of nothing beyond training.  
In his appeal of training, Sloterdijk sees religion as an isolator. 
That is something that saves us from the sheer boredom of shallow 
everyday life and gives us a few incommensurable and extraordinary 
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moments. In Sloterdijk’s point of view, this is the main function of 
(formerly called religious53) anthropotechnics (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 94). 
They distinguish between the ordinary and extraordinary. While in those 
extraordinary moments human beings find an opportunity to create 
themselves.  
So, an acrobat’s main message would be ‘do not be indifferent to 
the difference between perfect and imperfect’ or trained and untrained 
(Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 28) and it is precisely this demand for perfection that 
Rorty cannot put ahead of liberty. Rorty’s doctrine of the priority of 
democracy to philosophy is the expression of indifference to perfection 
not in a trivial sense but as irrelevant to the public life. It seems to me that 
Sloterdijk instead tends to define gaining perfection in a quite public way. 
In answering the above question about the authority that orders us to 
make ourselves (in the last chapter of his book), he suggests that there is 
not any authority which can order us to change our lives except for the 
‘global crisis’. Many contemporary thinkers see the global financial crisis, 
climate change or the different political crises of the last couple of 
centuries only from the perspective of the disasters that they caused 
(Beck, 1992; McKibben, 2000). Sloterdijk, however, believes that the 
twentieth century was the most ‘instructive period’ of history in terms of 
man-made catastrophes, that is, they were instructive because they were 
failed experiments that taught us something that we could not grasp 
without some sort of action (Sloterdijk, 2013a: 444-445). We can learn 
from past mistakes and we should do so to in order to be able to cope 
                                                          
53
 We should recall that Sloterdijk believes that religions do not exist. What exist is only 
anthropotechnic systems. 
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with the new mistakes that we will make in the future. There are varieties 
of responses to these crises. However, for Sloterdijk, one sort of 
response is outmoded; the time for the romantic brotherliness of 
communism and the Enlightenment varieties of universalisms are gone. 
What has survived from all those ideologies (specifically communism) are 
a few correct ideas. One of those correct ideas is the necessity of a 
“horizon of universal co-operative asceticisms” (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 
452—ital. Mine). So it seems to me that what Sloterdijk likes in 
communism is the idea of seeing our fellow humans as “co-workers” not 
merely “passengers of the fool’s ship of abstract universalism” (Sloterdijk, 
2013a: p.451). The aim is to survive the crises of what Ulrich Beck called 
‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992). Sloterdijk “makes clear, [that] this survival is 
only possible through co-operative áskēsis” or public asceticism 
(Mendieta, 2012a: p. 76—Ital. Mine). Why is that? Sloterdijk supports his 
Nietzschean answer with a historical narrative. The history of modernity, if 
not seen only through its failures, is the best evidence of the 
effectiveness of co-asceticism. For this we need to look at a fourteenth 
century movement and its connection to the modern time.  
The idea of training firstly appeared in religions and especially in 
the monasteries. At some point, nonetheless, it spread into society and 
included laity into the game. Sloterdijk emphasised the role of the devotio 
moderna movement which was begun by the nominalist priests and 
pupils of Ockham such as the Roman Catholic friar Geert Groote (1340-
1384). The movement, which sought to popularise mysticism, moved 
from the monasteries to the cities and promoted the idea of the imitation 
274 
 
of Christ (MacCulloch, 2010: chapter 10; Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 331ff). The 
movement which bridged nominalism to the forthcoming Reformaiton, did 
not abandon the Scriptures but promoted the idea that the sole Scripture 
is not enough. One needs to imitate Christ in his or her everyday life. The 
idea of imitation of the ‘God-man’ served “as a sublime attractor for the 
laity” (Slterdijk, 2013a: p. 331). In the following centuries, the spiritual and 
Christian character fades away but the ascetic aspect of ordinary life still 
remained, untouched. Sloterdijk, sees this transition of asceticism to the 
cities as lying behind the constitution of modernity:  
Modernity, which could never be anything but radical, 
secularised and collectivised the practising life by breaking 
the long-standing asceticisms out of their spiritual contexts 
and dissolving them in the fluid of modern societies of 
training, education and work. (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 331) 
So, both de-spiritualised and collectivised asceticism turned into the 
modern conception of training. He explained the modern predominance of 
the West in the same way. One cannot only blame it on ‘imperialism’. The 
‘deeper reason’ was that “the people in this part of the world who, 
because of their head start in practice, forced all other civilisations on the 
planet to join in with the training systems they had introduced” (Sloterdijk, 
2013a: p. 335). In another book In the World Interior of Capital (2013), 
Sloterdijk, argued that the “the pragmatic heart of the Modern Age was 
located in the new science of risk-taking” (Sloterdijk, 2013b) which is 
totally related to the secular conception of God-man. The God-man would 
be able to see himself as able to take huge risks and invest, for example 
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in ships, many of which would sink, and to invest on a journey from 
Western Europe to the other side of the globe. The goal might be to outdo 
rivals, but the response to this goal was bold and required a ‘long-
distance vision, long-distance speculation and long-distance winning’. It is 
in this context that the imperial motto of Charles V is understandable. The 
motto was: “Plus oultre [Further beyond], stimulated a form of thought 
concerned with seeing and proceeding not simply far, but fundamentally 
ever further” (Sloterdijk, 2013b: p. 51). Thus, they were successful not 
only by giving a collective definition of training but also by forcing other 
nations to accept their forms of training, risk-taking and long-distance 
vision. What remained after the last four centuries might perhaps be 
some bitter experiences and also achievements which are unmatched in 
human history. All in all, Sloterdijk following Nietzsche does not think that 
crises and disasters are there to make us more cautious. On the contrary, 
they call for more training and more preparation.  
Again, Rorty in his first phase could not accept the necessity of this 
shared goal of achieving perfection and might even have considered it as 
a dangerous plan specifically with regard to our freedom. But Sloterdijk is 
not worried about re-reading communism and other failed ideologies of 
the past century in terms of their few valid points.  
4. Co-training ahead of trade 
It seems to me the formerly taken for granted terms and conditions 
of the Jeffersonian trade became doubtful under the new conditions 
following 9/11, indeed, to the point that even Habermas “one of the most 
influential theorists of secular modernity”, with all of his former hostility to 
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postmodernism, could not resist embracing “a new discourse of ‘post-
secular’ societies” (Casanova, 2013: p. 27). So we need to put the 
Sloterdijk’s theses at the background of the sea change that the 
emergence of the post-secular theories brought about. Post-secularism is 
still a very controversial term. So one’s definition of the term depends on 
his or her general view on the secular and also the role of secular reason 
in the public sphere. In the last chapter of this thesis, I will review some of 
the definitions of post-secularism and in conclusion I will argue for the last 
definition which is the most general one. That is to say, post-secularism is 
a form of consciousness regarding the historicity of the secular:  
considering the secular as a historical phenomenon which needs 
explanation and contextualisation (Gorski, Kyumn, Tropey & 
VanAnterpen, 2012; Milbank, 2006). For now, let me continue with this 
primitive definition of the term. 
Regarding the standpoints on secular reason, we might perhaps 
use the metaphor of a road line to illustrate the debate like so: so Rawls 
is someone who strongly believes in such an entity and stands on one 
side of the road, however, Habermas, Taylor and Rorty are half-way 
across the road, while Sloterdijk is standing on the other side. Rawls held 
the idea of common reason and supported the exclusion of the 
comprehensive doctrines from the public sphere. After the post-secular 
turn, Habermas became concerned more about the inclusion of religious 
people in the public sphere. However, ultimately he defended the idea of 
a secular reason and the necessity of the translation of religiously specific 
vocabularies into the common secular language. Taylor expanded this 
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inclusion by asking for a radical redefinition of secularism and challenged 
the dichotomy of the religious versus the secular. Rorty was 
comparatively less concerned about the fairness of the trade but his anti-
essentialist position pushed him into his second phase in which he 
accepted the full presence of religious claims in the public sphere. Lastly, 
Sloterdijk, finished the job by the revolutionary suggestion of going one 
step backwards from the public sphere and considering co-training in the 
‘background culture’ or civil society. Co-training, arguably, will change the 
shape and form of the debates and discussions in the public sphere. So, 
while Habermas and Taylor’s versions of post-secularism were more 
concerned with the inclusion and accommodation of the marginalised 
religious people in the text of modernity, Sloterdijk’s version was about 
co-practice of all members of the society. 
We can use the football field example to clarify Sloterdijk’s 
contribution. Rawls, Habermas, Rorty and even Taylor were debating 
about, say, the fair rules of the game. Extending this metaphor, Rawls 
emphasised the authority of the fair referee (i.e. public reason), 
Habermas more focused on equality between the participants and Rorty 
rejected the existence of a neutral referee while underlining the 
arbitrariness of the rules of the game. Although, he could see that some 
rules are better than the rest. Finally, Sloterdijk changed the subject of 
the discussion and focused on the players and the effects of their pre-
game warm up and exercise on the shape and beauty of the game.  
To explore the line of this spectrum of intellectual positions, we 
must begin with Rawls. In his revision of the idea of public reason (1997) 
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he began with the presupposition that “a basic feature of democracy is 
the fact of reasonable pluralism” (Rawls, 2010: p. 205). That is to say, as 
a result of a democratic system a variety of ‘comprehensive doctrines’ will 
emerge in society. So how is it possible to have a peaceful society with all 
these differences in definitions of truth? That is the question of 
deliberative democracy, that is, “how public deliberation can bring about 
agreement without exclusion under conditions of pluralism?” (Lafont, 
2013: p. 231). Rawls’s answer was to counter the “zeal to embody the 
whole truth in politics” on the basis of presupposing a public reason which 
is a shared element among all citizens of society (Rawls, 2010: p. 206). In 
his work, Political Liberalism (1993) Rawls suggested that religious 
reasons can be offered by religious language in the public debate over 
fundamental political issues, but only if they are backed by political 
reasons and can be translated into the language of public reason (Rawls, 
2011). For instance, President Lincoln could have used the Biblical 
quotations in his debate with Stephen Douglas in 1858. Rawls asks:  
[W]hy not? Certainly they were debating fundamental 
political principles about the rights and wrongs of slavery. 
Since the rejection of slavery is a clear case of securing the 
constitutional essential of the equal basic liberties, surely 
Lincoln’s view was reasonable […] while Douglas’s was not. 
(Rawls, 2011: p. 484) 
So he strongly endorsed the ideas of the existence of a universal 
reason and the neutrality of the state regarding all the comprehensive 
doctrines while he tried to find a way for believers to offer their faith-
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based products in a public debate. Thus, one does not need to drop his 
or her references to the holy texts of his comprehensive doctrine to the 
point that his conviction is ‘reasonable’ thus defendable in the public 
sphere. 
There are several other ways of dealing with the question of the 
plurality of the comprehensive doctrines in the public sphere. Let us begin 
with Habermas’s latest answer and criticism of the above-mentioned 
Rawlsean famous proviso.  
4-1. Habermas and the gap between reason and action 
One of the problems of the Rawls’s trade is emphasised in 
Habermas’s 2008 book Between Naturalism and Religion. Habermas 
hesitates about the fairness of the trade of some parts of the 
comprehensive doctrines with freedom and cites Rawls’s own line in his 
hesitation about its feasibility.  
How is it possible… for those of faith… to endorse a 
constitutional regime even when their comprehensive 
doctrines may not prosper under it, and indeed may decline. 
(qtd. in Habermas, 2008: p. 123) 
So where does the problem emerge in Rawls’s proviso? The point 
is that the comprehensive doctrines are not mere ‘doctrines’. They are 
primarily ‘sources of energy’ that “the person of faith taps into 
performatively to nurture her whole life” (Habermas, 2008: 127). Even 
more than this, Habermas approves Wolterstorff in the belief that religion 
for the believers is their social and political existence (Habermas, 2008: p. 
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128). So, a secularist who supports the exclusion of religious beliefs from 
the public sphere in fact supports the suppression of some part of the 
very existence of the believer which for Habermas is a ‘compelling 
objection’ to secularism (Habermas, 2008: p. 128). While the same thing, 
for Rorty in his first phase, was considered to be a reasonable price that 
the believer pays for his or her freedom.  
Habermas’s solution, instead, is that we need to define, what I call, 
a three step scheme for both secular and religious members of the 
society. The religious people should first of all accept the fact that they 
are no longer living in a religiously homogenous society with a ‘religiously 
legitimated state’, that is, the necessity of the recognition of the secular 
age. Moreover, in modern times most of their beliefs have been subject to 
severe criticism, scrutiny and unmasking. So the former certainties do not 
exist in the society as a whole (Habermas, 2008: p. 129). After this 
acceptance of the modern condition, it is up to the religious community to 
decide if the past experience of a dogmatic approach to the cognitive 
challenges of modernity has been successful or not (Habermas, 2008: p. 
137-8). This helpful approach to secular society is only possible, 
Habermas argues, through the reconstruction of their sacred truth in the 
light of the modern condition (e.g. giving priority to secular reason, 
embedding the egalitarian individualism and universalistic morality into 
their comprehensive doctrines). This is possible only through a self-
reflective process from inside of their traditions (Habermas, 2008: p. 137). 
So, to my mind, he has hinted that no one else can accomplish this 
second task on behalf of the believers. And finally he talks about a project 
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of translation. That is to translate the vocabulary of a particular religion to 
a more generally accepted and accessible language (Habermas, 2008: p. 
131-2). However, the religious citizens are “only obliged to do so if they 
want their reasons to count in the legislative process” (Lafont, 2013: p. 
238—ital. Original)54. In the context of the informal public sphere, though, 
Habermas proposes to eliminate the task of translation (if the translation 
is impossible). In any case, following several criticisms regarding the 
exclusion of religious people from full-participation through ascribing and 
imposing too many tasks to them (Lafont, 2013: p. 233), Habermas 
emphasises that the burden of translating religious to non-religious 
reasons should not only be on the believers (Habermas, 2008). 
Accordingly, all citizens must take religious reasons seriously and 
consider their possible truth –as was the case for Lincoln’s theological 
arguments for the abolition of slavery.  
Instead, the three steps for the team of secular players in the field 
of the public sphere, according to Habermas, include, first, political 
tolerance which is necessary but not enough. The second step is 
adaptation which is different from tolerance in terms of being an active 
cognitive burden on the secular members of the society. Finally, they also 
need to be self-reflective to transcend the secularist self-understanding. 
That is to say, secular citizens should not just presuppose the existing 
                                                          
54
 In response, Lafont hesitates over the possibility of translation of the religious 
vocabulary into secular language. She convincingly argues that: “translation 
presupposes that it is possible to come to the same results by different epistemic 
means” (Lafont, 2013: p. 237—ital. Original). Nonetheless this presupposition is very 
problematic. Moreover, if the translation is possible only in a few cases of overlapping 
between the secular and non-secular proposals, then the very process of translation 
becomes unnecessary. 
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situation as a given. They must actively follow the goal of overcoming the 
“rigid and exclusive secularist self-understanding of modernity” 
(Habermas, 2008: p. 138).  
This ‘revised framework of citizenship’ that Habermas proposes, 
accompanies the belief that we have entered into a post-secular society. 
That is, a society which is epistemically adjusted to the continued 
existence of religious communities. As Casanova argued, post-
secularism for Habermas neither means re-sacralisation of the world, nor 
religious revival. What he means by this term is “becoming reflexively 
aware of […] secularistic self-misunderstanding” (Casanova, 2013: p. 33). 
So actually it is a sort of consciousness regarding the formerly prevalent 
Western misconception that modernisation will unavoidably end in 
secularisation (Casanova, 2013: p. 30-3). So the proposed 
‘complementary learning process’ is a sort of furthering that reflexive 
understanding. Accordingly, both secular and religious citizens should 
participate in a process of mutual learning to transcend their limitations in 
a society that does not ‘naturally’ go towards one certain goal.  
At this juncture, one main critical point (inspired by Sloterdijk’s the 
primacy of perfection) is this: by putting forward this proposal, Habermas 
reverses the relationship between reason and practice. He asks us to 
start the mutual learning from the most controversial point, that is, being 
self-reflective regarding comprehensive doctrines. From there he ended 
up in the process of mutual learning. This is a large and ambitious 
normative plan that, as Herrera Lima argued, is unlikely to gain 
acceptance and approval from either side (Herrera Lima, 2013: p. 50ff). 
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That is to say, he saw the necessity of a real dialogue and mutual 
exchanges in society but he preferred to address it fundamentally by a 
prophetic invitation of asking every group in the society, either secularist 
or religious to amend their own version of truth. While his criticism of 
Rawls was that the comprehensive doctrines are not mere doctrines. 
They are highly different sources of energy and sometimes inner spiritual 
experiences. Thus, it is hardly enough to simply ask people to amend 
those sources of energy and ecstasy following the new condition.  
In other words, in the Habermas’s scheme there is a gap between 
action and reason. On the issue of deliberative democracy, he clearly 
stands on the reason side. For instance, in his debate with Robert Audi 
this gap has been acknowledged by Habermas. Audi in a chapter on the 
situation of religious people in a liberal democracy wrote: 
It might still seem that motivation should not matter if the 
quality of one’s reasons is good enough […]. But I would 
stress that insofar as we are thinking of the advocacy or 
other public behaviour as supposed to be action from virtue, 
we should look not just at what kind of action it is and what 
can be said for it abstractly, but also at how it is grounded in 
the agent’s character. As Kant distinguished acting merely 
in conformity with duty and acting from duty, and Aristotle 
distinguished […] actions that express virtue from those not 
virtuously performed but merely ‘in the right state’, i.e. of the 
right type, we should distinguish actions from civic virtue 
morally, one may, within one’s rights, advocate as coercive 
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course of action without being motivated by an adequate 
secular reason for that action; my contention is that to do so 
is not always consonant with civic virtue. (Audi, 1997: pp. 
32-3—ital. Original) 
Actually Audi draws upon Rawls’s ‘duty of civility’. This duty, which 
applies in public spaces, requires citizens to “forgo reliance on their own 
more comprehensive worldview or on empirical data whose validity 
depends on such a view” (Menko Pogge and Kosch, 2007: p. 140). For 
example, a religious person might believe that abortion is the cause of the 
corruption of the soul or a secular nationalist might strongly believe that 
refugees are a threat to the authentic culture of his or her country. Audi 
radicalised this duty to the point that he suggests that secular reasons 
“must be strong enough to direct the citizen’s own behaviour” (Habermas, 
2008: p.126). For example, when voting in an election, one should act 
independently from religious motivations. Habermas answers:  
[T]he link between the actual motivation for a citizen’s 
actions and those reasons he cites in public may be 
relevant for a moral judgement of the citizen, but it has no 
import for assessing his contribution to maintaining a liberal 
political culture. For in the final analysis, only the manifest 
reasons have institutional implications for the formation of 
majorities and decision-making within the relevant political 
bodies. (Habermas, 2008: p. 126)  
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So for Habermas, only those ‘issues’, ‘statements’, ‘facts’, and 
‘reasons’ count in contributing to the intersubjective process of making a 
political decision. Thus, he prefers to ignore the proposed harmony 
between reason and action (Habermas, 2008: p. 126-7). Arguing for the 
primacy of training, I would like to support Audi’s stance on the 
conjunction and harmony between those two – nonetheless for a radically 
different purpose. This is the basis of Mouffe’s criticism of Habermas: 
“agreement is established not on significations (Meinungen) but on a form 
of life (Lebensform)” (Mouffe, 2010: p. 273). So, the fusion of voices 
through acting is what makes a common form of life possible not just 
seeing each other’s point. Audi, rightly, referred to the Greek 
philosophers like Aristotle. Since the Greek philosophers were certainly 
not what Kant called ‘artists of reason’ (Hadot, 2002: p. 258). Philosophy 
for them was a way of life: 
In order to understand the philosophical works of antiquity, 
we must take into consideration the particular conditions of 
philosophical life at that time. We must discern the 
philosopher’s underlying intention, which was not to develop 
a discourse which had its end in itself but to act upon souls. 
In fact, each assertion must be understood from the 
perspective of the effect it was intended to produce in the 
soul of the auditor or reader. (Hadot, 2002: p. 274) 
Thus the goal of the antique philosophy was not only to enlighten 
people’s mind but to form people’s soul and to direct their behaviour. Also 
in the Europe of fourteenth century, Petrarch distinguished ‘artists of 
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reason’ from philosophers who are living their philosophy and try to 
confirm their knowledge with their actions. What the Renaissance figures 
(especially Petrarch and Erasmus) had in mind as models were Socrates, 
Diogenes as well as John the Baptist and Christ (Hadot, 2002: p. 262-3). 
The idea of the separation of reason from action in a form that Habermas 
defends is probably invented by Descartes (Hadot, 2002: p. 263). 
Put differently, philosophy from its beginning was a system of 
anthropotechnics. Therefore it was a series of methods of mental and 
physical exercises by which humans “have attempted to optimize their 
cosmic and immunological status in the face of vague risks of living and 
acute certainties of death” (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 10). As argued above, for 
Sloterdijk it is only the crisis that has the authority to order us to change 
our lives. And what is the most severe crisis for human beings other than 
the fear of death. Philosophy from its dawn was obsessed with the crisis 
over the fear of death; as Cicero famously put it: “to philosophise is to 
learn how to die” (Critchley, 2008: p. xv). Simon Critchley’s interpretation 
of this quotation shows how philosophy was from its beginning a sort of 
training, not just a series of bourgeois theoretical contemplations. 
Critchley believes that Cicero showed that the main task of philosophy is 
“to prepare us for death, to provide a kind of training for death, the 
cultivation of an attitude towards our finitude that faces […] the terror of 
annihilation” (Critchley, 2008: pp. xv-xvi).  
Yet from another point of view, Audi’s example of the Greeks is 
interesting. We know that the works of the antiques whether philosopher, 
Sophist or tragedian were written to be read out, mostly in the public 
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square (Hadot, 2002: p. 274). So the close relationship between writing 
and speech, philosophy and lecture, theoretical thought and practical 
performance was one of the main characteristics of the antique forms of 
thought. In the light of these historical facts regarding the attachment of 
reason and action, the Sloterdijk’s revolutionary back step would not be a 
completely innovative suggestion. Indeed the Habermasian separation of 
reason and action is a more recent phenomenon—and at least from the 
Sloterdijk’s point of view an implausible phenomenon.  
All in all, Habermas gives a much more nuanced proposal 
regarding the Jeffersonian compromise in comparison with Rawls and 
Rorty (in his first phase). Habermas sees that one cannot easily forget 
some parts of his or her comprehensive doctrine and simply exchange it 
with political liberty. Even if it were possible, it would not be probable and 
even Rawls would have perhaps seen it as a problematic issue. For 
Habermas postsecularism isconsciousness about ‘the secularist self-
misunderstanding’ (Casanova, 2013: p. 33). Moreover, he intends to 
accommodate “religious claims in liberal institutions” through a process of 
complementary learning (Rosati and Stoeckl, 2012: p. 3). 
4-2. Taylor, Rorty and the principle of neutrality 
Taylor and Rorty will, if pressed, say that they are against the idea 
of a series of neutral secular principles which means that they are 
consequently against the Rawlsean conception of reason. From there it 
would be simple for both to show that when Habermas suggests a sort of 
translation of religious statements from the specifically religious 
vocabulary to the language of the public sphere, he presupposes a 
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version of a neutral language and thus a neutral, universally valid, a priori 
principle. After reviewing Taylor and Rorty’s similar criticisms of those 
presuppositions, I will argue that both their definitions of ‘the secular’ 
need to be radicalised even further. There I will suggest that again the 
thesis of the primacy of training over truth is helpful. Accordingly, the 
problem with the demand of a secular and neutral reason was not only 
that it was not considering the historicity of the very concept of pure 
reason. But also, the passive tone of the rhetoric of inclusion (of the 
marginalised, the religious, the minority etc). Both Rorty and Taylor are 
concerned more about the trade and its fairness than with the production 
of powerful and trained players. I would suggest that the centrality of 
training in Sloterdijk’s scheme is a much more active interpretation which 
(like Habermas) suggests a ‘mutual learning’ but not through a series of 
negotiations on the most problematic truth-claims. Learning from this 
point of view does begin at the practice level. Hence it is the result of co-
training and public cultivation of the habits of success.  
Let us begin with Taylor’s 2011 chapter on secularism. For the first 
step he in fact returns to Rawls’s question but recognises a fault in his 
answer. Rawls’s question was concerning the diversity of comprehensive 
doctrines in a modern secular pluralist society. So the secular for him, as 
for Habermas, gives us a neutral principle and language that every 
person in society can understand. Rawls’s presupposition was that it is 
because there is something called common reason in all people. Taylor, 
like Rawls, accepts that the emergence of the idea of the secular (as the 
neutral) was an answer to the question of diversity in a modern society (in 
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which citizens with different religions and non-religious beliefs live 
together). What Taylor rejects in the works of Rawls is a rather fragile 
distinction between an ordinary secular reason (or ‘reason alone’) and 
religious special languages (with some “extraneous premises that only 
believers can accept”) (Taylor, 2011a: p. 49).  
What are we to think of the idea, entertained by Rawls for a 
time, that one can legitimately ask of a religiously and 
philosophically diverse democracy that everyone deliberate 
in a language of reason alone, leaving their religious views 
in the vestibule of the public sphere? The tyrannical nature 
of this demand was rapidly appreciated by Rawls, to his 
credit. (Taylor, 2011a: p. 49) 
Taylor believes that one of the consequences of holding the 
distinction between one universal ordinary secular reason and varieties of 
religious specific languages is that if in the process of public debate the 
secular and the religious people come to one conclusion, the religious 
side would be superfluous. But if they disagree on something then the 
religious conclusions will considered to be disruptive and dangerous 
(Taylor, 2011a: p. 49). So holding this distinction leads to the belief in the 
neutrality of the secular which is problematic and ‘tyrannical’ in character. 
Moreover, he does not seem to support empirical scientific facts as the 
basis of neutrality as well. In his response to the critics of A Secular Age 
(2007), Taylor states that the idea of scientific neutral facts cannot 
disprove religion. He does not see himself refuting, say, pilgrim atheism 
by refuting those reductive theories of warfare between religion and 
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science. Metaphorically he instead believes that he is “trying to kick away 
a crutch on which some atheists want to lean, so that they can walk into a 
more fruitful debate” (Taylor, 2010: p. 406).  
Taylor sees the root of fetishisation of the principle of neutrality 
and exclusion of religious from the public sphere in what he calls the 
unjust fixation on religion. That is to say, many Westerners hold a wrong 
model through their defining of the secular. So people think that 
secularism is something about the state and its relationship with religion 
while in fact it is a response to the ‘democratic state of diversity’ (Taylor, 
2011a: p. 36; Calhoun, 2011: pp. 75-6). So logically, if even we equalise 
the secular with the neutral, on the political level we cannot only exclude 
religion. Rather, we should think of all comprehensive doctrines from the 
public sphere. The value statements either Biblical or Marxist or Kantian 
are on a par with each other. Thus a law in a parliament cannot begin 
with either “as God said in the Bible…” or “as Kant argued…” (Taylor, 
2011a: p. 50). Accordingly, a question will come to mind: so what is the 
reason of this fixation on religion and insistence on the distinction 
between the secular on the one hand and the religious on the other 
hand?  
In response to this question, Taylor suggests that the root of the 
problem of the fixation on religion is in the history of the constitution of the 
secular, specifically in France and the US. So, in the historical context 
“certain institutional arrangements can appear to be untouchable” (Taylor, 
2011a: p. 46). And for example, the French version of secularism came 
about during a harsh and bloody struggle with the institution of the 
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Catholic Church. Therefore, in the year following the French revolution, 
the separation of the Church from the State turned into a moral principle. 
Moreover, religion assumed to be an epistemologically ‘faulty reason’ and 
‘politically dangerous’ phenomenon. Regarding the latter question, Taylor 
suggests that we should focus more on the goals of secularism, than to a 
certain historically constituted institutional from (Taylor, 2011a). He also 
argues that there are three goals for secularism (as a response to the 
question of deliberative democracy in a pluralist society). These are the 
French Revolutionary trinity: liberty, equality and fraternity. So Taylor’s 
secularism would be about maximising our three basic goals through an 
unending process of negotiation with others (Taylor, 2011a: p. 51). In this 
negotiation, it seems to me, he wants to question the French version of 
laïcité with reference to, for instance, the exclusion of Muslims. This 
criticism though is based on reference to fraternity (or the necessity of the 
inclusion of the other) as a goal (Taylor, 2011a). Thus our age for Taylor 
is a secular age. He nevertheless gives a specific definition of it which 
does not contain any sort of neutral principle on the one hand and does 
not exclude religion on the other hand. He believes that the secular age is 
an age in which our practical self-understanding gone through profound 
changes (Taylor, 2007: p. 542). Our self-understanding constitutes as a 
result of a series of responses to the questions such as ‘how we fit into 
the world or into society’. 
Either religious or irreligious, Taylor suggests, we share the 
practical self-understanding that we are in a self-sufficient immanent 
constellation of orders: cosmic, social and moral (Taylor, 2007: p. 543). 
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That is to say, these orders are understood on their own without 
reference to the intervention of the outside. A society for Taylor is secular, 
“in so far as religious belief or belief in God is understood to be one 
option among others and thus is contestable” (Smith, 2012: p. 154). He 
normatively suggests that inside ‘the immanent frame’, we should try to 
maximise our fundamental three goals through negotiations and trying 
different sorts of institutional arrangements. So fixation on the exclusion 
of religion to make sure that we have a healthy democracy is not 
justifiable in Taylor’s scheme.  
As argued at the beginning of this chapter, through all of his life 
Rorty could totally agree with Taylor on his criticism of ‘neutrality’ (Gross, 
2008: p. 19). But in his first phase he undoubtedly was one of the 
exemplars of those intellectuals who fixated on religion and considered 
religion particularly as a conversation-stopper. Rorty himself recognized 
this problem. So after around 2003 we can talk about Rorty of the second 
phase who was not calling himself an atheist, did not connect his defence 
of atheism to the Jeffersonian compromise and moreover, rejected the 
idea of any sort of exclusion of religious people from the public sphere 
(Rorty, 2003; Stout, 2010).  
After receiving several criticisms over his review of Carter’s book, 
Rorty revised his former position in two chapters, Religion in the Public 
Square (2003) and Anticlericalism and Atheism (2005). The first chapter 
has was written as a response to criticisms of Nicholas Wolterstroff 
(1997) and Jeffrey Stout (2010) which, as Rorty admitted, ‘impressed’ 
him. Rorty acknowledged that his response to Carter was ‘hasty and 
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insufficiently thoughtful’ (Rorty, 2003: p. 141). Then he went on to explore 
the difference between two types of usages of the term ‘atheist’. For him 
the first type of philosopher who call themselves atheists are those that 
think that the divine is an ‘empirical hypothesis’. So the existence of the 
divine can be refuted by the results of the empirical sciences (Rorty, 
2005: p. 33). Rorty evidently has never been one of the members of this 
group. He adds that: 
[T]here is a second sort of philosopher who describes 
himself or herself as an atheist. These are the ones who 
use ‘atheism’ as a rough synonym for ‘anticlericalism’. I now 
wish that I had used the latter term on the occasions when I 
have used the former to characterize my own view. For 
anticlericalism is a political view, not an epistemological or 
metaphysical one. It is the view that ecclesiastical 
institutions, despite all the good they do […] are dangerous 
to the health of democratic societies. (Rorty, 2005: p. 33) 
In fact, this is a reaction to Stout’s criticism that an anti-essentialist 
pragmatist like Rorty cannot criticise ‘religion per se’. For the good reason 
that such a pragmatist cannot talk about anything per se (i.e. anything in 
itself). There is not any essence for religion that one can discover and 
then judge that religion is essentially a  conversation-stopper, dangerous 
or even peaceful and democratic etc (Stout, 2010: p. 524). So sweeping 
generalisations about religion and its role in the public sphere are not 
helpful at all. One can also talk about fascinating historical examples of 
religion playing significant roles in the emancipatory democratic 
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movements. Such as the case of the American Civil Rights movement 
which was inspired by Christianity (Stout, 2004: p. 300).  
Rorty of the second phase still emphatically insisted on his own 
political stance on, say, the case of the homosexuals’ rights. He believed 
that those religious people that express their views against homosexuals 
by referring to the Bible should be ashamed of themselves and their 
assertions should be considered as ‘hate speech’ (Rorty, 2003: p. 143). 
Approving the arbitrariness of all intellectual and political positions, he 
wished that he could find a principle to differentiate between different 
ways of reference to the holy texts. But he admitted that such a principle 
does not exist. He added:  
I wholeheartedly believe that religious people should trim 
their utterances to suit my utilitarian views […]. [But] I do not 
think that it is helpful to say that the homophobes are being 
‘irrational’. So I view the struggle between utilitarians and 
homophobic Christian fundamentalists as no more a 
struggle between reason and unreason than is the Catholic-
Protestant struggle in Northern Ireland. (Rorty, 2003: p. 144) 
Thus, Rorty in his second phase became much more consistent 
regarding his own version of anti-essentialism. While in his first phase he 
believed in strictly abandoning the references to the religious texts in the 
public sphere and again considered it as another ‘reasonable price’ for 
freedom (Rorty, 1999: p. 173), in his second phase he wrote: “neither law 
nor custom should stop either of us from bringing our favourite texts with 
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us into the public square” (Rorty, 2003: p. 143). It seems to me that he 
was persuaded that more than anything, this type of fixation on religion is 
a problem. That fixation is the conversation-stopper, not an abstract entity 
called religion per se (Stout, 2010: p. 532). 
Now we can conclude that we are facing two types of utopias. 
Rorty’s utopia is a not-religious secularist utilitarian utopia. That is, in 
Taylor’s words, a closed reading of the immanent frame (Taylor, 2007). 
Stout instead described his vision of the ideal society in this way: “my 
dream is to revive the sort of coalition between religious groups and 
secular intellectuals that I first experienced when I joined the civil rights 
movement as a teenager” (Stout, 2010: pp. 524-5). Stout’s vision 
contains the necessary radicalism that Sloterdijk needs for his 
suggestion. A coalition, political co-working, making change through co-
practice towards one political goal, these are the values of Sloterdijk’s 
dream society.   
Consider the tone of Taylor’s invitation to the reconsideration of 
the inclusion of Muslims by more focus on the goal of fraternity. This is a 
passive demand. It asks for a re-writing of the main text of Western 
modernity by adding the excluded margin which is becoming increasingly 
important. Just like the presence of Muslims in the West. At this historical 
moment one cannot reject seeing them. One either should opt to defend 
the ‘authenticity’ and ‘purity’ of the European culture or consider some 
level of inclusion. The former option would be like racism, as Stuart Hall 
defined it i.e. a form of discourse which tries to expel the Other, at least 
symbolically (Hall and Du Gay, 1996: p. 5). While this option is not 
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plausible, the latter can be interpreted in either passive or active ways. A 
passive inclusion is what has been explained in different versions of the 
political doctrines of tolerance. Both Taylor and Rorty of the second 
phase can be put in this category. Rorty, on the one hand, defends the 
difficult (but necessary) tolerance of the religious fundamentalists who he 
thinks ‘should be despised’. Moreover, Rorty expressed his sadness that 
he cannot appeal to any ‘principle’ to persuade the fundamentalists to 
adopt his version of utilitarianism (Rorty, 2003: 143-4). Taylor on the 
other hand defends a ‘painful’ process of revision of secularism as an 
answer to the question of diversity, not to the question of religion (Taylor, 
2007; 2011). What is shared here is the lack of any mechanism of 
inclusion beside an uncomfortable process of negotiation. This would be 
understandably a painful and unpleasant process because it begins from 
the very comprehensive doctrines and diverse versions of truths. That is 
to say, any negotiation over one’s source of energy would be 
understandably insufferable. Now I would argue that what makes the 
negotiation possible is the active usage of those energies to follow the 
common political goals. That is an active and shared movement which 
would be a public exercise for a common good. Unlike what Taylor and 
Rorty suggested, we, Sloterdijk would perhaps say, do not need more 
negotiations, but more co-actions.  
In an imaginary situation, Gandhi and Martin Luther King as two 
Hindu and Christian fellow citizens could hardly come to terms with a 
reasonable price for their freedom. They could, for instance, meet up at a 
university and try to find some ways of living together peacefully by 
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ignoring some parts of the teachings of those religions. But the real 
Gandhi and Luther King were extremely successful in their own lives in 
attracting people from different backgrounds, races and nationalities to 
one specific way of pursuing a political goal (Nojeim, 2004) which, was 
the non-violent technique of fighting for freedom and equality. This is a 
successful historical example of what Sloterdijk called co-practice and co-
training.  
5. Conclusion 
To wrap up the discussion, we might ask what the existing options 
of democratic co-existence are. Is there any principle, argument or 
process on which we can all agree? As shown above, Rawls would say 
that one can distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable 
arguments. So, there is something called reason inside all human beings 
which can be addressed. Being a universal criterion, reason can 
distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable statements either 
philosophical or religious. The tyrannical character of this criterion, as 
Taylor argued, is obvious. That is to say, religious arguments per se are 
not considered to be relevant. If they are, it is because they happened to 
be in agreement with the secular side. Habermas, for his part, suggested 
a cohesion in which all sides of a public debate should amend some 
aspects of their own comprehensive doctrines. As has been shown, it is a 
painful and somehow impossible project. Because the comprehensive 
doctrines are not just some ideas in one’s mind. They instead are sources 
of energy. Taylor, alternatively, could not find any valid argument to fixate 
on the exclusion of religion from the public sphere. This fixation however 
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does have some historical roots in the French Revolution but now is the 
time to move on and reinterpret the tripartite motto of liberty, equality and 
fraternity. Reinterpreting the last one especially would be helpful. The 
point about Taylor’s scheme was that he never defined any mechanism 
for his dialogue.  
All of these figures have, using Taylor’s metaphor, kicked away a 
crutch on which Rawls’s reason and principle of neutrality were leaning. 
Thus, there is not any trustworthy reason, an inside human nature, a 
universally valid principle, or a shared conception of transcendence. In 
this context, Rorty and Sloterdijk’s arguments are relevant and 
provocative. One can think of the contrast between them in terms of a 
gap between two types of approaches to the measure of the success of a 
democracy. Rorty believed that there are such measures but they are not 
eternally true. Namely, that political controversies can be brought back to 
‘the first principles’. Nevertheless, only if we define ‘the first principles’ as 
some former compromises that are still valid this will help us to “seek 
common ground in the hope of attaining agreement” (Rorty, 2008: p. 
190). He also insisted that the learned lessons from former experiences 
are not philosophical truths or religious ones. The citizens, instead, “will 
simply get some hints about what to watch out for when setting up their 
next experiment” (Rorty, 2008: p. 196).  
Sloterdijk’s could also agree with Rorty except that he maintains 
the difference between the trained and untrained. What we have learned 
through the crises of the past two centuries, for example, were some 
hints about handling the future crises. Nonetheless, those hints are useful 
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only if we are qualified enough to be able to do something with them. 
However, he, unlike Rorty, believes in a measure of the success of a 
democracy i.e. more skilful, more trained and more self-formed citizens. 
Thus, Sloterdijk radicalises Rorty’s emphasis on self-formation by giving 
priority to the result of former experiments. A democracy will be 
successful when it makes well-formed citizens. Therefore, taking for 
granted the unheroic results of a democracy as a ‘reasonable price’ for 
freedom is a sort of self-defeating argument. Assuming self-formation as 
a measure of the success of a democracy, the Jeffersonian compromise 
over the privatisation of comprehensive doctrines does not seem to be 
able to remain untouched. So we need a new compromise and a new 
experiment. Sloterdijk’s thesis of ‘primacy of training’ gives us a hint 
about the forthcoming compromise. The hint is that there is not any 
universally valid principle to lean on. If it was possible several hundred 
years ago to be united under one single authoritative doctrine, it 
increasingly becomes challenging in our secular world to be so. Thus, 
suggesting a return to a religious ‘golden age’ is as obscure as simply 
forging a universally valid reason on which everyone could rest. Only 
when we kick away that crutch, does a meaningful co-walking and co-
practice becomes possible. Sloteridjk’s main contribution here is to draw 
attention to anthropotechnics which, by the way, distinguish early 
Christians from the modern religious radicals. The early bishops designed 
monastic rules according to which people lived for almost two thousand 
years (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 158), while modern radicals only find their 
position in the modern public area unfair and passively demand inclusion. 
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Sloterdijk’s invitation is to act by saying “one does not criticise mountains. 
One climbs them or stays at home” (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 158). Modern 
religious radicals would prefer to stay at home; and, accordingly, they are 
similar to the seculars who ignore anthropotechnics for the sake of the 
fear of religious dogmas or the ideological nightmares of the past century. 
Sloterdijk believes that for both of these gropus, all mountains are evil. At 
this juncture, what is important is to move from the passive rhetoric of 
trade on the basis of a common secular reason to an active approach of 
co-training and preparing ourselves to cope with the new crises.  
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Chapter Ten 
A Post-Secular Reading of Public Sociology: 
a way to co-practice 
 
1. Introduction 
Engaging with the public is the shared element of both types of 
modern atheisms. Both pilgrim and tourist atheists are the writers of best-
selling books, directors of documentaries and the users of social 
networks with millions of followers. This chapter is dedicated to the 
evaluation of the sociologist’s public engagements. In this chapter, I will 
argue that there are two theses originally put forward by Burawoy (2005) 
but which still need to be highlighted; those are the necessity of 
challenging the assumed neutrality of the social sciences and also the 
necessity of public engagement in the form of encouraging co-practice in 
society. I will suggest that an idea of a much needed post-secular public 
sociology is the result of such reading of Burawoy’s thesis.  
It is noteworthy that the idea of opening sociology to other modes 
of post-secular theories also needs public engagement. Michael Burawoy 
(born 1947) believes that open and free dialogue will lead us to deepen 
our internal democracy (Burawoy, 2005 and 2007). It is true that we need 
to recognise ‘others’ at least as eligible to be heard and as an equal 
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people. Public sociology, as he suggests, would be an unconditional 
dialogue and negotiation between several scholars who represent a 
multiplicity of narratives of truth and their counterpart public societies, and 
the final outcome will be more inclusive of the suppressed and the 
unheard (Burawoy, 2005). Let us say it in this way: in the past sixty years 
many marginal movements tried to rewrite the text of modernity by 
including themselves, as in the case of the excluded women. For 
example, Simone de Beauvoir (1967), Donna Haraway (2013) and Luce 
Irigaray (1985), and in the case of excluded former colonial societies, 
Edward Said (1978), Gayatri Spivak (1999) and Homi Bhabha (2004), 
and for, excluded ethnic minorities, John Rex (1973) and Stuart Hall 
(2007). Below, however, I will argue that public sociology, which is at the 
centre of current sociological discussions, needs something more than 
the demand of the inclusion of the marginalised groups. Following my 
previous chapter on Sloterdijk’s thesis of the priority of co-training, I would 
argue that public sociology could be read as a plan for active public 
engagement and co-practice.  
In the first part of the chapter, I will highlight the arguments on the 
rejection of the possibility and also on the plausibility of the neutrality of 
the social sciences. I will begin with the definition of post-secularism 
which in the broadest sense of the term has been regarded as as a 
challenge to the idea of neutrality of the secular. That is to say, post-
secularism can be used as a term to address the intellectual scepticism 
about the possibility of fabrication and construction of a secular space 
somewhere outside all the comprehensive doctrines. I will argue that the 
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most effective argument for post-secularism in this sense has been put 
forward by revealing the historicity of the secular. I mean, the secular has 
been a historical invention related to a certain socio-political climate of a 
certain part of the world. It served as an intelligent resolution for some 
historical tensions (i.e. European Confessional Wars) among certain 
social forces.  In the second part of the chapter, I will show how the 
conception of post-secular as a challenge to the idea of neutrality could 
couple with practice and with what previously has been called the second 
side of Prometheanism i.e. self-creation. Accordingly, the suggestion is 
that challenging the ideal of neutrality would pave the way for co-practice. 
I will try to make my point by reviewing the intellectually overlooked 
experience of one of the classic Middle Eastern public sociologists (i.e. Ali 
Shariati) who led massive socio-political changes as a result of his public 
engagements.  
2. Post-secularism as a challenge to the idea of neutrality 
Sloterdijk begins his You Must Change Your Life with a Marxian 
warning: “A spectre is haunting the Western world” but for him, unlike 
Marx, that is the spectre of religion (2013a: p. 1). He points out that a 
series of post-secular theories flourished after 9/11. Sloterdijk rejects their 
promises of a form of religious revival in the modern world. Through 
rejecting the idea of the ‘re-emergence of religion’, he proposes that if we 
consider religions as ‘misunderstood spiritual regiments’ we should 
conclude that the distinction has never been between believer and non-
believer. The true distinction is between ‘the practicing’ and ‘the 
untrained’ (Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 3). And if there is no revival of religion, 
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then talking about post-secularism is futile. Approving his deeper 
distinction, we still can, I would suggest, use the term post-secularism in 
a different and useful sense. That is to say, and as stated above, post-
secularism does not simply mean a ‘revival’ of religion. It means the 
consciousness about the problematic nature of the theories of secularism. 
Furthermore, it can be considered as a challenge to the idea of the 
secular as the neutral. 
Sloterdijk’s understanding of post-secularism like any other 
understanding of the term depends on how he defines the secular (a 
modern epistemic category), secularism (a world view or ideology) and 
secularisation (conceptualisation of modern world processes) (Casanova, 
2011: p. 54ff). Thus, we need to distinguish different ways of using the 
term. There are many categorisations of the secular, two of which hold 
more importance. The first one is by Beckford and the second one by 
Casanova.  
Beckford distinguishes six clusters of usages of the controversial term 
post-secular (Beckford, 2012): 1. Secularisation deniers who believe that 
it was never a reliable conception of the processes of social 
transformation. 2. A progressive interpretation which sees post-
secularism as a development which builds on the achievements of both 
religion and secularism. 3. Post-secularism as a new return of the sacred 
(similar to what Calhoun called ‘re-sacralisation’). 4. Post-secularism as 
the era of return of religion to the public sphere. 5. The fifth category is 
rather vague and, for this reason, Beckford does not seem to be 
successful in finding a suitable title for it. So he uses the titles of “politics, 
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philosophy and theology”. He also put Habermas in that category. 
Habermas, however, can be safely placed under the fourth category. By 
the way, Habermas’s version of post-secularism, which I will write about 
below, is more about democratic politics and lack of human solidarity than 
about religion per se. Indeed, this is the point of the fifth cluster of 
theories. 6. Finally, the last cluster contains critical, sceptic and negative 
points of views. The most serious of which is Ingolf Dalferth’s depiction of 
the post-secular state as indifferent to the division of religion and 
irreligion. This point of view, though, is different from mere neutrality. So, 
for him, the fact of the existence of religion and irreligion is of no 
particular importance in an alleged post-secular society (Beckford, 2012: 
pp. 1-13). One can easily see how inclusive and helpful this typology is. 
However, I still prefer the second typology by Casanova. 
Casanova distinguished three meanings of the term secular and 
consequently three senses of the term post-secular (2011: p. 60; 2013: p. 
27ff). Firstly, mere secularity in the broadest sense of the term originated 
from the very Medieval Christian use of the term saeculum. The Middle 
Age use of the term secular as temporality, in fact, was not used in 
contrast with religion. Understandably, they used to juxtapose this 
concept with eternity (Calhoun, 2012: p. 340). Thus, they were able to 
distinguish between ordinary priests and secular priests. The latter group, 
unlike the former, did not take vows of chastity and poverty. Instead, they 
could live in wider society. So they were still considered to be devout 
Christians but the ones who lived in the cities and among lay people, not 
in the monasteries. The prevailing idea during the Middle Ages was that 
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human flourishing was something to be attained with restricted religious 
ascetic rules inside the monasteries. Some branches of the lay or secular 
priests, mostly in late Middle Ages, tended more towards popularising 
asceticism. These cleric movements are linked to the modern idea of 
secular self-creation. Let me say it in this way, in its modern sense the 
term secular turning into a positive interpretation and confirmation of 
worldly life and considering it as ‘the place for human flourishing’ 
(Milbank, 2006; 2013). Taylor’s description of the emergence of ‘exclusive 
humanism’ refers to the final outcome of the transition of those monastery 
ascetic ideals and skills to the cities. From one perspective, ‘exclusive 
humanism’ or the emergence of the idea of self-flourishing detached from 
any sense of higher being was partially the result of the mission of 
secular priests to remake society according to ascetic life (Taylor, 2007: 
pp. 150-160; Sloterdijk, 2013a: p. 150ff). Be it as it may, the first meaning 
of the term secular would be the classic idea of not-religious, temporal 
and inner-worldly. 
If we define the secular in this general sense, as mere secularity, 
then the first meaning of post-secular would be the re-sacralisation of the 
world (Casanova, 2013: p. 30). This is what Sloterdijk understands by the 
term post-secular and consequently rejects it. My general view is that no 
one is going back to the Middle Age monasteries and the world will not 
become re-enchanted.  I think that most of today sociologists would also 
agree that there is not enough evidence for a positive process of ‘re-
sacralisation’ of the world (cf. Zuckerman, 2008; Joas, 2014). For 
example, Zuckerman conducted empirical research in Denmark and 
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Sweden about people’s belief in God and their practicing of religion. He 
did that using 149 formal interviews (Zuckerman, 2008: p. 184). In the 
conclusion of the book, he nonetheless describes the contemporary 
societies of those Scandinavian countries in this way:  
Most people [of the research sample] don’t believe much in 
God, don’t accept the supernatural claims of religion as 
literally true, seldom go to church at all, and live their lives in 
a largely secular culture wherein death is calmly if not 
stoically accepted as [a] simply natural phenomenon and 
the ultimate meaning of life is nothing more or less than 
what you make of it. (Zuckerman, 2008: p. 183) 
One cannot predict if this situation will massively change in the 
future or not. One cannot also extend the result of this research which 
has been conducted in a couple of Western European countries to the 
rest of the world and the researcher, in fact, was over-cautious not to 
make any sweeping generalisation. However, one can arguably conclude 
that even if the revival of religion is taking place in some parts of the 
world, that currently there is not enough evidence of religious revival in 
some other parts. So it is not a universal trend (Zuckerman, 2008; 
chapter 8; Smith, 2012: p. 164).  
The second meaning of the secular, Casanova argues, is what 
Taylor understands by the term. That is the self-contained secularity 
which is the phenomenological experience of living in the immanent 
frame, that is,. “an interlocking constellation of the modern differentiated 
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cosmic, social, and moral orders” (Casanova, 2013: p. 30). So it is the 
result of a transition from a medieval society in which the belief in God 
was the unproblematic and unchallenged standpoint of most of the 
members of the society which has been replaced by recent modern 
society in which being religious is just one option among several others 
(Casanova, 2013: pp. 30-1; Taylor, 2007). Consequently, the post-secular 
in this latter context would imply what Peter Berger described as ‘de-
secularisation’ (Casanova, 2013: p. 31; Berger, 1999). Also the term post-
secularism as has been used in the field of international studies has the 
same connotation (See: Mavelli and Petito, 2014).  
Casanova called the third category the secularist secularity. It is 
closely connected to the term secularisation as a specific philosophy of 
history that turns the specifically Western historical experience of 
secularisation into “the teleological process of human development from 
belief to unbelief” or from the irrational to rational (Casanova, 2013: pp. 
32-3). In his 2008 book, Habermas criticised the recent conception of the 
secular. Thus post-secular for him implies “reflexively abandoning or at 
least questioning the modern secularist […] consciousness” (Casanova, 
2013: p. 33; Habermas, 2008). Habermas, like Berger, sees 
secularisation as an exceptionally European conception. Convincingly, he 
argued that there are three recent changes in modern societies which 
need addressing: firstly, the belief in the necessary disappearance of 
religion does not seem justifiable anymore. Secondly, “religious 
organisations can function as ‘communities of interpretation’ in the public 
arena” (Beckford, 2012: p. 8). Finally, the integration of immigrants with 
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traditional backgrounds is considered to be problematic. So, according to 
Habermas, we need a process of complementary learning to correct the 
insufficiency of the past theories of secularisation which I wrote about in 
the previous chapter (Rosati and Stoeckl, 2012: p. 3).  
Habermas’s scheme also contains some levels of openness 
towards religious claims. Massimo Rosati, for example, builds on 
Habermas’s conception of complementary learning. In his project, Rosati 
separates three stages: absolute abandoning of the specifically religious 
vocabulary which in fact is not intended by Habermas. The second stage 
is tolerance of the other which is necessary but not enough. Finally, what 
Rosati suggests is a type of mobilising religious vocabulary and imaginary 
through a critical review of the existing religious resources from within 
(Rosati, 2012: p. 61ff). So the Habermasian post-secular research 
projects focus on the inner religious potentials to modernise religious 
consciousness through a process of negotiation with the secular other. 
Thus the goal of such a post-secular society would be co-existence and 
co-presence through the processes of translation and inner-
modernisation of religions.  
Beckford, appropriately, criticised Habermas’s scheme by asking 
two questions. First how religion could be defined so all interested parties 
would be happy. It is noteworthy that ‘religion-in-itself’, does not exist. 
There are varieties of social phenomenon called religion because of their 
‘family resemblances’. Secondly, and related to the former point, 
Beckford asks; while Habermas was always critical of fundamentalism 
and the New Age tendencies: 
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…one wonders whether he thinks that the post-secular 
applies only to relatively tolerant and liberal forms of 
religion. It remains to be seen where the outer limits of 
Habermas’s willingness to tolerate and listen seriously to 
religious values and beliefs are located in the so-called 
post-secular age. (Beckford, 2012: p.9) 
Beckford also pointed at an important issue in an increasingly 
connected modern world in which the comprehensive doctrines are 
divergent such that finding an overlapping consensus becomes 
increasingly challenging. It will not be easy for Habermas to give a 
criterion which simply divides the fundamentalists from the tolerant 
religious groups. Even if it is possible, what are the limits of openness 
toward their narrative of truth? This is a crucial question that leads us to 
the point that I made when discussing the thesis of the primacy of training 
over truth (see chapter nine). That is to say, one does not need to be 
intellectually in agreement with others to co-act with them. 
As mentioned above, Sloterdijk rejected and abandoned the 
concept of the post-secular in its first meaning. What makes Sloterdijk’s 
project different, from one point of view, is his disagreement with 
Habermas’s project of ‘complementary learning’. He replaced it with a 
totally different conception of co-practice and co-working which is defined 
as something beyond merely flaccid co-existence with religion. It is a sort 
of re-occupation of anthropotechnics. If ‘re-occupation’ seems an 
aggressive term one can use Sloterdijk’s own term of co-training, co-
working and co-practice, that is to say, disregard of one’s own belief 
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system. His scheme is different from Habermas’s because it is not an 
invitation to tolerance. It is, instead, an invitation to go beyond the 
dichotomy which constructs believer versus unbeliever and recognise the 
underlying dichotomy of trained versus untrained. So the action might be 
in agreement with some religious teaching, and might be prescribed by 
some belief systems or not. Either one likes it or not, the action itself is 
determining. Consequently, one can prescribe not to enter into the public 
square only with one’s truth-claims. The goal should be co-action not 
mere persuasion.  
I want to push this critical point one step further. There is a fourth 
meaning of the secular as the neutral. Thus, post-secular can be 
interpreted as a consciousness about the impossibility of neutrality. This 
means that the secular will remain as an option in the modern world as 
Taylor described it. It will not however consider being the neutral context 
of interaction of all other value-laden comprehensive doctrines.  
The conception of secular as neutral has emerged historically as an 
intelligent resolution for the horrors of the Confessional Wars of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Accordingly, the secular was an 
impartial place of neutrality. That was somewhere outside of religious 
dogmas and diverging interpretations of the Scripture. So, all religious 
groups can be agreeing on this (Michea, 2009; Calhoun, 2012; Milbank, 
2013).  
However in its original form it was a political resolution but it also 
was translated into cognitive terms; Hence, scientific ‘facts’ where 
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considered to be something beyond any dispute. Historically speaking, 
Milbank shows, the idea of ‘pure reason’ (and accordingly ‘pure scientific 
fact’), has emerged as a shadow of pure faith. That is to say, one cannot 
find the idea of ‘pure reason’ in antiquity. Ancient Greeks were never 
interested in a ‘value-free’ enquiry (Hadot, 2002). Their philosophy was 
rather a mode of ‘spiritual practice’ (Milbank, 2013: p. 20). However, there 
was an idea of purely rational enquiry that Jew, Muslim and Christian 
philosophers of the Middle Ages projected back onto antiquity which was 
actually their own invention-- or let us call it a misreading. The interesting 
question would be how this conspicuous misreading occurred. Milbank’s 
explanation is that it was easier for them to sympathise with, and utilise 
the ancient philosophy if it was a result of ‘pure human reason’ not linked 
with the ancients’ pagan belief system (Milbank, 2013: p. 22). Still, before 
1300, there were no dichotomy between reason and revelation among 
the Christians. So, a “more complete reasoning was itself situated within 
an entire ‘life according to the Logos’, such that the monastic life was 
often equated with philosophia” (Milbank, 2013: p. 23—ital. Original). But 
after the scholastic movement and specifically by nominalist theology and 
the detachment of the natural form the supernatural, the duality played a 
more important role (Dupré, 1993). Specifically, we should recall that 
purity of faith has always been part of the teachings of Abrahamic 
religions. So the dichotomy was mostly used to criticise so-called 
‘Aristotelian pure reason’ for the benefit of pure faith. However, this 
preference has been changed in modern times and the imagined ‘pure 
reason’ considered to be the basis of universal peace and tolerance.  
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What Taylor called subtraction stories were the cornerstone of the 
modern conception of the secular as the neutral (see chapter three). 
Thus, it has been imagined that if all the dogmatic illusions (including 
religious ones) are disappeared what remains will be ‘pure fact’, ‘pure 
reason’, ‘pure nature’ and ‘pure individual/thinker’ etc. (Taylor, 2007). So, 
the secular does not have any history. It rather is just there outside 
waiting for us to put aside our ideological glasses. Accordingly, the most 
intellectually suitable way to challenge those stories would be to show the 
historicity and evolution of the secular.  
One can argue that one of the current trends of post-secular critique 
is dedicated to challenging different forms of subtraction stories. Calhoun, 
for instance, rejected the myth of neutrality by challenging the myth of ‘the 
secular as an absence’ not a presence (Calhoun, 2012: p. 351). This kind 
of approach to the secular as something which has been constituted 
historically led to Casanova’s project of sociology of the secular 
(Casanova, 2011: p. 54). The mission of the proposed research field 
would be to recognise and distinguish the historical and sociological 
differences between varieties of versions of the secular in different 
countries in the past two centuries (Warner, Van Antwerpen and Calhoun, 
2010). For example, the secular emerged as a sort of ‘distance from 
religion’ in the Western Europe. Nonetheless in India it has been defined 
with ‘the equity toward religion’ which includes “equitable state subsidies 
for Hindus, Muslims, and others” (Calhoun, 2012: p. 337). Yet the 
American understanding of the secular was designed to protect religious 
differences and “helped to create a sort of marketplace for religions” 
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(Calhoun, 2012: p. 336). Generally, post-secularism means going beyond 
a historically constituted misconception, the act which opens the horizon 
for more researches. It seems to me that Sloterdijk’s Nietzschean line of 
thought is sympathetic to this type of disenchantment of the modern 
mythologies.  
3. The legitimacy of a post-secular public sociology  
Contemporary social theory is a chaotic field in terms of the 
divergence of the foundational value judgement of each school of 
thought. Feminist social theory and post-colonialism along with cultural 
studies, on the one hand, and the semi-positivist movements of the 
Strong Program in Professional Sociology55, on the other, are only a few 
examples of those diverging value commitments. By emphasising this 
theoretical chaos, an essential question would be: is there any standard 
sociological insight to be invoked by the public sociologists? Is there any 
neutral sociological point of view about social ‘facts’ that the public 
sociologists are going to promote in the society? If not, what is the use of 
public sociology? In this section, I would support the idea of a post-
secular public sociology and I would suggest that its seeds existed in 
Burawoy’s original thesis as well. 
To answer those questions we need to initially answer this 
question: what is public sociology? Burawoy, the past president of the 
American Sociological Association, in his presidential address of 2004 
talked about the idea of public sociology which, in the decade that 
                                                          
55
 Jonathan Turner, David Boyns and Jess Fletcher are defending a kind of value neutral 
professional sociology and call it the Strong Program in Professional Sociology (see: Nicholas, 
2007: pp. 119-48).  
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followed, became one of the central discussions of sociologists all around 
the world. Burawoy believes that sociologists have spent a century 
making professional knowledge by “translating common sense into 
science” and now is the time for back-translation (Burawoy, 2005: p. 5). 
That is to say, public sociology is a way of turning sociology into a “moral 
and political force” which is able to make real changes in society through 
sharing the basic insights of social theory with people (Burawoy, 2005: p. 
6). Nevertheless, Burawoy emphasises that this does not mean that 
public sociology is the negation of professional sociology. Quite contrarily, 
they both complement each other perfectly (Burawoy, 2005: p. 5). There 
cannot be public sociology without professional sociology because the 
latter prepares “legitimacy and expertise” for the former (Burawoy, 2005: 
p. 10). Public sociology, in return, builds constructive dialogue between 
sociologists and the public through which each adjust to the other. This 
process of dialogue is ideally a mutual understanding in which the 
sociologist not only teaches something but also learns from the people. 
The reciprocity and mutuality is essentially part of an ideal dialogue. 
Moreover, the ideal speech condition is equal. That is to say, persuasion 
depends on nothing beyond the best argument. However ‘equality’ in this 
sense is a necessary fiction which never takes place in the real world. 
Burawoy also recognises the inherent inequality and differences in the 
process of the public engagement of sociologists. But he suggests that 
the combination of professional, public and also critical sociology will 
make a more moderate version of sociology. The function of critical 
sociology, as the third type of sociological efforts, is to show the biases of 
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professional sociology and to suggest alternative foundations for social 
theory (Burawoy, 2005: p. 10). The fourth type of sociology is policy 
sociology which is a sociological knowledge in the service of a goal 
defined by a client which might be either government or the private 
sector. Finally, Burawoy believes that critical sociology, on the one hand, 
is the conscience of professional sociology and public sociology, on the 
other hand, is the conscience of policy sociology (Burawoy, 2005: p. 10).  
Nevertheless, still a question remains untouched: is there any 
standard sociological insight that public sociologists need to share with 
the public? Burawoy’s answer is that such a standard sociological insight 
and message does not exist.  
The multiplicity of public sociologies reflects not only 
different publics but different value commitments on the part 
of sociologists. Public sociology has no intrinsic normative 
valence, other than the commitment to dialogue around 
issues raised in and by sociology. It can as well support 
Christian Fundamentalism as it can Liberation Sociology or 
Communitarianism. (Burawoy, 2005: pp. 8-9) 
Accordingly, he rejects the seeking of neutrality or any demand of 
a ‘pure sociology’ which is beyond any public engagement (Burawoy, 
2005: p. 16; Burawoy, 2007: pp. 318-22; Turner, 2007). Alternatively, 
Burawoy seeks a kind of ‘value science’ and in support of this idea writes: 
“in the contemporary world a sociology hostile to values, politics, 
diversity, utopias, and above all to publics no longer makes sense – if it 
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ever did” (Burawoy, 2007: p. 317). Thus, he recognises that opening the 
Pandora’s Box of public engagement means to enable a huge social 
transformation. Moreover, he prescribes that quarrel.  
Probably the most controversial part of Burawoy’s idea is when he 
adds that sociology must defend the interests of humanity by defending 
civil society against the “state despotism and market tyranny” (Burawoy, 
2005: 24—ital. mine). We might wonder where this obligation comes 
from. On the one hand, Brint (2007) persuasively shows that Burawoy’s 
claim is rhetorical not analytic (Brint, 2007: p. 247). Brint adds that it is not 
quite evident why we should ‘defend humanity’ only in the civil society. 
Furthermore, it is not easy to define concepts such as humanity, civil 
society and social justice with much precision (Brint, 2007: p. 247). On 
the other, McLennan (2007), criticising the shortcomings of Burawoy’s 
project, pinpoints those leftist values of Burawoy’s which led him to 
determine a liberating mission for sociology. If sociology should support 
civil society against the tyrannies of the market and the state, McLennan 
suggests, we also need to add, “and against the encroachments of 
religiosity too” (2007, p. 859). Consequently, we have several nominees 
here to be defended or to be opposed.  
Burawoy, in response, said that he never denied his own Marxist 
values and clearly stated that while “social science without values is 
impossible”, we only need to clarify which set of values “makes more 
sense today” (Burawoy, 2007: p. 320). After that he draws his own point 
of view on Karl Polany’s study of the rise of classical liberalism, The 
Great Transformation (1944), by separating three waves of sociology 
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which resonate with three waves of marketization of the nineteenth, 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries (Burawoy, 2007: pp. 323-27). The first 
wave was at the time of Chartism and other trade union movements. The 
counterpart sociology at that time was ‘utopian sociology’. The second 
wave, accordingly, was in the age of extremes – as Hobsbawm famously 
called it — with the horrific universal ideological divides. The counterpart 
sociology of that age was the expansion of policy sociology which in the 
West was dealing with the question of the emerging welfare state 
(Burawoy, 2007: p 324). The last wave of marketization has happened in 
our time, in which, according to Burawoy, state and market have become 
allies and together colonised civil society. Indeed, in this situation the 
defence of humanity is intertwined with the defence of civil society against 
the state and the market (Burawoy, 2007: p. 324).  
Be that as it may, a supporter of the idea of ‘open dialogue’ can 
argue that all of these interpretations are sociological insights. Namely, 
the anti-religious perspectives of McLennan, along with the Marxist 
approach of Burawoy, and also, say, the theistic viewpoint of Fuller and 
Lipinska (Fuller and Lipinska, 2014), are the equally legitimate 
candidates. Consequently, the only necessary imperative for that ‘open 
dialogue’ would be the acceptance of the legitimacy of the contribution of 
the other groups in the discussion.  
This quotation from Henrik Dahl’s chapter on public sociology, as 
he claims, is the result of his twenty years of being an academic 
sociologist. Dahl says:  
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In my personal experience, disagreement is much stronger 
when pure sociologists are involved in debates with other 
pure sociologists or with practical sociologists than it is 
when similar social groups debate. I have personally 
witnessed levels of aggression I found comparable only to 
disagreement about schismatic religious differences inside 
hard-core or esoteric religious communities. (2008: p. 147) 
Dahl’s conclusion is also interesting. He believes that the only way 
out of these disputes is an agreement that we cannot criticise a colleague 
for betraying our values (whatever they are); rather we should criticise 
them because of betraying their own values (again, whatever they are) 
(Dahl, 2008: p. 154). In other words, at the end, the question is only about 
the consistency of one’s ideas not the content. Even more than that, 
Burawoy believes that “If sociology actually supports more liberal or 
critical public sociologies that is a consequence of the evolving ethos of 
the sociological community” (Burawoy, 2005: pp. 8-9—ital. mine). 
Therefore, we can conclude not only that no standard sociological 
standpoint exists, but also that what looks like a solid sociological insight 
is nothing but the historically constructed ethos of sociologists which does 
not contain anything necessarily ‘authentic’ or manifestly ‘reasonable’.   
4. Making social movements and co-practice  
In his 2004 lecture, Burawoy recalled a trip to South Africa to talk 
about public sociology. His audiences, he remembered, were looking at 
him “nonplussed” because they could not imagine what else sociology 
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could be (Burawoy, 2005: p. 20). That is to say, sociology, for the South 
Africans, was closely connected to the anti-apartheid movement and 
served nothing beyond making real changes in real society. So, it was 
already a public sociology. Burawoy concluded that “while in the United 
States we were theorising social movements; in South Africa sociologists 
were making movements” (Burawoy, 2005: p. 20-1—ital. mine). The 
same is true for many countries in the Global South. It is true that the idea 
of not only theorising but also making movements to change the real lives 
of people is at the centre of the public sociology project. But it has been 
forgotten for the past several decades in the West.  
In the previous section, I tried to show that public sociology is the 
new battlefield of different sociological schools and ideas. In the following 
sections, I will review some lessons from which we can learn from the 
experience of public engagement of Islamic religious intellectuals. I will 
argue that a post-secular public sociology can work as a context in which 
challenging of neutrality and co-practice can join. 
Burawoy distinguishes between traditional and organic public 
sociologists (Burawoy, 2005: pp. 7-8). The books of the traditional public 
sociologists, on the one hand, are read beyond the academy and spark 
public discussions. This category includes Zygmunt Bauman (2000), 
Richard Sennett (1977) and Hanna Arendt (1958), for instance. The 
organic public sociologists, on the other hand, are those who make public 
dialogues a process of “mutual education” between different groups 
(Burawoy, 2005: p. 8). Thus, this mutuality of the relationship is the point 
which separates organic public sociologists from the traditional ones. At a 
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2008 conference in Tehran, I asked Burawoy about the traditional 
sociologists in (what he calls) the global South. He immediately pointed at 
the picture of Ali Shariati (1933-1977) on the wall of the conference hall 
and responded that Shariati was a good example of such public 
sociologists.  
For several reasons, I think that Burawoy is right and Shariati was 
a good example of a traditional public sociologist. Moreover, I will argue 
that Shariati was a traditional post-secular public sociologist. It is 
noteworthy that Shariati was one of the most politically influential figures 
in the contemporary history of the Middle East. As Vali Nasr (2006) 
pointed out, the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran was partly the result of 
the two intellectual revolutionary interpretations of the Shia religious 
beliefs: the reinterpretation of Islamic messianism by Imam Khomeini56 
and the reinterpretation of martyrdom by Ali Shariati57 (Nasr, 2006: p. 
130). It is remarkable that Shariati was not a political character in the 
conventional sense of the term: he was not a member of one of the 
numerous political parties or teams of revolutionary activists against the 
Shah (king of Iran at the time). Instead, he was a sociologist and lecturer 
                                                          
56
 According to the Shia beliefs the twelfth Imam (Imam Mahdi) is a hidden leader of the ummah 
and believers should wait for his second coming. Traditionally, waiting for the accomplishment 
of God’s will by the return of Mahdi has been defined in a passive way. That is to say, even if 
necessary for the safety of the believers, they should conceal their beliefs. But Imam Khomeini, 
not only a politician but first and foremost a faqhih (Islamic scholar), redefined the concept of 
‘waiting’ (entezar) as the process of active preparation for the return of Mahdi (Nasr, 2006: p. 
130; Chatterjee, 2011: pp. 139-141).  
57
 The concept of martyrdom in Shia theology is highly intertwined with the story of the martyr 
of Karbala (Imam Hussain) who was the grandson of the prophet Muhammad and was killed in 
an unfair war with the ruler of the time in a land called Karbala in nowadays modern Iraq. 
Shariati divided between the ‘red revolutionary religion’ of Imam Hussain which is about making 
political changes, and the ‘black ritualistic religion’ of mourning for Imam Hussain --without any 
political goal of making a real change in society (Shariati, 2014). Thus, he reinterpreted the 
Karbala event not as a mere historical event but as an exemplar of any revolutionary change in 
society.  
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who was educated in France and was in contact with the great intellectual 
figures of Europe such as Louis Massignon (1883-1962), Georges 
Gurvitch (1894-1965) and Jacques Berque (1910-1995). In France, he 
engaged with the anti-colonial movements in Algeria. But the important 
turning point for him was during the last years of living in Paris when he 
had come to realise that what he needed was a combination of Marxism, 
existentialism and Islam. The result of the mixture, he believed, is a 
modern Islamic progressive and revolutionary ideology which can make 
real change in society (Rahnema, 2000: p. 128; Shariati, 1971). He was 
right and his ideology had a great effect on the emerging educated middle 
class youth who were unsatisfied with the tyranny of the Shah but had no 
alternative except socialism (which was not reconcilable with their 
traditional religious beliefs) (Abrahamian, 2010: pp. 143-147). Chatterjee 
describes Shariati’s popularity in Iran between 1962 and 1969 in this way: 
The appearance of a western-trained professor using the 
language and jargon of western philosophers and social 
scientists couched in an Islamic terminology proved a 
novelty. In his lectures, traditional religious concepts were 
cast in a new mould that was no longer obscure, prosaic, 
and stale. (Chatterjee, 2011: p. 78) 
Shariati’s novel interpretations of the religious stories such as the 
story of Adam and Eve, Abraham and companions of Muhammad, in 
addition to his imaginative, creative and poetic rhetoric, had impressed 
crowds. He was an avant garde intellectual celebrity but not for 
translating pioneering western ideas, which was the common gesture of 
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many Iranian intellectuals of the time. Quite contrarily, he started from the 
so-called ‘retrogressive’ popular religious ideas and texts and 
reinterpreted them in an entirely new way. Rahnema (2000), in his 
biography of Shariati wrote about the hostile reaction of the Iranian 
secular (mostly Marxist) intellectuals to Shariati. One instance was the 
case of his translation of a treatise on Salman, by Louis Massignon, from 
French into Farsi58. Amir Parviz Puyan (1946-1971), a Marxist political 
activist, sent a sarcastic message to Shariati saying: “instead of 
translating (Marx’s) Capital, is this (Salman) the present you have brought 
us from Europe?” (Rahnema, 200: p. 138). Shariati retorted that from now 
on he will work on ziyaratnameh-ha (i.e. the praying texts that Muslim 
Shia pilgrims read during visits to the holy shrines) (Rahnema, 2000: p. 
138). Taking everything into account, Shariati was one of the pioneering 
figures of a new form of being Muslim in the modern world which became 
known as religious intellectualism, which had only a few precedents in 
Egypt. His novelty was the progressive modern reinterpretation of 
religious traditional texts and stories both to adapt to modern reality and 
to transform it. The division refers to two types of reform according to 
Tariq Ramadan in his Radical Reform (2009): adaptation reform and 
transformation reform (Ramadan, 2009: p. 33). Adaptation reform, on the 
one hand, was what Muslim scholars normally used to do during history – 
“observing the world, noting its changes then coming back to the texts to 
suggest new readings” (Ramadan, 2009: p. 33). Transformation reform, 
                                                          
58
 Salman was a companion of Prophet Muhammad who was a Persian, born in a Zoroastrian 
family, but converted to Christianity and finally became Muslim. The historical figure of Salman 
who searched around the world for truth was interesting for Massiognon (Rahnema, 2000: pp. 
130-137). 
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on the other hand, concerns adding another step – moving again from the 
religious text to the society and trying to change it. Accordingly, 
transformation reformers do not accept the given modern context as the 
unchangeable fate (Ramadan, 2009: p. 33). Shariati, I should add, was a 
reformer in the second sense of the term.  
Arguably, Shariati was neither a Marxist who used Islam for his 
political goals, nor a Muslim who was enchanted with modern Western 
philosophies. His goal, in fact, was a synthesis between the two (Shariati, 
1971; Rahnema, 2000; Hunter, 2009: pp. 50-6). He went back to the texts 
with which the ordinary people were familiar: the Quran, sacred texts and 
religious stories. Accordingly, he saw religion as praxis, not as ‘the opium 
of the people’ as Marx used to think. Let us focus on this aspect of his 
work by reviewing one of his central texts, eslamshenasi (Islamology/ 
1971).  
Shariati in the first volume of eslamshenasi (1971) interpreted two 
verses of the Quran: (1) “certainly we created man from a dry clay, of 
black mud fashioned in shape” (Quran, 15:26), (2) “So, when I have 
made him complete and breathed into him of My spirit, fall down making 
obeisance to him” (Quran, 15:29). Shariati stated that the human being is 
something between a piece of inferior black mud and an unmatched spirit 
of God. He adds that neither of these refers to something real in the 
history of the creation of man. Instead, they are two metaphors to show 
two possibilities for the human condition (Shariati, 1971: pp. 61-2). Thus, 
he concludes that in Islam, man is a hybrid entity or a “god-like creature 
in exile” (Shariati, 1971: p. 73). As mentioned above, this kind of 
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conception of man is shared between the Abrahamic religions. However, 
there are still huge theological differences between, say, Christianity and 
Islam. For example, in Islam God is more transcendental and 
inaccessible to man, but in Christianity, God is incarnated in the body of a 
man – Jesus. Yet both religions allow the believers much room for 
manoeuvre in terms of becoming like God. In Shariati’s unorthodox 
interpretation, we should depart from the Satanic muddy self (khistan-e 
lajani) toward the spiritual divine self (khistan-e khodayi) (Shariati, 1971: 
p. 66). And this is the very essence of an Islamic revolution on an 
individual scale. In the same vein, Shariati theorised the social and 
political changes. He did so by reinterpreting the Quranic story of Cain 
and Abel which for Shariati was ‘the Islamic philosophy of history’ 
(Shariati, 1971: p. 74). The fight between two brothers, for him, was the 
beginning of the eternal battle between the muddy side and the divine 
side of history. Consequently, Islam as a religion, for Shariati, could not 
be anything other than a path from the satanic side of the self to the 
divine side. In another of his books Niyayesh (Invocation/ 1970), Shariati 
wrote: “if religion does not work before death, it certainly will not work 
after it” (Shariati, 1970: p. 77). Accordingly, he defended the red religion 
of martyrdom against the black religion of unworthy rituals (Shariati, 
2014).  
These revolutionary interpretations, which turned into the basis for 
a revolutionary ideology, resulted the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran. 
Many historians mentioned Shariati as the most important ideologue of 
the post-revolutionary government as well (Abrahamian, 2010: pp. 143-
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147; Hunter, 2009: p. 50; Nasr, 2006: p. 130). It is unlikely that any other 
sociologist has since reached this level of popularity and political 
effectiveness. His rereading of religious ideas not only to adapt to the 
modern world but also to transform it makes him the classic figure of the 
traditional post-secular public sociologist who does not take for granted 
the rebellion side of Prometheanism. It instead engages with the self-
creation side (see chapter three). Following his father he believed that 
materialists cannot be ‘real socialists’. The real socialists are those who 
believe in monotheism (towhid). In a monotheistic point of view, Shariati 
argued, everything in the world has one origin and one goal. Any duality 
and dichotomy is a sign of either atheism or infidelity (kofr) (Shariati, 
1971: p. 59). Thus, he believed that all dichotomies – such as spirit/body, 
nature/what is beyond nature, science/religion, landlord/peasant, 
Arab/non-Arab, Persian/non-Persian, capitalist/proletariat, etc. – in the 
monotheistic point of view are meaningless (Shariati, 1971: pp. 58-9).  
He tried to expropriate the secularist Westernised intellectuals’ 
paradigm and, one might say, tried to occupy their concepts which were a 
successful project in the Middle East. In a religious context such as in the 
Middle East, the revolutionary reformation in religion and redefining it as 
praxis, I believe, was one of the crucial causes of his success. Finally, 
Shariati’s main idea was to challenge the ‘sacred thus apolitical’ definition 
of religion. In contrast, religion should be ‘sacred’ and political in terms of 
being devoted to the transformation of people’s worldly life. 
5. Authenticity of struggle 
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Shariati adopted a position shared by right wing intellectual 
Sloterdijk, left wing thinkers Žižek and Badiou, pragmatism and, indeed, 
the Abrahamic religions; that is the centrality of remaking society through 
co-practice. Let us begin with the last one; Abrahamic religions. In a 
famous part of the bible, Jesus gave an unusual definition of love: “If 
anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and his mother, his 
wife and children, his brothers and sisters—yes even his own life—he 
cannot be my disciple” (Luke14:26)? As Žižek interpreted it:  
Family relations stand here for any particular ethnic or 
hierarchical social bond that determines our place in the 
global Order of Things. The “hatred” enjoined by Christ is 
therefore not the opposite of Christian love, but its direct 
expression: it is love itself that enjoins us to dissociate 
ourselves from the organic community into which we were 
born. (Žižek, 2012: p. 44) 
Žižek used this biblical insight to make a point about tolerance in 
the multi-cultural societies of Europe. He argued that the conflicts over 
multiculturalism are not about the contrast between pluralities of cultures. 
They, instead, are about Leitkultur (dominant culture). How do they want 
to co-exist? What do they have to share? Žižek rejects the ‘liberal game 
of tolerance’. Questions such as; do we need to tolerate them banning 
their women to drive? Do we need to tolerate them praying in public? 
These questions, Žižek believes, are distracting us from the most needed 
solution which is ironically a struggle. “The only way to break out of the 
deadlock is to propose and fight” for a positive project (Žižek, 2012: p. 
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46). So, for him, going beyond tolerance is only possible when all sides 
begin to co-practice in a fight and struggle. There are two noteworthy 
points regarding the necessity of struggle: firstly, during the struggle all 
the differences between man, woman, Jews, Muslims, and origins etc. 
are disappearing because all of the members of the society share one 
thing which is the battleground. Secondly, today ‘s dividing lines were 
also the result of the earlier struggles. The most important function of co-
practice would be to generate those shared memories of common 
achievements that will serve as a ground for a sense of solidarity among 
the members of a given community. Badiou is sharing this view with 
Žižek: 
Rather than tasking ethics with the job of respecting 
difference by practising tolerance, Badiou begins with the 
assumption, as does Deleuze, that difference is the natural 
state of the world. Difference constitutes the banal 
conditions of life. As such, difference in and of itself is not 
particularly interesting. Of much greater interest is the 
difficult and ethically challenging task of recognizing the 
Same (i.e. that which is not yet, that which will become 
indifferent to difference, which for Deleuze entails the 
eternal return of difference). (Hawes, 2015: p. 84—ital. 
Original) 
  
The difference and contradiction, therefore, is all that we can say 
about the ‘normal’ state of the world. Difference in itself, thus, is not the 
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main concern. The important point is a form of practice to ‘recognise’ and 
more accurately to construct the sameness. Here is an ontological 
schism. Assuming sameness as a normal state of the world would result 
in the prescription of tolerating differences. It also leads to the assumption 
of neutrality. That is to say, it has been suggested that when there are a 
variety of cracks in the society, the best thing to do is to presuppose a 
neutral sphere in which everybody can be represented. So neutrality and 
tolerance are two sides of one coin. Outside of the neutral sphere 
(political sphere, scientific disciplines, etc.) one will experience all the 
divisions and cracks in society, but one should remain tolerant. While, 
inside the neutral sphere everyone is equally represented and decisions 
are made according to the benefit of the public.  
Žižek and Badiou, alternatively, argue that the point is not the 
formerly constituted differences and identities. The point is to make a new 
set of collective memories which will serve as a basis for remaking a 
Leitkultur, not mere absorbing and including of the others into the existing 
dominant culture (Žižek, 2012). Here again Žižek who, in Beckford’s 
typology, was categorised under the last title of the sceptics of post-
secularism can be seen as a post-secularist in the fourth sense of the 
term i.e. the negative questioning of neutrality which is joined with the 
positive prescription of co-practice.  
Shariati also tried to re-read the history of Abrahamic religions to attach 
religion with revolutionary co-practice by considering the former social 
ties (i.e. nationality, family etc.) as battlegrounds. In the same vein, he 
interpreted the role of religion in the context of the ontological authenticity 
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of differences and struggles. So he distinguished ‘revolutionary religion’, 
which destroys and rebuilds, from the religion of pre-determination and 
fate (Shariati, 1988: p. 31-2). The original and real dichotomy for him was 
not religion versus irreligion. It rather was the dichotomy of ‘the religion of 
justification of the existing situation’ against ‘the revolutionary religion of 
re-making and re-creation of society’ (Shariati, 1988: p. 31). One of the 
sources of Shariati’s authoritative appearance in the Iranian public sphere 
was channelling all the dissatisfactions and diversities toward a shared 
battleground of will to re-make the self through re-making, re-arranging 
and re-assembling society. So, he only technically gave the priority to co-
practice and at a particular time but also attributed the authenticity to 
struggle. So for Shariati, if one wants to be a good believer at any 
moment he or she needs to find the right field of struggle. Therefore, the 
main questions of a believer would be; are you struggling or not? Your 
struggle is against/for what (e.g. discrimination, racism, certain social 
rights, etc.)? In other words, did you choose your ‘true struggle’ or are 
you are fighting in the ‘wrong battlefield’? All in all, a post-neutrality and 
post-secular public sociology is intriguing and inviting such questions as 
the subject of negotiations in the public sphere not a mere discussion 
about passive co-existence, cultural absorption of the minorities and 
tolerance of the others. It seems that Burwoy also makes the same point. 
The only inconsistent part of his thesis, from this perspective, is the 
insistence on a certain battlefield which, for him, is ‘defending humanity 
and civil society’ against the tyranny of the market. Instead, I suggest that 
public sociology can work as a frame of debate about the priority of each 
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battlefield. Otherwise, it can be easily turned into a target for the criticism 
of those who do not share the interest in Burawoy’s preferred struggle.  
6. Conclusion 
To the extent that sociologists are willing to challenge the 
subtraction stories and the underlying assumed neutrality, they will make 
a free space for creativity which is the result of practice. In this chapter, I 
have argued that we can consistently define post-secularism as a form of 
challenging the conception of the secular as the neutral. This critical 
process, is not in any way, a return to the pre-modern or pre-secular. 
Indeed, and by contrast, it is a progressive movement of building on 
former achievements and, at the same time, it goes beyond the formerly 
fabricated borders. If there is no neutrality, a post-secular public sociology 
would develop around the ideal of the authenticity of struggle. Struggles 
from this point of view are a way of co-practice and making new identities 
based on the new shared collective memories of individuals who have 
diverging interests in society.  
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Conclusion 
 
Below, I will conclude the thesis in four sections. In the first 
section, I will summarise the major claims and insights of the thesis. The 
second section is dedicated to one of the main theoretical theme of the 
thesis: criticising the modernity versus religion dichotomy. The third 
section is about the future of both pilgrim and tourist atheisms. Finally, the 
last section puts forward some ideas about further studies which can be 
conducted as a result of my thesis. 
*** 
1. A précis of the entire argument of the thesis 
During the Enlightenment Goethe’s Prometheus drama fragment 
was associated with a series of debates about pantheism. He 
occasionally mentioned his sympathy with the old mysterious character of 
Prometheus in terms of having a poetic inspiration which “he thought was 
his ‘very own possession’” (Nicholls, 2015: p. 164). Thus, he rewrote the 
drama, re-created the mythical character and amended the story to fit into 
the discussions of his time. Goethe, who defined himself as an aesthetic 
polytheist, used to believe that having a poetic inspiration and being a 
writer in a Christian culture “meant to be a god in opposition to God” 
(Nicholls, 2015: p. 165—ital. Original). God of Christianity is creating 
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through the word. Thus man is godlike to the extent that he possesses 
the poetic power of creation.  
One can define God’s creative power in non-linguistic ways as 
well. Mimicking God can mean seeing the future as a dynamic horizon of 
new possibilities; that is a future that can be shaped by our powers. Does 
this mean that we know everything from the outset? Or is there any a 
priori knowledge which will let us be sure about the consequences of our 
actions? It does not seem that empirical science, philosophy or religion, 
are able to prepare us with those principles. The plurality of their truth-
claims, paradoxically, is strong evidence of their failure to do so.  
A pragmatist argument, with which I am sympathetic, would be that 
we learn from our previous actions and experiences. This does not mean 
that we will learn a set of universally valid principles that will act as guide 
to future experiments; hence we are not able to accumulate our 
knowledge to make further progress in the conditions of our existence. 
Instead, the result of our former experiences would be some hints about 
our future actions.  
Take the case of modern world crises such as global warming, that 
is, climate change and air pollution which are human-made and the 
results of our former actions. These are unprecedented crises because 
modern man’s incomparable power over the manipulation of nature is 
unprecedented in human history. Some of the forerunners of science and 
technology were worried about the unintended consequences of ‘playing 
God’. But in general there was not enough knowledge of the extent of the 
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disastrous results to come. Still, as a result of experiencing these crises 
we cannot claim that we have discovered some new laws that will direct 
our future actions to a safer path. We can only claim that we have gained 
some ideas about handling climate change; for example, to appeal for 
bold international co-operation, the reduction of the emission of 
greenhouse gases, and investing in renewable energy sources. These 
are nothing but a few policies to cope with the existing crises. So, what 
else do we learn from the crises?  
However these crises always seem to fail to teach us some truths 
about the world, they are nevertheless, wake-up calls for us to be trained 
and to prepare ourselves for more crises to come. Sloterdijk’s Nitzscheian 
invitation is to co-train, co-practice and co-work in the face of crisis 
(Sloterdijk, 2013). The resolution cannot be found in some objective 
knowledge but in trained and empowered individuals and crowds who are 
ready to deal with what Blumenberg called the ‘absolutism of reality’ 
which is the bitterness that we feel when we cannot control the conditions 
of our existence (Blumenberg, 1985: p. 3-16). Therefore, crises are calls 
for training.  
Unger seeks to radicalise this demand by encouraging 
experimentalism. Accordingly, while we can neither gain some sort of 
universal truth, and nor are we protected from the crises, there is still the 
option open to us of more experiments and more practices (Unger, 2007). 
We should keep playing God, by ‘capturing the imagination of alternative’. 
The idea of letting the images of the future change the present is the core 
of Unger’s suggestion. From this point of view, not only should we be 
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prepared for crises but we should also actively try new ways of expanding 
our powers. 
All these approaches fall into the category of Promethean self-creation. 
That is to say, Prometheanism is not only about the rejection of 
transcendence but it is also about mimicking transcendence through 
imagining new futures.   
In the first part of the thesis, I argued about the historical roots of 
Prometheanism in the nominalist theology of the late middle ages. In the 
last part, however, I have argued for the re-writing of Promethanism and 
that we should use its second aspect (self-creation) for our post-secular 
age. Post-secularism in this sense refers to consciousness about the 
historical formation of the secular as the neutral and also hesitation about 
its possibility. The idea is that the second aspect of Prometheanism will 
let us co-practice without assuming any shared truth-claim. New 
possibilities emerge out of this co-practice. Pragmatists who try to re-write 
Prometheanism for our age are doing what Goethe did in his own time; 
attempting to reorder and re-arrange the old and familiar stories so as to 
fit them into the current age.  
Challenging the faith versus reason dichotomy more than being an 
entertaining intellectual game is a politically necessary action. During the 
last two centuries, the dichotomy, with all of its variants such as ‘religion 
versus science’, ‘the sacred versus the secular’ and ‘church versus state’, 
was the cornerstone of both religious and secular violent ideologies. The 
ideological followers of each side of the dichotomy, by making 
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stereotypical and simplistic conceptions of both faith and reason, have 
demonised the followers of the other side. First, religious fundamentalist 
movements presuppose the inherent secularity of scientific theories. 
Thus, they look at those theories with suspicion. The recent tragicomic 
example of these suspicious views is the case of Catherine and Herbert 
Schaible, the American Pentecostalist parents who believe in faith-
healing. They refused any sort of modern medicine for their family’s 
physical illnesses because they believed that the Son of God shed blood 
to heal humankind and no modern medicine that is made by human 
reason can replace it. No wonder that this dogma caused the death of 
two of their young children from an illness which could have been cured 
with a few pills (Dockterman, 2014). Second, the New Atheists, for 
instance, demonise the followers of the religion side of the dichotomy by 
attributing ignorance and violence to all of the believers. For instance, 
Dawkins in August 2013 made a controversial comment on his Twitter 
account. He wrote: “All the world's Muslims have fewer Nobel Prizes than 
Trinity College, Cambridge.” Many activists criticised this Islamophobic 
assertion. One blogger humorously retorted: “Trinity Cambridge has 
presumably also produced more Soviet-supporting traitors to the UK 
than Islam.” In defence Dawkins responded that what he said was just an 
‘intriguing fact’ (Meikle, 2013). To show the Dawkins fallacy, one can 
simply rewrite that ‘fact’ by replacing Muslims with Chinese people. While 
there are more than one billion Chinese people on earth, few of them (in 
comparison with scholars at the University of Cambridge) have received a 
Nobel Prize. Can we attribute their scientific failure to their nationality, 
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race or religious beliefs? We apparently consider the second assertion 
fallacious, racist and heinous. In fact, the lack of scientific progress in 
each community is related to many historical, economic and social factors 
which cannot be reduced merely to the official religion of that community. 
The New Atheists by such simplistic assertions only inflame anti-Muslim 
sentiment in the West, which nowadays resonates with the anti-
immigration policies of the governments after the Great Recession. 
One way of approaching the increasing tension between the two 
sides of the faith/reason dichotomy is to choose a politically pacifistic 
position which promotes pluralism, mutual tolerance and peace among 
both sides. But the more drastic and intellectually challenging practice, 
which I have chosen in this thesis, is to show the historical and theoretical 
misreadings which triggered those simplistic interpretations on both sides 
of the dichotomy. 
Arguing that reason and faith could not be and have never actually 
been completely separated from each other, this thesis adopted the 
strategy of unearthing and revealing the ‘epistemological unconscious’ – 
Matthew Engelke’s helpful term – of modern atheisms. It has been 
illustrated that the myth of warfare between science and religion is a 
foundational myth for the New Atheists, as today’s most famous 
representatives of pilgrim atheism. The New Atheists heavily rely on 
Darwinism to reject religion which they consider to be nothing more than 
‘superstition’. But their very epistemological notions of science as an 
objective knowledge, the scientist as the person who attains that God-like 
knowledge, and technology which manipulates and controls nature, are 
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dependent on the late Middle Ages Christian conception of man as a 
cognitively privileged animal who has been created in the image of God. 
This epistemological unconscious is not only historically important but 
also essential for modern day science and technology. As argued in part 
two of the thesis, the neo-Darwinian conception of humankind – as yet 
another animal species which might become extinct like its other 
counterpart species – cannot form an appropriate background ideology 
for science. This is because scientific progress needs human beings who 
can take enormous risks, which in itself depends on a notion of man who 
is not limited to the animal side of its being. But the New Atheists through 
the myth of warfare constructed a historical narrative which is based on 
the idea of the radical break between theology and modernity. They 
believe that modernity was an ‘absolute beginning’ – as Hans 
Blumenberg called it – of a new type of human being who is aware of his 
animality. For New Atheists, that was an end-point to all the delusions 
and the irrational beliefs concerning our God-like nature. I demonstrated 
that this theory was founded on a misreading of the history of science. I 
also argued that theology remained alive in disguise.  
The radical break idea of the New Atheists stands against the 
tourist atheists’ continuity conception of the relationship between theology 
and modernity. Tourist atheists’ idea of using religious sentiment, insight 
and wisdom for an atheistic blissful life is founded on their implicit 
rejection of the reason versus faith dichotomy. They go beyond that 
dichotomy without demonising the religious believers and quite contrarily 
attribute some wisdom to religion. Their clever strategy is actively to claim 
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those wisdoms and occupy the religious concepts, ideas and even rituals. 
In other words, tourist atheists would argue that if religions are not true, 
they have never been true. So, why do we need to bother showing their 
falsity? Conversely, atheists need to see religions as games which were 
started by our ancestors. There were reasons for making such games 
and there is no good evidence which shows that we will benefit from the 
total abandonment of those games. I showed that the touristic strategy, 
which might change the face of atheism in the following decades, is 
founded on still another interpretation of the Christian imago dei doctrine 
which defines man as a God-like creature, not in objective knowledge, but 
in its very subjective individuality. Thus, the tourist is an individual who 
quests not for control over nature, but for self-fulfilment. For this goal, 
tourists do not recognise any sacred territory which cannot be occupied – 
even the territories of religions. 
Moreover, it is reasonable to say that the occupation and 
reoccupation of past paradigms has always been a successful way of 
making revolutionary changes in history. For instance, the first Christians 
of the beginning of the Middle Ages occupied pagan concepts, ideas and 
rituals. The act of occupation showed itself specifically in the works of 
Saint Augustine regarding the Hellenistic question of the idea of the old 
cosmos (Blumenberg, 1983: pp. 131-133). Furthermore, the Muslim 
philosophers of the ninth and tenth centuries did the same thing with the 
Ancient Greek philosophies which were translated into Arabic. They 
occupied and redefined the pagan Greek philosophical heritage to build 
their own theistic philosophies. For instance, Ibn-Sina redefined the 
340 
 
Aristotelian idea of an unmoved mover (primum movens) in a totally new 
way and turned it into an argument for the existence of the unique God of 
Islam (Goodman, 1992: p. 75). His project was successful to the point 
that his Christian counterparts such as Aquinas and Scotus, a few 
centuries after Ibn-Sina, used his argument for the existence of God as 
the basis of their own theistic philosophical approaches (Aquinas, 1975). 
We can even say that the Christian philosophers of the Middle Ages 
occupied those particular concepts and arguments. Likewise, it was 
claimed that scholasticism per se was a movement in Christendom 
designed for the occupation of both Greek and Islamic philosophical 
heritages (MacCulloch, 2009: pp. 396-415). Finally, I have illustrated that 
the pioneering figures of both the Enlightenment and the scientific 
revolution also occupied Christian concepts and ideas. This is the lesson 
that we can learn from a generation of scholars: Carl Schmitt (1985), Karl 
Löwith (1949), Amos Funkenstein (1986), John Milbank (2006), Michael 
Allen Gillespie (2008) and Steve Fuller (2011). My work also contributes 
to this literature.  
2. Models of relationships between religion and modernity 
I started this thesis with the goal of challenging the platitude in 
sociology textbooks that religion is opposed to modernity. To conclude 
the discussions regarding that platitude I need to suggest a new typology 
of models of seeing the relationship between religion and modernity. All in 
all, we can recognise three general models, two of which are well known 
to researchers in the field of sociology of modernity and another which is 
increasingly gaining attention from scholars. The first conception is what I 
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called the radical break conception which has many followers among 
religious and secular ideologists. It also had many supporters among 
sociologists until recently – especially among the leftist-Marxist traditions 
of social theory. The other conception is what I called the idea of the 
continuity between religion and modernity which has more followers 
among scholars in the fields of science studies and theology. Yet another 
conception of the religion/modernity relationship which is still popular 
among sociologists is the Weberian sociological point of view in his The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930). The Weberian 
conception is halfway between the two former conceptions and I call it the 
connectivity conception. Weber observed that we live a shallow, everyday 
life because money and economic acquisition have turned into an end in 
themselves (Weber, 2001: p. 18), restless activity without seeking any 
meaning to underpin it has become prevalent (Weber, 2001: p. 32), and 
man now exists for the sake of business not vice versa (Weber, 2001: p. 
32). As Weber famously suggested, these malaise are the results of the 
capitalistic ethos – systematic, methodic and regular work which is not 
limited to any time or place (Weber, 2001: p. 107). Furthermore, the 
capitalistic ethos is the unintended result of the Calvinistic mode of 
approaching the world. Specifically, the idea of work-in-calling (Beruf), 
Weber believed, played a central role. That idea means that one can 
overcome the existential anxiety about his own state of salvation by 
working methodically to achieve worldly success which is itself the sign of 
God’s grace (Weber, 2001). Thus, Weber could see some sociological 
connections between those theological roots and the final outcome of the 
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process which is the rationalisation of the life-world (Lebenswelt). Yet still 
he failed to answer one question about the fate of religion in the modern 
world; Weber believed that the religious roots of the capitalistic ethos 
“died out slowly” and gave way to the “utilitarian worldliness” (Weber, 
2001: p. 119). But he did not seem to care about answering the following 
question: did the religious roots of modernity disappear or dissolve into 
modernity? Nevertheless, the continuity conception of the relationship 
between religion and modernity shows us that those roots have never 
vanished. There are not only historical connections between the modern 
and the pre-modern but the pre-modern continually shapes the modern – 
it is more precise to say that they are interwoven with each other. Indeed, 
the continuity conception completes the Weberian line of the argument. 
No wonder that Löwith, one of the founders of the continuity conception, 
was Weber’s student in Germany; later, Löwith wrote a famous textbook 
about his teacher (see: Löwith, 1993). 
To conclude, the continuity conception of the relationship between 
religion and modernity does not start from the ideological notion of a 
‘conjectural leap’ from the Middle Ages to a secular age, and it goes 
further than discerning some historical-sociological connections between 
the two. Instead, it presupposes that religion and modernity are 
historically and structurally interwoven with each other. Such a 
conception gives rise to a number of sociological questions about the 
enduring theological structures in today’s society and how we can 
contribute to their dynamism in the future. Thus, I believe that the 
continuity conception is more sociologically intriguing in character. 
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Moreover, we must hesitate about the analytical productivity of both the 
absolute rejection of the role of religion in modern times (the radical break 
conception) and the partial acceptance of its role (the connectivity 
conception); rather, the continuity conception of the relationship between 
the past and the present is more academically insightful for researchers 
in the field of the sociology of modernity. 
3. The Future of Atheism 
Another subject that I need to address is the future of modern 
atheisms. After de Botton declared his plan to establish an atheist temple 
in London, the idea was picked up by a comedic duo, Sanderson Jones 
and Pippa Evans. They held their first atheist Sunday gathering in an old 
abandoned Church in Bath in January 2013 with a few attendants. After a 
while it went viral and now there are 28 of these assemblies in the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Australia. On their website, Jones and 
Evans estimate that there will be 100 such assemblies around the world 
by the end of 2014 (Jones and Evans, 2014). The idea is to provide a 
gathering for atheists in a church-like building to listen to entertaining 
music, to sing together, to hear short lectures about happiness in life, and 
probably to engage in a few minutes of relaxation. So, in this way they try 
to mimic the Christian Sunday services but without any type of organised 
system of belief. We might wonder if this is a serious, growing movement 
or just a transient bourgeois pastime. I think the second idea is more 
probable because it does not seem that there can be a unique function 
for such atheist temples which is not already covered by other secular 
institutions such as universities, NGOs, museums and art centres. 
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Nevertheless, tourist atheism has a lot more to accomplish than these 
fancy social gatherings in the near future. The most significant thing that 
these gatherings can do is to make an intellectual movement of rethinking 
religion which is not exclusive to the academic ivory towers and engages 
with society. The most famous tourist atheists are also popular figures 
such as de Botton or ‘philosopher-celebrities’ such as Žižek who are 
capable of drawing public attention to issues regarding religion in today’s 
society. Their interpretation of religion is a lot more complex than that of 
their fellow New Atheists and more diverse in terms of approving and 
rejecting different items in the ‘buffet of religion’. Thus, their method of 
approaching religious faiths helps religion to remain one of the most 
vibrant topics in public debate. Their creative ways of approaching 
religion might be more interesting to the younger generations in 
comparison to the militant atheism of the New Atheists. Therefore, it is 
highly likely that the tourist atheists will be the new representatives of 
modern atheism in a few years. 
However, New Atheism still has a commanding lead in the modern 
atheistic discourses. Disregarding the validity of their arguments, they 
have – in my terms – occupied the science and technology discourse. 
And we know that science and technology will remain relevant for a long, 
unknown future. Thus, until they rely on science and technology to 
legitimise their own intellectual positions, they will remain more or less 
socially attractive to many audiences. The only alternative can be another 
movement which can reoccupy their scientific rhetoric. Here the idea of 
reclaiming reason comes on the scene, about which I wrote in the last 
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chapter. A post-secular movement can reclaim science, technology and 
human reason, which is the motor-engine of both by referring to the 
relevance of religious structures which are still shaping modern science.  
4. Future research 
As a result of my study, further studies might well be conducted, 
first about the sociology of atheism, which is a new project in the field of 
religious studies (LeDrew, 2013), and second about the theological roots 
of modernity.  
1. For a long time many sociologists defined atheism negatively as 
the lack of belief in religion. Thus, studies on atheism were included in the 
field of the sociology of religion. I believe that this is totally misleading. In 
fact, atheism is not a ‘non-belief’; rather, it is a combination of not-
religious, anti-religious and sometimes scientistic or humanist beliefs 
(which as I have shown are unconsciously utilising theological structures). 
That is to say, since atheist doctrines state something positive about the 
world, they unavoidably turn into belief systems. People make their own 
identities (along with social organisations) around the principles of those 
atheistic systems of belief. So we need to consider atheism as a unique 
sociological phenomenon, different aspects of which needs to be studied, 
such as its relationship with religion, its public presence and its 
organisations. 
Stephen LeDrew (2012 and 2013) started the project on the 
sociology of atheism but the main problem with his work is the 
incompetent and old typology of scientific versus humanist atheisms. The 
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point is that no atheist figure can completely be placed into one of these 
categories – neither historical figures such as Feuerbach nor today’s 
figures such as Sloterdijk. To solve this problem, I chose a more abstract 
level to divide between the different types of atheisms. As I illustrated in 
chapter two of the thesis, the pilgrim atheism versus tourist atheism 
typology is founded on the atheist’s recognition of the rigidity of the 
division between true and false. While pilgrim atheists believe in a clear 
border between true (e.g. science) and false (e.g. religion), tourist 
atheists deconstruct those dichotomies. Concomitantly, while pilgrim 
atheists are concerned with objective knowledge, tourist atheists focus on 
subjective fulfilment. This division is an up-to-date typology which can 
become the basis for further studies on atheism. Undoubtedly, a more 
detailed typology which considers the subdivisions of these two types will 
be helpful. For instance, I put both scientific and humanist atheisms under 
the category of pilgrim atheism, but still one can place many figures 
alongside Dawkins in the subcategory of scientific atheism who are not 
biologists so do not talk about Darwinism that much (e.g. Stephen 
Hawking). Detailed subcategories of the typology will help us gain a 
clearer map of today’s atheisms.  
2. Moreover, the deeper insight of this research is that we can 
unearth the theological foundations of the very modern phenomenon that 
claims inherent, absolute secularity. Thus, this thesis can also be seen as 
an invitation to further historical-sociological studies about the theological 
roots of modernity. In the past five decades, the most insightful studies in 
this field have been about the constitutive role of the Middle Ages 
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nominalist movement regarding modernity. Recently, an increasing 
number of studies have been completed concerning the central figure of 
nominalism, John Duns Scotus (cf. Williams, 2003). One point that I think 
is both relevant to the sociology of atheism and also to general 
sociological studies is about the nominalist foundations of individualism. 
Hitherto many sociologists have written about the Protestant roots of 
individualism, but these theories are more sensible in the context of the 
connections between Protestantism and nominalist figures of the 
fourteenth century. Sociologists thus need to complete the Weberian 
project by changing the focus of their researches from, say, Luther and 
Calvin to their teachers, Ockham and Scotus. These nominalist figures for 
the first time put human beings and God on one and the same spectrum 
and attributed God-like powers to human beings. Accordingly, they have 
contributed to the constitution of the modern individual who is a self-
sufficient sovereign like God. This line of argument can be followed in 
other studies about the theological foundations of modern subjectivity and 
individualism. 
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